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Abstract
This thesis examined whether individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders are sensitive to traits. The ability of individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders to infer traits from descriptions of behaviour was investigated by asking
participants to read trait implying sentences and then to chose one of two words
that best related to the sentence. In experiment 1, individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders performed similarly to matched controls in being faster at
choosing the trait in comparison to the semantic associate of one of the words in
the sentence. The results from experiments 1 and 2 provided converging evidence
in suggesting that inferring traits from textual descriptions of behaviour occurs
with relatively little effort. The results of experiment 3 suggested that making trait
inferences took priority over inferring actions or making semantic connections
between words. Experiment 4 investigated whether individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders associated the inferred trait with the person carrying out the
behaviour (actor). Participants were presented with a pair of faces and sentences
followed by the same pair of faces being presented with a single word.
Participants had to choose which actor is best described by the word. The results
provided evidence that participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders were able to
associate inferred traits with the actor easily, even when the actor was represented
by his face. The experiments described in this thesis provide evidence for the
possibility of trait inference as relating to behaviour being a spared socio-
cognitive function in autism.
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General Background to Autism
1.1 Introduction
One of the most famous folklore characters in Kerala, a southern state of
India, is Naranath Branthan (Naranath, the lunatic). Naranath supposedly spent
his days pushing huge rocks up a steep hill only to send them rolling down from
the top. He would laugh, jump and clap his hands in glee as he watched the rock
tumble down. This he would repeat over and over again; hence being called a
lunatic by some. Others, though, gave philosophical interpretations to this ritual
and thought him to be a saint. Naranath supposedly lived about 1500 years ago. If
he had been born in this century he quite possibly may have been diagnosed with
autism. History has stood witness for many lives who probably were autistic.
Brother Juniper, one of the first companions of Saint Francis who lived in twelfth
century France, astonished everyone by his guileless and unpretentious behaviour
and the descriptions of the 'Blessed fools of ancient Russia' match closely to how
autism is portrayed in modem times (Frith, 2003). Houston and Frith (2000)
systematically corroborated evidence archived in the Edinburgh court record
dating from 1745 to arrive at a retrospective clinical diagnosis of autism for Hugh
Blair. Blair's younger brother wanted the court to declare Blair mentally
incapable with the intention of disinheriting him and Frith's diagnosis was based
on the testimonials provided by friends and neighbours at the hearing. But, it was
many years later, in 1943, that autism was clinically described for the first time by
Leo Kanner as a disorder with symptomatology that clearly differentiated it from
childhood schizophrenia and other psychoses. The term autism was coined by
Eugen Bleuler for the active withdrawal from relationships seen in people with
Schizophrenia and Kanner used this term to portray what he considered to be the
essence of autism, "inability to relate themselves in the ordinary way to people
and situations from the beginning of life".
Social impairment sits at the core of this syndrome which manifests a
potpourri of other characteristics as well. A large amount of research has been
carried out in an attempt to explain the social ineptness seen in individuals with
autism, some of whom are otherwise highly successful. But the puzzle is yet to be
solved. In order to better understand the enigma we must try and explain not only
how individuals with autism are disabled by their social impairment but also how
a few individuals with autism cope despite the impairment.
This thesis begins with a brief introduction to autism as we understand it
today (Chapter One). Chapter Two discusses making inferences about others'
personality traits as a socio-cognitive process that has not been investigated in
individuals with autism. Arguments for and against expecting individuals with
autism to infer traits from descriptions of behaviour are discussed concluding with
the paradigm developed to investigate this ability. Chapter Three to Chapter Six
describe the experiments carried out. The final chapter provides a summary of the
experiments carried out, elaborates on the conclusions and discusses possible
future research on the role played by traits in social cognition in autism.
1.2 What is autism?
Autism is a neuro-developmental disorder with an unknown aetiology and
hence diagnosis is based on symptoms manifested behaviourally. Many
epidemiological studies of autism have been carried out since the first one by
Victor Lotter in 1966, who reported the prevalence rate to be 4.5/10,000. Recent
studies suggest a much higher incidence of autism. In one of the latest studies, the
incidence rate for autism was reported to be 38.9 per 10,000 children in the south
Thames 9-10 year old population (Baird et aI., 2006). All epidemiological studies
report a higher incidence in males than females, with a ratio of 4:1 on average
(DSM-IV-TR, 2004).
1.2.1 Diagnosing autism
The first diagnostic criterion for autism was developed by Eisenberg and
Kanner (1957). They set the two pathognomic features as extreme aloneness and a
desire for preservation of sameness, both of which must be present within the first
two years of life. The other features described by Kanner in the seminal writing
on autism (delayed or deviant language development and a fascination for objects
as opposed to people) were considered to be derivatives of these two core
characteristics. Rutter (1978) included delayed and deviant language development
as the third behavioural criterion and increased the age by which the features must
be manifested from 24 months, as suggested by Eisenberg and Kanner (1957), to
30 months.
Autism was included as a distinct disorder for the first time in an official
diagnostic system in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
third edition (DSM-III), published by the American Psychological Association in
1980. DSM-III used the label infantile autism which was changed in the revised
version, DSM-III-R (1987), to autistic disorder in recognition of the fact that
children with autism grow up to become autistic adults. DSM-lII-R underwent
two further revisions with the latest being DSM-IV-text revision (DSM-IV-TR.
2004).
The International Classification of Diseases (lCD) is the diagnostic system
published by the World Health Organisation. Childhood autism was mentioned in
the ICD for the first time as a disorder different from childhood schizophrenia in
the tenth and latest edition, published in 1994. ICD 9 (1977) included autism but
under the category 'Psychosis with origins in childhood'. The criteria for autism
are identical in ICD-I0 and DSM-IV-TR (see Appendix A), although they use
different labels. ICD-I0 uses the label 'childhood autism' and DSM-IV-TR uses
the label 'autistic disorder'.
To arrive at a diagnosis, a detailed case history is taken, behavioural
observations are made and neuro-psychological tests are administered. The
information obtained from them is used to determine if the individual shows
qualitative impairments with respect to his or her developmental age in the areas
of social interaction and communication, and displays restricted range of interests
and activities and whether these impairments were present before the age of three
years. In addition, tools developed specifically for the purpose of identifying
autism, including the Autism Diagnostic Interview-R (ADI-R, Le Couteur. Lord,
& Rutter, 1994) and the Developmental, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview
(3Di, Skuse et al., 2004), to name a few, help to standardise the diagnostic
procedure.
1.2.2 Clinical picture of autism
No two individuals with autism show identical clinical pictures. In fact as
a child with autism develops, s/he may show different symptoms or variations in
the intensity with which a particular symptom was manifested. In other words,
being diagnosed as having autism means having a definite impairment in the three
core areas of social interaction, communication and repertoire of interests and
activities; but how the impairment is manifested behaviourally may vary between
individuals as well as within the same individual overtime. The impairments,
however, must be present before 3 years of age.
Qualitative impairment in social interaction
In the early years difficulties in social interaction are evident (though not
necessarily recognised as a symptom at the time) in failure to cuddle, failure to
raise hands in anticipation of being picked up, lack of imitation of speech and
gestures, not finding enjoyment in reciprocal games like peek-a-boo and a deficit
in joint attention (the phenomena when two people co-ordinate their attention to
the same object or event). Those with autism may be indifferent to the presence or
absence of their parents. They may approach strangers with the same uninhibited
friendliness as they do with family and friends. But, some children with autism
may cling to their parents and show extreme distress at separation. Many children
with autism may not spontaneously seek to share enjoyment, interest or
achievement. Neither do they seek comfort from parents or significant others
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when in distress. Those with autism may not develop mental age appropriate peer
relations and may prefer solitary activities, showing relatively more interest in
objects than people. As they grow, some may become interested in making friends
but may not understand even basic conventions of social interaction, which their
peers pick up with ease. People with autism may show difficulty initiating and
maintaining conversation, selecting an appropriate topic, taking turns or keeping
the conversation going. They may not be able to regulate social interactions based
on information from non-verbal social cues like eye contact, facial expressions,
body postures and gestures.
Wing and Gould (1979) identified three types of social interactions in
children with autism. The aloof child is withdrawn, indifferent or upset by social
overtures. The passive child accepts social interactions without a fight but not
with any keenness or interest. The active but odd child likes to interact with others
but the interaction is inappropriate, for example cuddling a stranger. A child may
show all three types of interactions in different situations and the predominant
type of interaction may change with age.
Qualitative impairment in communication
While the initial deficit in social interaction is often disregarded by parents
as streaks of independence, contentment and self sufficiency, delay in language is
often the symptom which rings definite alarm bells and leads the parents to seek
professional advice.
Spoken language is either delayed or deviant and in many COmpletely
absent. Retrospectively parents often report that babbling was absent. Both non-
verbal and verbal skills are affected in autism. Autistic children often do not use
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communicative gestures (for example, waving goodbye and nodding yes) or
expressive gestures (for example, shrugging shoulder). They may not view the
parent as a person who could fulfil their desires but use their parents' hand as a
tooI to get a desired 0 bject.
Deviations are observed in the form of immediate and delayed echolalia
(parrot-like repetition of speech), pronominal reversal (using'!' instead of 'you'
and vice versa), neologisms, idiosyncratic use of words and literal understanding
of language resulting in difficulty with understanding words having two
meanings, puns, sarcasm and humour. The speech quality may be pedantic and
uncolloquial. Prosody may be impaired. Difficulty with semantic and syntactic
aspects of communication may vary in degree but pragmatic difficulty, using
language for the purpose of communication, is universal in autism (Frith, 2003).
Markedly restricted repertoire of activities and interests
Individuals with autism may show interests that are abnormal either in
intensity or focus, for example, an all pervading interest in bus timetables. They
may show persistent fascination for ordinary objects or parts of objects like keys
or buttons, or movements like the spinning of the washing machine. Those with
autism may insist on a set routine for carrying out activities and strongly resist
change; the same route may have to be taken to the supermarket every time, or
Lego will be arranged in the same sequence and pattern every time. Often the
route, sequence and pattern may be the one shown to the child the very first time.
Change may lead to extreme distress in some individuals with autism. Stereotyped
body movements (hand flapping and rocking) may be present.
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Play may be stereotyped and repetitive, lacking in imagination. Children
with autism may line up blocks or spin the wheels of a toy car rather than play
constructively or symbolically with them. They may not show developmental age
appropriate co-operative play with other children.
Associated features
A few features which are observed frequently in autism are not important
for diagnosis per se, but help increase our understanding of the disorder. One of
the features which led researchers to suspect a biological origin for autism is an
increased frequency of seizures with the risk increasing at puberty (Tuchman &
Rapin, 2002). Approximately seventy percent of children with autism have mental
retardation (Fombonne, 2003). In intelligence tests most individuals with autism
obtain a higher performance Intelligence Quotient (lQ) than verbal IQ. Some
people with autism demonstrate islets of ability like hyperlexia, drawing skill or
music ability that is well above what is expected based on their intellectual ability.
Abnormal responses to sensory stimuli may be present in some children and
adults with autism. Any of the sensory modalities, sound, vision, touch, smell or
taste, may be affected. Temper tantrums, self injurious behaviour (like biting,
pinching) and aggression towards others are sometimes exhibited by individuals
with autism.
1.2.3 Current issues relating to diagnosis: Autism as a spectrum of disorders
Lorna Wing (1981) reported a disorder similar to Kanner's autism which
she referred to as Asperger's Syndrome after the person who first described it.
Hans Asperger's paper was published in 1944, just a year after Kanner's
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influential article on autism. Though at first glance it is the similarities between
the two descriptions which stand out (higher incidence in males than females,
social isolation, impaired non-verbal communication and so forth), subtle
differences are present between Asperger's Syndrome and Kanner's autism. The
current classification systems (DSM-IV-TR and ICD-IO) classify autistic disorder
and Asperger's Syndrome separately under the category of Pervasive
Developmental Disorders (PDD). Asperger's Syndrome is differentially
diagnosed from autistic disorder in terms of cognitive and language skills.
Individuals with Asperger's Syndrome do not show clinically significant delay in
cognitive development, self help skills or adaptive behaviour. Early language
development occurs at the normal pace. The nature of social impairment is
different in autistic disorder and Asperger's Syndrome. Individuals with
Asperger's Syndrome may not be indifferent to social approaches and in fact are
often described as 'chatty'. However, their social interaction is characterised as
odd due to failure to acknowledge conventional rules of conversation (like tum
taking), limited understanding of non verbal cues and inadequate self monitoring
capacity. Restricted repertoire of interests and activities are observed in both
autism and Asperger's Syndrome. In autism this is characterised by fascination
for objects, while in Asperger's Syndrome it is manifested in the form of the
individual devoting an inordinate amount of time and energy gathering
information about subjects that are often of little practical use (for example, actors
and names and year of production of their movies).
Epidemiological studies on Asperger's Syndrome are few. Fombonne
(2003) reported that the incidence of Asperger' s Syndrome is lower than autism.
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approximately 2.5/10,000. The gender ratio is found to increase with level of
functioning. In the average intelligence group, Fombonne (2003) reported, the
ratio to be 5.75:1 which decreased to 1.9:1 in the group with autism and moderate
to severe learning difficulty.
It is debated whether the two syndromes are distinct nosological categories
or whether Asperger's Syndrome is a milder, higher functioning variant of
classical Kanner's autism. Some authors argue against the use of the term
'Asperger's Syndrome' without empirical evidence based distinction (ef Ozonoff,
Rogers, & Pennington, 1991) and the term Higher Functioning Autism is often
used in preference by some. However, Ozonoff et al. (1991) found that it is
possible to distinguish between Asperger's Syndrome and Higher Functioning
Autism on neuropsychological measures. They found that participants with
Asperger's Syndrome had fewer autistic characteristics on the Childhood Autism
Rating Scale (CARS) and obtained a significantly higher verbal Intelligence
Quotient (lQ) than participants with Higher Functioning Autism. The discrepancy
between verbal and performance IQ found in the group with Higher Functioning
Autism was not found in the group with Asperger's Syndrome. The group with
Higher Functioning Autism showed deficits in Theory of Mind (discussed later)
and verbal memory which were not observed in the group with Asperger's
Syndrome.
The presence of other disorders characterised by social impairment,
deviant communication, presence of narrow interests and repetitive behaviour but
not fitting the diagnostic picture of classical autism has led to the use of the term
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Autism Spectrum Disorders includes Autistic
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disorder, Asperger' s syndrome, Rett' s disorder (a rare disorder occurring
exclusively in girls where autistic like symptoms develop after a period of normal
development), Childhood disintegrative disorder (another rare disorder where
there is regression in social and communication skills after a period of normal
development) and Pervasive Developmental Disorders, Not Otherwise Specified
(PDD-NOS, an umbrella term used when a child shows some but not all features
of any of the conditions listed under Autism Spectrum Disorders).
Many epidemiological studies report an increase in the prevalence rate
(total number of cases in the population divided by number of individuals in the
population) of Autism Spectrum Disorders. The increased awareness about autism
in the clinical set up along with the broadening of diagnostic criteria may be
partly responsible for this trend. Baird et al. (2006) reported the prevalence rate
for autistic disorder to be 38.9 cases per 10,000 in the south Thames 9-10 year old
population. This rate however increased to 116.1110,000 when the whole
spectrum was considered.
1.2.4 Theories of causation
Highly intelligent but emotionally and behaviourally cold parent as the
cause for autism was pondered by Kanner in his seminal work. However, he
concluded that the symptoms are present very early in life which suggests that
autism is an 'inborn autistic disturbance of affective contact'. The theory that
autism is the result of parental rejection, especially by the mother, came to be
known as the 'refrigerator mother hypothesis' and was propagated by Bruno
Bettleheim (1959). But, the hypothesis was rejected, though not soon enough for
some unfortunate parents, in favour of a biological explanation for autism thanks
to the work of Bernard Rimland (1964). Our understanding of autism has
progressed from the psychoanalytic explanation, and autism has now been
established as a neuro-developmental disorder presenting distinctive deficits in
cognition that are genetically influenced (Rutter, 2003).
Genetics of autism
The prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders among family members of
individuals with autism is found to be higher than the prevalence in the general
population, suggesting a high rate of heritability for autism. The prevalence of
Pervasive Developmental Disorder subtypes amongst siblings of probands with
autism was found to be seventy-eight percent for autism, six percent for
Asperger's syndrome, and sixteen percent for atypical autism in one study (cf
Szatmari, Jones, Zwaigenbaum, & MacLean, 1998). Bailey et al. (1995) reported
the concordance rate for autism to be sixty percent for monozygotic pairs and zero
for dizygotic pairs.
The fact that males are at a higher risk of Autism Spectrum Disorders than
females is suggestive of a genetic link, probably on the X chromosome (Skuse,
2003). However, identifying 'the gene' for Autism Spectrum Disorders has
proved to be far more complicated than initially thought (Bamby & Monaco,
2003) particularly in terms of replicating evidence for the many candidate genes
that have been identified in some studies (on chromosome 2, 7 and 14). This may
be due to the complex nature of Autism Spectrum Disorders. How autism
manifests in an individual varies dramatically in form and intensity. leading some
researchers to suggest that multiple genes may be involved in Autism Spectrum
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Disorders. Different sets of genes may be mutated in different individuals with
autism (McIntosh, 1998).
Neural basis of autism
Neuropathological and imaging studies have identified structural and
functional variations in the brains of individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders.
The most consistent structural abnormality reported is increased brain volume.
This increase in brain volume is not evident at birth, but is a result of abnormal
growth during infancy which slows down by adolescence (Courchesne et al.,
2001). The sudden increase in brain volume is speculated to be the result of
abnormality in the pruning process which normally occurs in infancy. During
pruning faulty connections are eliminated and the functioning of feedback control
system is optimized (Frith, 2003). Structural abnormality in other brain regions,
such as the amygdala and cerebellum, has also been implicated in Autism
Spectrum Disorders. However the research findings are not always consistent
(Frith, 2003).
Studying blood flow in the brains of individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders 'at rest' reveals persistent abnormal perfusion in certain brain regions
with consistent results found with respect to the medial temporal cortex in both
hemispheres (ef Hill & Frith, 2003).
Environmental factors in autism
The concordance rate for Autism Spectrum Disorders is not 100 percent
even in monozygotic twins and hence non-genetic and environmental factors must
also contribute to the development of autism. Environmental factors are seen as
the culprit by researchers and the general public who support the claim that the
increase in Autism Spectrum Disorders is real and not a result of increased
awareness or improved diagnostic procedure. Some of the environmental factors
considered are food allergy, particularly with respect to casein and gluten, gastric
inflammation, viral infections and autoimmune disorders. Environmental factors.
like mercury level in the environment, pre and perinatal complications, have also
been implicated in some studies tcf Rodier & Hyman, 1998).
Cognitive theories of autism
Explaining autism in terms of cognitive processes provides a vital
interface between brain and behaviour (Hill & Frith, 2003). The three major
cognitive theories of autism are the Theory of Mind hypothesis, the Weak Central
Coherence hypothesis and the Executive Dysfunction hypothesis. These theories
attempt to explain the behavioural symptoms exhibited by individuals with
Autism Spectrum Disorders in terms of how the brain processes information.
1.2.5 The Theory of Mind hypothesis
Premack and Woodruff (1978) defined Theory of Mind as the ability to
impute beliefs, desires, intentions and other mental states to self and to others.
Children's knowledge about states of mind increases rapidly with development.
Abilities that may be essential for learning about minds are observed in very
young babies. Early in the first year of life babies can differentiate between
people and objects and show preference for human faces, voices and movements
(Flavell, 1999). Over the first two years, children rapidly learn about
intentionality, desires and emotions. By 18 months they show a basic
understanding about how simple mental states like intention (Meltzoff, 1995) and
14
desire (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997) influence action. Between three and four
years of age children begin to understand more complex mental states like beliefs
and knowledge as 'representations' of reality (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983).
Eventually an implicit theory, where mental states form an interacting coherent
explanatory system for human action, develops. In other words, children progress
from being desire psychologists to being belief-desire psychologists. Having a
belief-desire psychology helps children to understand that people with the same
desire may act differently if their beliefs are different or that individuals may even
act contradictory to his desire because he holds a false belief (Wellman &
Woolley, 1990). Thus, knowledge about mental states is essential for social
interaction and communication as it helps us to understand and make predictions
about others' behaviour.
Theory of Mind deficit as an explanation for social and communication difficulty
in autism
Many of the social and communicative difficulties observed in individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorders could be explained in terms of a deficit in
Theory of Mind. Joint attention refers to the phenomena when two people co-
ordinate their attention to the same object or event. It involves more than mere
following of gaze or gesture and reflects an interest in what the other person
thinks feels or knows about the shared event. Joint attention requires,
differentiating between what is in one's own mind from what is in the others'
mind. While typically developing children show reliable evidence ofjoint
attention by 18 months, it occurs with much lower frequency in children with
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autism (Sigman, Mundy, Sherman, & Ungerer, 1986). Absence ofjoint attention
is often considered to be a sign of autism.
Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders struggle with regulating
social interaction. They are unable to comprehend non-verbal cues and even
simple social conventions. Non-verbal cues like facial expressions, body postures
and gestures are subtle expressions of 'what is in one's mind'. And, conventions
like choosing an appropriate topic for conversation and taking turns demand
appreciation of others' states of mind in terms of their interests and emotions.
Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders show delayed and/or deviant
language development. Language development depends on tracking a speaker's
intention by using cues from the 'speaker's direction of gaze' and differentiating
it from the 'listener's direction of gaze' (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin, & Crowson,
1997). Thus, children learn that the long, thin, colourful thing is a 'pencil' and not
the eraser lying near by because father was 'looking' specifically at it when he
'said' pencil. Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) found that children with autism used the
'listener's direction of gaze' and hence assumed that a novel word referred to the
object they themselves were looking at rather than the object the speaker was
looking at. The idiosyncratic use of words, which is common in autism, may be
the result of such errors. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from parental report suggests
this to be the case (Kanner, 1943). Making inferences of other's point of view
plays a vital role in understanding words like pronouns, which individuals with
Autism Spectrum Disorders find difficult. The clinical picture of autism is also
characterised by confusion with words that have multiple meanings. inability to
comprehend puns, humour and sarcasm. These special categories of language
16
require the listener to interpret the meaning 'behind the words'. The literal
understanding of language exhibited by individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders, thus, may be due to difficulty understanding the speaker's intention.
In summary, the Theory of Mind hypothesis explains the clinical features
of Autism Spectrum Disorders, particularly in the realm of social interaction and
communication, in terms of cognitive difficulty in imputing mental states.
Experimental studies on Theory of Mind in autism
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) suggested that children with autism
have difficulty imputing false belief. In.order to test this Baron-Cohen et al.
(1985) developed the 'Sally-Ann task' which was a shortened and simplified
version of the 'unexpected transfer' technique used by Wimmer and Pemer
(1983). Two puppets, Sally and Ann, were used to enact a scene. Sally has a
marble which she places in a basket. In Sally's absence, Ann removes the marble
from the basket and puts it in a box. The final scene shows Sally returning and
children were asked where she would look for her marble. Baron-Cohen et al.
(1985) administered this task to children with autism, children with Down's
syndrome and typically developing children. They found that all children passed
the reality (Where is the marble really?) and memory (Where was the marble in
the beginning?) questions, suggesting good comprehension of the story. With
respect to the belief question (Where will Sally look for the marble?), 86 percent
of the children with Down's syndrome and 85 percent of the typically developing
children passed, but 80 percent of the children with autism failed, even though
they had a higher mental age than the children with Down' s syndrome. They
pointed to where the marble really was rather than where Sally falsely believed
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the marble to be. Since the participants with Down's syndrome, who had a lower
verbal and non verbal mental age, were able to appreciate Sally's false belief the
authors concluded that individuals with autism have a deficit in representing
mental states of others which is independent of mental retardation.
Difficulty with attributing mental states was observed even when real-life-
like scenarios were used (Leslie & Frith, 1988; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam,
1989). Perner et al. (1989) used a 'deceptive-appearance paradigm'. Participants
were shown a 'Smarties' tube and asked about its contents. All answered
'Smarties' , and were surprised when the tube was opened to reveal a pencil
instead. After replacing the pencil participants were asked about what another
child, who was about to come in to be tested for the first time, would think was in
the box. Results indicated that a majority of the participants with autism (whose
mental age was well above 3 years) did not make a correct belief attribution. In
contrast, control children with specific language impairment attributed false belief
to the other child without difficulty. One might expect this task to be easier than
the 'Sally-Ann task' as participants can use their own recent experience with false
belief to make similar attributions to another person. However, children with
autism continued to be severely impaired in 'rnentalizing' even on this
comparatively easier task.
Since the ability to represent mental states is crucial for predicting others'
behaviour, impairments in social interaction observed in autism were suggested to
be due to lack of Theory of Mind.
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Is the difficulty with representation specific to mental concepts?
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1986) compared children with autism,
Down's syndrome and clinically normal children on a picture sequencing task.
The mental age (verbal and non-verbal) of the group with autism was higher than
the mental age (verbal and non-verbal) of the group with Down's syndrome and
the chronological age of the clinically normal group. The picture sequences
illustrated stories that were mechanical, behavioural or intentional in nature. The
mechanical stories depicted objects interacting or people and objects interacting
causally. Both the behavioural and intentional stories showed people involved in
interactive activities, but comprehending the former did not require an
understanding of mental states, whereas comprehending the latter did. See figure
1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Mechanical (a), behavioural (b) and intentional (c) picture
sequence used in Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1986).
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Participants were awarded points for correctly sequencing the cards.
Results indicated that the children with autism were far superior to the children
with Down's syndrome and as good as the typically developing children on
mechanical and behavioural stories respectively. However, on intentional stories
they were the worst performing group, scoring less than the group with Down's
syndrome who had a lower mental age. From the narration given by the children,
it was observed that all children used descriptive utterances for the behavioural
stories, but the typically developing children used comparatively more mental
state expressions. In the intentional stories, the clinically normal children and the
children with Down's syndrome used significantly more mental state utterances
than the children with autism. But, the children with autism used causal utterances
to a greater degree than the other two groups for the mechanical stories. The
authors concluded that while individuals with autism have a greater understanding
of physical interaction, they show specific impairment with regards to interactions
requiring an understanding of mental states.
Leslie and Thaiss (1992) compared children's performance on two tasks
requiring comprehending representation, one mental and the other non-mental.
In the false photograph (non-mental representation) task, a puppet (a horse) was
shown photographing another 'model' puppet (a cat) placed in location A.
Though puppets were used, an actual photograph was taken using a Polaroid
camera. After the photograph was placed face down on a table, the 'model' was
moved from location A to B. In the unexpected transfer task and false photograph
task, the respective belief and scene represented were rendered false as both were
out dated representation of reality. In another version of the false photograph task,
the model cat was replaced by a mouse puppet but the location remained the
same. The photograph is a non-mental representation of reality, comparable to the
mental representation in the deceptive appearance task. The participants, who
were not shown the photograph, were asked three questions similar to the ones
used in the false belief task: a memory question ('When Polly, the horse, took the
photograph, where was the cat sitting?' or 'Who was sitting on the toy-box when
the cat took the photograph?'); a belief question ('In the photograph where is the
cat sitting?' or 'In this photograph, who is sitting on the toy-box?') and a reality
question ('Where is the cat now?' or 'Who is sitting on the toy-box now?').
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Results showed that the typically developing participants performed similarly in
the false belief and false photograph tasks unlike the participants with autism,
who were significantly worse on the mental representation (false belief) tasks than
the non-mental representation (false photograph) tasks. The participants with
autism, in fact performed better than the typical participants on the false
photograph tasks. The authors concluded that individuals with autism do not show
a general impairment in handling representations, but have a specific difficulty
with mental representations.
Limitations and criticisms of the Theory of Mind hypothesis of autism
Baron-Cohen (1995) suggested that a cognitive mechanism or domain
specific module is dedicated to the understanding of others' mind. Children with
autism showed no difficulty sequencing behavioural and mechanical stories, but
their performance on intentional stories was poorer than children with Down's
syndrome who had a lower mental age (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986). In the false
photograph task children with autism showed superior performance to typical
controls though they were significantly worse on the false belief task (Leslie &
Thaiss, 1992).
Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi and Fomella-Ambrojo (2005) questioned the
specificity of the representational deficit demonstrated by the false photograph
task. They contended that the false belief task was more complex than the false
photo task in terms of the number of elements and episodes. Possibly, individuals
with autism find complex events, not mental states, difficult to interpret. The
same criticism holds for the picture sequences used by Baron-Cohen et al. (1986).
The mechanical and behavioural sequences were intrinsically easier than the
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intentional sequences (Zelazo, Jacques, Burack, & Frye, 2002). Bowler et al.
(2005) developed a mechanical analogue of the Sally-Ann task which they
suggested was a better control task of similar complexity but not requiring the
participants to infer mental states. The scenario was a model airport where planes
could land on either a blue or a yellow landing pad. The location of the plane was
signalled by a blue or yellow light, as appropriate, to an automatic, driverless train
which conveyed goods from the plane to the terminus. Once the children
understood the sequence of events, the test trial was presented. In the test trial, a
bird lands on a particular pad (say the blue one) before the plane. The plane is
then forced to land on the other (yellow) pad, but not before the blue (false) signal
was triggered by the bird. Participants were asked to predict to which pad the train
would go. Participants (children with autism, children with learning difficulty and
children developing typically) who passed the Sally-Ann task predicted that the
train would go to the signalled pad, where as children who failed the Sally-Ann
task predicted that the train would go to the pad on which the plane actually
landed. The authors concluded that the result is a reflection of difficulty
understanding complex events by individuals with autism of which mental states
may be one. Thus, there is no strong evidence for individuals with autism having
a specific deficit in representing mental states.
When Baron-Cohen et al.'s (1985) article was published it was argued that
autism is the result of a single core cognitive impairment, namely a lack of
Theory of Mind. However, the current view is that it is not so much a total deficit
in Theory of Mind, but a delay that is observed in autism. Happe (1995) reviewed
a large set of data on performance by children with autism and typically
developing children on the Sally-Ann task and the Smarties task. They reported
that the performance of typically developing children aged four years was
comparable to the performance of children with autism who had a mental age of
nine years and two months.
Though Theory of Mind hypothesis is one of the most influential theories
of autism, having impairment in Theory of Mind is not currently accepted as a
primary and sufficient explanation for autism. In order for a theory to provide a
sufficient explanation for autism it must, according to Rajendran and Mitchell
(2007), fulfil the conditions of universality and uniqueness. Uniqueness and
universality refer to whether the causal factor identified is observed only in
individuals with a diagnosis of autism and in all individuals with a diagnosis of
autism respectively.
In every 'mentalizing ability' study, there were a few participants with
autism who passed the test. Across studies, the percentage of children who pass
the Theory of Mind task varies from 15 percent to 60 percent (Happe, 1995).
Indeed, in some studies a majority of individuals with High Functioning Autism
and Asperger's Syndrome passed both first order (Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires,
1990) and second order (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff et a/., 1991) false belief tasks.
The explanation suggested by Frith, Morton and Leslie (1999) for some
individuals with autism being able to pass the Theory of Mind task is that unlike
typically developing children who solve the task intuitively, children with autism
use rules. Rules may help them pass simple structured tasks in the laboratory but
continue to show difficulty in real life scenarios. Indeed, tougher and presumably
more age appropriate Theory of Mind tasks were more sensitive and tapped
deficits which were not tapped by first order (Where does she think the marble
is?) and second order (Where does Mary think John thinks the van is?) Theory of
Mind tasks (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). Happe
(1994) developed stories where one character says something intended as a joke,
sarcasm, irony and other utterances which were not literally true. After hearing
each story, participants were asked to provide explanations for why the character
said something. Relatively able individuals with autism passed both the first and
second order false belief tasks, but many performed poorly on the stories task,
which presumably depicted more natural interactions. They often gave context
inappropriate reasons. However, a small subset of the participants with autism
performed well on this tougher and arguably more naturalistic task too. Thus, the
Theory of Mind hypothesis of autism fails to satisfy the condition of universality.
Another challenge to the Theory of Mind hypothesis of autism is that
failure on mentalizing tasks has been reported in children with other disability
who do not show features of autism. Woolfe, Want and Siegel (2002) used
thought pictures (see figure 1.2) that minimized receptive and expressive
language ability and found that late signing children (deaf children of hearing
parents who acquire sign language mainly outside the family) showed deficits in
Theory of Mind ability.
Figure 1.2: Though bubble paradigm used in Woolfe, Want and Siegel (2002).
Minter, Hobson and Bishop (1998) tested Theory of Mind ability in
congenitally blind children using tactile versions of the false belief tasks. In the
tactile version of the deceptive appearance task , children were presented with a
hot teapot and asked about it contents. A majority of the children answered either
tea or coffee. The contents were then poured into an empty cup to reveal that the
pot actually contained sand. After replacing the sand children were asked the
representational change and false belief questions as in the ' smarties tube ' task . In
the tactile version of the unexpected transfer task , one experimenter places a
pencil in one of three boxes which had a lid-made of sandpaper (rough box),
cotton (soft box ) or foil (smooth box) and leaves the room. In his absence a
second experimenter tran sfered the pencil to one of the other boxes .
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Subsequently, the memory, reality and belief questions were presented as on the
Sally-Ann task. Results indicated that the visually impaired children's
performance on both the tasks was poorer than the control children who were
matched for chronological age and verbal mental age.
These findings, which suggest that difficulty with 'mentalizing' is not
unique to autism, do not support uniqueness of a Theory of Mind deficit in autism
as an explanation for the triad of impairments in social interaction,
communication and imagination (Wing & Gould, 1979).
In addition to having problems with universality and uniqueness, the
Theory of Mind hypothesis is also problematic in that it does not explain all the
features of autism. It falls short when it comes to explaining features like
restricted repertoire of interests and activities, abnormal responses to sensory
stimuli and savant abilities. These features are better explained by the other two
cognitive theories, namely the Executive Dysfunction hypothesis and the Weak
Central Coherence hypothesis, which suggest a domain general deficit in autism.
1.2.6 The Executive Dysfunction hypothesis
Executive function is often defined by a list of functions regarding the
ability to maintain an appropriate problem solving set for the attainment of a
future goal. It includes behaviours such as planning, impulse control, inhibition of
pre-potent but irrelevant responses, set maintenance, organised search and
flexibility of thought and action (Ozonoff, Penington & Rogers., 1991). These
functions are associated with the pre-frontal area of the brain. The possibility of
executive dysfunction in autism dates back to a 1978 paper by Damasio and
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Maurer who found many behavioural and neurological similarities between
individuals with autism and individuals with frontal lobe damage (cf Griffith,
Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999). Some features of Autism Spectrum
Disorders suggest an executive dysfunction that is not explained by a deficit in
Theory of Mind. Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders resist change and
show extreme distress over even trivial variation in their environment or routine.
Perseverative behaviour is common in the form of extremely narrow interests or
repetitive stereotypical activities. They are impulsive, poor in self monitoring,
inflexible and find it difficult to anticipate consequences of behaviour in the long
run.
Empirical assessment carried out using a variety of neuropsychological
tests report that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders have difficulty with
planning, mental flexibility and inhibition (Hill, 2004). Planning involves
establishing sequences of actions that is constantly monitored, re-evaluated and
updated for attaining a goal. Tasks like the Tower of Hanoi or the Tower of
London assess planning ability. In these tasks participants have to move discs
prearranged on three different pegs to match an arrangement determined by the
examiner. This must be achieved using few moves and as quickly as possible.
Several specific rules may also have to be followed. For example, in the tower of
Hanoi task, the pegs vary in size and participants are not allowed to place a larger
disc on a smaller one. Studies suggest that participants with autism are less
efficient and require more moves to solve the problem, compared to matched
controls without autism (Bennetto, Pennington, & Rogers, 1996).
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Mental flexibility or set shifting refers to the ability to modify strategies
based on changed situation. Mental flexibility is assessed using tasks like the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST). As the name suggests part icipants are
required to sort cards based on one of three possible dimensions (colour, number
or shape). See Figure 1.3.
Figurel .3: Sample cards from Wisconsin Card Sorting Task taken from Hill
(2004).
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However, the rule for sorting is not explicitly stated to participants.
Instead, they are given feedback on whether or not the card was placed correctly
in each trial. The participant learns the rule through trial and error. Once the rule
is learned and the participants consistently use the correct dimension to sort , the
rule is changed. Again, the change is not explicitly stated but is implied through
feedback . Many studies (Bennetto et aI., 1996; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers,
1991) report that while the typic al participants shift to the new rule with ease , the
participants with autism tend to perseverate and continue to use the old, and now
incorrect, rule despite feedback.
The ability to inhibit pre-potent but undesirable responses was assessed by
Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe and Tidswell (1991) using the 'windows task' that
they devised. This task involved a participant and a 'competitor'. The
participant's task was to point at one of two boxes, one of which contained a
chocolate. The participant won the chocolate if s/he pointed at the empty box but
if s/he pointed at the box containing the chocolate then the participant lost the
chocolate to the competitor. In the initial phase, neither the participant nor the
competitor was aware about which of the boxes contained the chocolate. Hence,
the participant was essentially guessing. Thus, the participant learned that to get
the chocolate s/he had to point at the empty box without being reinforced for the
behaviour (of pointing at the empty box). In the next phase, the same box was
used but with windows such that the participant could see which of the two boxes
contained the chocolate. If the participant now points at the empty box, this
suggests that s/he is deliberately misdirecting the competitor. Results indicated
that significantly fewer children with autism pointed to the empty box in the first
trial of the second phase, which consisted of 20 trials, compared to children with
Down's syndrome. The children with autism continued to perseverate pointing at
the box that contained the chocolate in the rest of the trials despite the fact that
they lost the chocolate as a consequence. Russell et al. (1991) suggested that, for
the children with autism, the knowledge of the physical reality was more salient
than the knowledge of mental states. They were unable to inhibit a pre-potent
response even though they were maladaptive.
Russell ef al. (1991) further argued that poor performance on the false
belief tasks may also be explained by the relatively greater salience of 'the
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current location of the object'. According to this explanation children with autism
do not lack Theory of Mind but have an inability to disengage from the more
salient knowledge of the physical reality.
Limitations and criticisms of the Executive Dysfunction hypothesis of autism
Based on the perseverative behaviour of individuals with autism on the
windows task, Russell et al. (1991) argued, the Executive Dysfunction hypothesis
may be able to explain not only the restricted repertoire of interests and repetitive
behaviour observed in autism, but also the social and communication impairment
which are thought to arise from an impaired Theory of Mind ability. For example,
impairment in disengaging and shifting attention may lead to problems in
interpersonal sharing (Bowler, 2006).
Jarrold, Boucher and Smith (1994) investigated whether children with
autism fail to engage in pretend playas a result of a deficit in executive
functioning characterised by an inability to use internally generated
representation setting aside the schemas evoked by the external object. They
asked participants to select a prop to stand as substitute for a target object (for
example, toothbrush). Specifically they wanted to know whether children with
autism would have difficulty choosing an object with a clear alternate function
(for example, pencil), to perform the pretend function (of brushing teeth), from
amongst other, non-functional props. However, it was observed that children with
autism were as likely as control participants to select a prop with an alternate
function. Hence, diminished pretend play in autism cannot readily be explained
by executive function deficits. A few researchers have investigated whether
executive functioning is co-related to the severity of autistic symptomatology and
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the acquisition of adaptive functioning using measures like the Vineland Adaptive
behaviour Scales and Childhood Autism Rating Scale. However, the results are
equivocal (Fine et al., 2001). Thus, evidence for an executive dysfunction
explanation for the social and communication difficulties observed in individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorders is not sufficient.
Most research on Executive Dysfunction reports group differences but not
individual differences in terms of the percentage of participants who pass the
task. This makes it difficult to ascertain the prevalence of executive dysfunction
in autism (cf Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). The prevalence rate of Executive
Dysfunction in the sample with autism ranged between 50 and 96 percent in the
three studies reviewed by Rajendran and Mitchell (2007). More studies are
required before conclusions can be drawn about the universality of executive
dysfunction in autism.
The Executive dysfunction hypothesis definitely does not fulfil the criteria
of uniqueness. It is observed in a large number of varied clinical groups like
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Tourrett's disorder,
Schizophrenia and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, none of who show the social
difficulties observed in Autism Spectrum Disorders. However, Ozonoff and
Jensen (1999) reported that individuals with autism demonstrated difficulties on
tasks that demanded flexibility and planning but not inhibition. Conversely,
individuals with ADHD demonstrated difficulties with inhibition but not
flexibility and planning. Thus, it is not sufficient to explain the features of autism
in terms of a general impairment in executive functioning. The executive function
profile in autism requires further clarification in terms of which functions are
spared and which impaired and how the autism profile of executive functioning
can be differentiated from that of other disorders.
1.2.7 The Weak Central Coherence hypothesis
The Theory of Mind hypothesis and the Executive Dysfunction hypothesis
focus on deficits observed in autism. Individuals with autism, however, show
relative strength in associative memory, rule based tasks, and visuo-spatial
organisation (Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz, & Payton, 1992). Frith (1989)
suggested that a single cognitive processing mechanism could explain both the
deficits as well as the assets exhibited by individuals with autism. Typically,
information processing is characterised by extracting the overall meaning or gist
rather than focusing on individual features that make up the whole. Frith (1989)
suggested that a deficit in global-level processing results in a tendency to process
information in terms of local features in autism. This could explain the uneven
cognitive profile observed in autism. In other words, autism is characterised by
weak central coherence.
Shah and Frith (1983) observed that participants with autism were
significantly quicker in the Embedded Figures Test which involved locating a
target hidden within a more complex figure. See figure 104.
Figure 1.4: Examples ofthe Embeddedjigures test ' material used in Shah an
Frith (1983).
The authors suggested that the participants with autism did perceive the
meaning of the complex figure as they were able to name them. However, they
might not have been ' captured by the overall meaning ' to the same extent as the
control group of participants, thus allowing them to perceive the embedded figure
quickly and accurately. Hence, for the typical population the meaning conveyed
by the complex figure (pram) is so compelling that it interferes with the task of
locating the target (triang le). In individuals with autism central coherence is
suggested to be much weaker, and hence they are able to dissociate the parts from
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the whole. Thus, they do not experience severe interference from the global
figure.
Shah and Frith (1993 ) suggested that this ability to view local elements as
distinct from the global picture may be responsible for individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders gaining higher scores on the performance subscales (block
design subtest in particular) than the verbal subscales of Wechsler ' s intelligence
scales. In the block design test participants are shown abstract two dimensional
geometrical designs on a card and are required to use cubical wooden blocks with
two sides coloured red , two sides coloured white and two sides coloured red and
white to make the patterns shown on the cards. See figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Individual blocks (below) and an example ofpattern (above) used
in the block design test.
Efficient performance requires participants to inhibit perceivin g the design
as a whole and identifying the constituent parts in terms of the block faces. Shah
and Frith (1993) hypothesised that the process of segmentation is easier for
participants with autism because of Weak Central Coherence. But, in typical
participants the central coherence is so strong that the process of segmentation
takes time and effort. If so , the performance of typical participants should increase
to the level of participants with autism if the design were pre-segmented (as
shown in figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6: Original and pre-segmented designs used in Shah and Frith (1993).
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As predicted, pre-segmentation significantly improved the performance of
participants without autism (typically developing children and children with
learning difficulty) but not the performance of participants with autism. This wa s
taken as support for the hypothesis that while coherence is very strong in typical
participants, autism is characterised by Weak Central Coherence.
The Weak Central Coherence hypothesis pro vides a possibl e explanation
for abnormal and often enhanced perc eptual processin g found in many higher
functioning individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Comprehending the gist
of written language at the level of sentences or longer requires a global strategy.
This may explain the difficulty faced by individuals with autism on sentence
processing tasks (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967; Romondo & Milech, 1984).
Ordinary conversation too requires separating out the meaningful from the
meaningless and taking account of the context in which the interaction takes
place. Difficulty processing the information globally may thus explain the social
impairments in autism.
Limitations and criticisms of the Weak Central Coherence Hypothesis of autism
Frith and Happe (1994) suggested that weak central coherence is a
'cognitive style' rather than a deficit. Having weak central coherence is
disadvantageous in tasks requiring global level contextual processing but
advantageous when detailed local level processing is required. This impact of
weak central coherence is observed in both higher level tasks like extracting
meaning from sentences and lower level perceptual tasks. Happe (1996) reported
that participants with autism were less likely than typical participants to succumb
to visual illusions created by immediate visual context. For example, in the
Ebbinghaus illusion (see figure 1.7) participants with autism do not see one inner
circle as larger than the other inner circle. In order to be susceptible to the illusion
the inner circle should be perceived in the context of surrounding circles. Weak
central coherence would impair such integrative processes which influences
perception in typical individuals.
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Figure 1. 7: Ebbinghaus illusion.
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However, using a computerised procedure where participants had to adjust
the circles so that they were the same size (as opposed to saying whether the size
of the circles were the same or different) Ropar and Mitchell (1999; Ropar &
Mitchell , 2001) failed to replicate Happe 's (1996) finding . They found that
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders were just as susceptible to illusions
as matched typically developing controls. Ropar and Mitchell (2001) did not find
the visuo-spatial abilities tests thought to measure weak central coherence (block
design and embedded figures tasks) to correlate with or predict non-susceptibility
to illusions in individuals with and without Autism Spectrum Disorders. Thi s
suggests different mechanisms may be involved in the perception of illusions and
performance on visuo-spatial tasks.
Other researchers have reported that indi viduals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders can process global asp ect s of information using the Navon task. The
Navon task consists of hierarchical stimuli - a large figure made up of smaller
identical figures (See Figure 1.8). Participants were required to identify whether
the tar get letter (for example A) was present or absent. The target could be
presented either at the global level (as in the figure on the right) or at the local
level (as in the figure on the left ). In the congruent condition the letters in the
local and global level are the same. In the incongruent condition, the two are
different.
Figure 1.8: Example ofstimuli used in the Navon task.
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AA AA
AA AA
AA AA
Aft OR
AAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAfUlAA
Art AA
All All
AR alA
All alA
AAAA
AA AA
AA alA
AA AA
AAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAA
flA AA
AR alA
AA AA
AA AR
Both participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders and participants
developing typically showed global advantage and global interference on Navon
tasks. They are faster and more accurate when the target was presented at the
global level than at the local level (global advantage) and when the target was
presented at the local level in the congruent condition than the incongruent
condition (global interference). However, participant s with Autism Spectrum
Disorders also showed local interferenc e; incongruent local stimuli disrupted the
processin g of the global stimuli (Plaisted. Swettenham, & Rees , 1999 ; Rinehart,
Bradshaw. Moss. Brereton , & Tonge , 2000)
Weak Central Coherence hypothesis suggests that enhanced visuo-spatial
ability in autism is a result of preference for local level processing as a result of
weak central coherence. However, in some studies ( Plaisted et al., 1999; Ropar &
Mitchell, 2001) individuals with autism demonstrated intact global processing,
given appropriate testing conditions. This has led to an attempt to find alternative
explanations. Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) model proposed by
Mottron and colleagues (1993, 2006), suggests that individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders have a hierarchical organisation defect - an imbalance
between complex high level and simple low level processes. Hence, while they
process information at the global level and local level normally, they do not show
a global precedence which typically developing individuals show. Another rival
theory of Weak Central Coherence posits that individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders process unique features of stimuli better than typical individuals and
common features of stimuli worse than typical individuals (Plaisted, O'Riordan,
& Baron-Cohen, 1998). This could explain enhanced performance on tasks like
embedded figures where participants have to focus on features that are unique
between the target figure and the complex figure. However, categorization tasks,
on which individuals with autism perform less well (Klinger & Dawson, 2001),
require participants to focus on the common features between stimuli and make
generalisations.
A further problem for the Weak Central Coherence hypothesis comes from
a large scale study by Pellicano, Maybery and Durkin (2005). They administered
four visuo-spatial coherence tasks (the Preschool Embedded Figures Test the
Pattern Construction Task from the Differential Abilities Scale, the Figure
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Ground Task from the Developmental Test of Visual Perception and the
Developmental Test of Visual Integration) to typically developing four and five
old children. Contrary to what was expected by the Weak Central Coherence
hypothesis inter-correlations between the four measures were not substantial or in
the direction that would have been predicted if central coherence had been a
unitary construct. Furthermore, a principal components analysis carried out to
assess whether the four measures were driven by the same underlying mechanism
for central coherence yielded two factors, one corresponding to integrative or
visuo-spatial construction ability while the second factor was ambiguous. These
results question the validity of central coherence as a unitary construct.
Information about the uniqueness and universality of Weak Central
Coherence are rarely reported in research articles. Furthermore, although local
precedence could explains the perceptual characteristics of Autism Spectrum
Disorders, its ability to explain the social features remains to be tested.
1.2.8 Mapping the theories to areas in the brain
With the advent of neuro-imaging techniques like tMRI scientist have
began attempts to identify functional differences in brain regions of typical
individuals and individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Neuro-imaging
studies involve recording brain activity while individuals carry out tasks, inside a
scanner, which supposedly depend on cognitive process in which the investigator
is interested.
When the task concerns Theory of Mind, the medial prefrontal region
(paracingulate cortex) and the temporo-parietal junction in the superior temporal
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sulcus, have been consistently identified (Frith & Frith, 2005). The medial frontal
region appears to be involved in reflecting on one's own and other's mental states
while the temproral-parietal junction seems to playa special role in recognizing
actions and intentions of others. Differences in brain activation between
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders and individuals of typical
development have been reported in many studies when different social tasks were
being carried out. For example, Baron-Cohen et al. (1991) conducted an fMRI
study on individuals with High Functioning Autism or Asperger's Syndrome and
typically developing participants while they were shown photographs (of the eye
region alone) and asked to identify the mental state expressed in the same
photographs. Results showed increased activation of the superior temporal gyrus,
amygdale and parts of the pre-frontal cortex in typical participants. However,
participants with High Functioning Autism and Asperger's Syndrome showed
activation of fronto-temporal regions but not in the amygdale.
Executive functioning has been historically related to the frontal lobe of
the brain, the pre-frontal cortex in particular. In fact, the possibility of individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorders having executive dysfunction was based on the
similarities observed in behaviour exhibited by individuals with acquired frontal
lobe damage. Lesion studies have identified medial and dorsolateral frontal
structures as mediating performance on Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. Very few
fMRI studies on Autism Spectrum Disorders have used executive function tasks.
But significantly lower task-related activation of the dorsolateral frontal
structures and the posterior cingulated cortex have been observed in individuals
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with autism when carrying out spatial working memory tasks and a visually
guided saccade task (cf. Hill, 2004a).
Just and colleagues' underconnectivity theory (2004) is related to Weak
Central Coherence hypothesis but at the neural rather than the cognitive level.
They suggest that Autism Spectrum Disorders is caused by reduced integrative
functioning in the brain. The coordination and communication between relevant
cortical areas appears to be lower in participants with autism than typical
participants when they were scanned carrying out various tasks like sentence
comprehension (Just, Cherkassky, Keller, & Minshew, 2004), face processing
(Koshino, et al., 2007), planning (Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Minshew,
2007) and inhibition tasks (Kana, Keller, Minshew & Just, 2007).
1.2.9 Treatment options for autism
The intervention options for individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders
can also be classified as biological, cognitive and behavioural. Sometimes
medications which fall under the category of major tranquilisers are prescribed,
not as a cure but as a means to control behaviour that may cause a threat to the
child or interfere with education.
A few researchers have attempted to teach children with autism Theory of
Mind (Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin & Hill, 1997; Ozonoff & Miller, 1995).
They reported that children with autism were able to succeed in Theory of Mind
tasks following training. Hadwin et aj. (1997) investigated whether formal
training on theory of mind tasks in children with autism improved their ability to
initiate and maintain conversation and increased the frequency of mental state
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terms used in conversation. The participants in the study were randomly assigned
to one of three groups and were trained in the areas of emotion, belief or play. The
results showed that the children through training did learn to pass tasks
concerning emotion and belief understanding, but, no corresponding advance in
social communication was seen - either in terms of development of
communication or use of mental state terms in speech.
Many therapies which use behavioural modification techniques. like
Applied Behaviour Analysis or ABA and Treatment and Education of Autistic
and related Communication Handicapped CHildren or TEACCH, have been
developed and are proving to be highly successful. However, early identification
and intervention is crucial to help the child achieve his/her potential to the
maximum, possibly learning some coping strategies for dealing with the world as
well as themselves (for example, their own sensory issues). Best intervention
option, as of now, is a combination of behavioural therapy, speech and language
therapy and special education.
A few of the other therapies include nutritional therapy (for example
gluten and casein free diet based on the theory that children with autism often
suffer from allergy to gluten and casein which aggravate symptoms), sensory
integration which involves exposing the child to various sensory stimulations in a
controlled manner, thus regulating their hyper and hypo active sensory systems.
However, further controlled studies are required before claims about their efficacy
can be accepted.
1.3 Chapter summary
Autism Spectrum Disorder is a complex neuro-developmental disorder of
unknown aetiology; it is complex at the biological, cognitive and behavioural
level. It is diagnosed behaviourally and the core features of autism can be
categorised under impairment in social interaction, impairment in communication
and restricted repertoire of interests and activities. At the cognitive level no single
unifying theory has been identified so far. Three main theories have been
described: the Theory of mind hypothesis, the Executive dysfunction hypothesis
and the Weak central coherence hypothesis. The cognitive impairments identified
by these theories, which are obvious in their names, explain a different subset of
features. Structural and functional brain imaging studies hold the promise of
identifying which features of Autism Spectrum Disorders have similar origins in
the brain, and hence a common cause. Frith (2003) suggested that autism affects
development and development affects autism. Hence, results from imaging
studies should be interpreted with caution as we cannot be clear which of the
observed differences are causal and which are compensatory. As of now the best
rehabilitation option for children with Autism Spectrum Disorders involves a
combination of behaviour therapy, speech and language therapy and special
education.
Qm.pter Two
Social impairment in Autism Spectrum Disorders
2.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter One, no two individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders present identical clinical pictures. However, a pervasive social
impairment is observed across the spectrum, even in individuals who have high
intelligence and lead a successful professional life. Temple Grandin is a
remarkable person who despite her autism holds a PhD and is Professor of animal
sciences at Colorado State University, U.S.A. She also runs a successful business
as a consultant and designer of livestock-handling facilities. But, she refers to
herself as an anthropologist on mars 'stumped by the games people play' (Sacks,
1995). Williams (2004) carried out an interpretative phenomenological analysis (a
qualitative method analysing how people understand the experiences they have
lived through) often published autobiographical accounts written by individuals
diagnosed with either High Functioning Autism or Asperger's Syndrome. A main
theme common to the autobiographies was the difficulty understanding the social
world around them, a feeling ofbeing an alien onlooker unable to access the
social and emotional cues for interaction.
Of the three core cognitive theories of autism, the Theory ofMind
hypothesis focuses on the social features. A deficit in attributing mental states like
beliefs, desires and intentions is intuitively compatible with features like poor
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imitation and impaired understanding of non-verbal social cues. Experimentally
however, the results are not clear-cut and the Theory of Mind hypothesis has
many shortcomings as explained in the previous chapter. One criticism is the
over-emphasis on false-belief tasks. The majority of the studies that report
specific impairment in mentalizing in autism investigated belief attribution in
particular. Comparatively fewer studies look at other mental states like intention,
desire, knowledge and thinking. Understanding of false belief is considered to be
the hallmark test for possessing a Theory ofMind. It requires an understanding
that the other person has beliefs different from one's own and hence provides the
strongest evidence for the capacity to conceive others' mental states (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985). However, difficulties in social and communication behaviour
are observed in Autism Spectrum Disorders even before the age at which typical
children pass the classical theory of mind tasks of 'unexpected transfer' and
'deceptive appearance'. Since intentions and desires occur earlier in ontology than
beliefs and knowledge, investigating understanding of these simpler mental states
by children with autism would provide important information about how far back
Theory ofMind deficits extend in autism (Carpenter, Pennington, & Rogers,
2001). In the few studies which investigated understanding of intentions and
desires by individuals with autism, some found impaired performance (Intentions:
Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998. Desires: Baron-Cohen, Campbell,
Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994)
though the majority did not (Intentions: Carpenteret a!., 2001; Russell & Hill,
2001. Desire: Baron-Cohen, 1991; Tager-Flusberg, 1992; Tan and Harris, 1991).
Since some studies report that children with Autism Spectrum Disorders do not
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show impaired understanding of mental states like intentions and desires, a
general difficulty in attributing mental states as an explanation for autism is
questionable. Possibly there may be something special about mental states like
beliefs (Carpenter et al., 2001). According to Bloom and German (2000), the
false-belief task is ingenious but taps only one aspect of peoples' understanding of
others' minds.
2.1.1 Traits and Theory ofMind
Theory of Mind is a crucial aspect of social understanding as it is used to
understand and predict others' behaviour. Even though it is not widely
acknowledged by researchers into Theory of Mind today, how we understand and
predict others' behaviour is also the area of study of attribution research. An
important component of attribution research involves understanding 'traits', a
characteristic of a person that is associated with a particular type ofbehaviour.
Initial research in the area of attribution and Theory ofMind conceives of
both traits and mental states as causing behaviour. The seminal work in attribution
carried out by Heider (1958) describes how in common-sense psychology, the
result of an action is felt to depend on factors within the person (which included
mental states like desires and intentions as well as traits) and factors within the
environment (luck and difficulty). Research on Theory of Mind began in the late
1970's with experiments investigating whether chimpanzees possess a Theory of
Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Woodruff & Premack, 1979). In attempting to
study intentional communication in chimpanzees, Woodruff and Premack (1979)
developed a paradigm that required taking into account the behavioural
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disposition of the "sender" or "receiver" of the information as being
"cooperative" or "competitive". The researchers wanted to know whether the
chimpanzees were sensitive to these traits when evaluating information, More
recently, other researchers have suggested that traits and mental states are inter-
related in being part of Theory ofMind. According to Wellman (1990) specific
desires and beliefs arise from traits. For example, the desire to do skydiving may
stem from an adventurous disposition. Rosati et al. (2001) suggested that children
may develop the notion of stable and enduring traits to explain regularities in
intentional action. Thus, mental states can be viewed as the proximal cause and
traits as the distal cause of an action.
2.1.2 Can individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer traits?
One could argue for and against the possibility that people with Autism
Spectrum Disorders can infer traits. The debate concerns the point in development
at which children begin to comprehend traits. Some researchers believe that trait
reasoning develops after belief-desire reasoning has already been established.
While understanding of false beliefs is achieved between the age of 3 and 4 years
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), comprehending traits as causing thoughts,
feelings and desires develops after four years (Gnepp & Chilamkurti, 1988; Yuill
& Perason, 1998).
Gnepp and Chilamkurti (1988) examined the ability of Kindergarten
(mean age: 6;1 years), second grade (mean age: 8;2 years), fourth grade (mean
age: 10;2 years) and university students to take account of traits when predicting
future emotional reactions of the protagonist. The traits were implied in stories
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that depicted three examples of a child's past behaviour. For example, "This is a
story about a boy named Tommy. He helps old people walk down the stairs. He
shows new kids around the school. Tommy sets the table for his mom whenever
he can. One day Tommy's mom asked him to help his little sister clean her room.
Do you think Tommy felt happy or sad when his mom asked him to do that?"
Having to clean up would under most circumstances result in unhappiness.
However, given Tommy's helpful disposition we might assume that he would in
fact be happy to help. Thus, only by taking Tommy's disposition into account
(based on his previous behaviour) can participants correctly predict his emotional
response to the new situation. Control stories presented only the first and the last
two sentences. Results indicated that only the university students and the fourth
graders, to a lesser extent, demonstrated understanding of traits as implying
internal events such as thoughts, feelings, intentions and motivations.
Yuill and Pearson (1998) adapted Gnepp and Chilamkurti's (1988) task to
make it clear and simple for younger children. In the first experiment, they used
stories implying opposing pairs of traits (for example, selfish-generous) rather
than the no information control stories so that the same behaviour (for example.
sharing cake) results in different emotions (sadness in the selfish person and
happiness in the generous person). It was expected that the stronger contrast
would yield a sharper distinction between predictions. Using this task, children as
young as five years (but not four year olds) made different emotional predictions
about the same situation depending on the actor's (inferred) traits.
In a further experiment, Yuill and Pearson (1998) found direct evidence
for subjective understanding of desires and causal understanding of traits to be
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related. The participants were divided into two groups based on their conception
of desires as subjective or objective. This was assessed from the children's
response regarding the emotion of a protagonist to an unpleasant outcome (for
example, hitting someone with a ball) when it was desired and when undesired.
Objective children would predict that the protagonist would be sad because the
desire and the outcome were objectively bad, whereas subjective children would
predict the protagonist to be happy on achieving a desired outcome despite it
being objectively bad. The performance of the two groups of children on a task
similar to the first experiment revealed that the subjective children were taking
the actor's disposition into account and thus making different emotional
predictions about the same situation to a greater extent than the objective
children. The mean age of the subjective group was 5 years 6 months and that of
the objective children was 4 years 11 months. Hence, the developing
understanding of traits, desires and emotions can be seen as part of general
development, with children moving towards theory based understanding of traits
with increased understanding of desires as subjective.
If belief-desire reasoning and awareness of the subjective nature of these
mental states is required in order to understand traits as psychological entities,
any deficit in belief-desire reasoning may lead to difficulty with trait inferences,
amongst other things. Therefore, because individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders reputedly do have difficulty with belief-desire reasoning, so they
should have difficulty inferring traits.
Notwithstanding, even preschoolers who have not yet acquired belief-
desire reasoning understand trait in terms of behavioural regularity; a person
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having a particular trait would behave in a way consistent to the trait across
situations. They can use this information to make predictions about others' future
behaviour. Dozier (1991) presented children from kindergarten (mean age: 5;7
years), second grade (mean age: 7;7 years) and fourth grade (mean age: 10;1
years) with two pieces of information about a peer who helped (just a little or a
lot) and shared (just a little or a lot). They were then required to indicate how
much they liked the peer on a rating scale and to predict how many pennies (of a
total of 10 pennies) they thought the peer would give them. It was reported that
children from all age groups used the knowledge about how the peer had behaved
previously (helped and shared just a little or a lot) to make their judgements about
the peer's future behaviour (how many pennies they would give). In Gnepp and
Chilamkurti (1988) and Yuill and Pearson (1998) children as young as four years,
including the objective children, were able to infer dispositions from past
behaviours and use this information to predict future behaviour (though not
emotional response) in a different situation.
Research suggests that children make these predictions using rules. They
use simple frequency rules about how often a particular behaviour occurs as well
as more complex rules like Kelly's covariation principle. According to Kelly
(1973), causal attribution involves identifying which of the causes (person, entity
or circumstance) the effect (behaviour) covaries with. Individuals use three types
of information to identify the cause of behaviour. One, they observe the degree to
which the person's behaviour (for example, John sleeps in Mr. Andy's class) is
consistent across time and situation. Consistency would be high if John always
sleeps in Mr. Andy's class. Two, how distinct the behaviour is across stimuli is
observed. Distinctiveness would be high if John does not sleep in any other
lecturer's class and only in Mr. Andy's class. Three, the degree of consensus
across other individuals is considered. Consensus would be high ifnot only John
but other students too sleep in Mr. Andy's class. Based on the covariation pattern
the event is attributed to one of the three classes of causes, person (John), entity
(Mr. Andy) or circumstances (for example, Mr. Andy takes a boring subject or
Mr. Andy's class is always the first one on Monday morning) using the rules
outlined in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Causal attribution based on Kelly's covariation principle.
Attribution Information
Consensus Distinctiveness Consistency
Person Low Low High
Entity High High High
Circumstances Low High Low
Ferguson, Olthof and Luiten (1984) investigated whether there is a
decreased use of frequency and an increased use of covariation information with
age. They presented five to thirteen year old children with (aggressive)
behavioural information about a boy. The information varied in frequency and
covariation pattern. In the first condition, consistency was low, distinctiveness
was high and frequency was low. In the second condition, consistency was high,
distinctiveness was low and frequency was high. In the third condition
consistency was low, distinctiveness was high and frequency was high. Later,
53
participants were required to rate the protagonist on a list of adjectives as well as
infer the cause ofhis behaviour in a number of stories. A frequency-based rule
would result in stronger dispositional attribution of aggressiveness in the second
and third condition. On the other hand, a covariation-based rule would result in
stronger dispositional attribution only in the second condition. In the story task
kindergarten children (mean age: 5;9 years) attributed aggressiveness to a greater
degree in conditions two and three, whereas first (mean age: 7;3 years), third
(mean age: 8;9 years) and fifth graders (mean age: 9;4 years) showed stronger
dispositional attribution in condition two alone. This suggests a developmental
decrease in the use of the frequency rule and an increase in the use of the
covariation rule. However in the rating task, even the youngest children showed
an ability to use covariation principle.
Considering that people with Autism Spectrum Disorders sometimes
successfully learn and apply rules (Herme1in & O'Connor, 1986; Klinger &
Dawson, 2001; Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz, & Payton, 1992), they might draw
on this ability to good effect when inferring traits. A particular incident narrated
by Temple Grandin, (Sacks, 1995) neatly illustrates this possibility. The
machinery in one of the plants designed by Temple Grandin suffered repeated
breakdown and she observed that these occurred when a particular man was in the
room. Thus, she inferred that this man was sabotaging the machinery by "putting
two and two together" and "correlating" the incidents though she " ...couldn't see
the jealous look on his face".
Hermelin and O'Connor (1986) found that individuals who have below
average intelligence but show superior calendarical skills (referred to as savants),
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being able to name the day of the week of any given date of any year with speed,
used rule-based strategy and not rote memory or arithmetic procedures to do their
calculations. Furthermore, some of the participants were able to transfer the rule,
with varying degree of success which depended on their cognitive ability, to a
non-calendarical task.
Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz and Payton (1992) administered several
neuropsychological tests to a group of individuals with autism (without learning
difficulty) between the ages of 15 and 40 years. Results indicated that the
participants with autism were not significantly different from control typically
developed individuals matched on age, gender, intelligence quotient and race on
rule learning aspects of abstract thinking.
Klinger and Dawson (2001) investigated the use of a rule-based strategy
and a prototype-based strategy by individuals with autism when learning about
categories. The performance ofparticipants (with autism, with Down's syndrome
and developing typically) was compared on two categorization tasks: one where
there was an explicit rule and the other where there was no rule and hence
required that a prototype be formed. The results indicated that although
participants with autism and participants with Down's SYndrome showed
difficulty forming prototypes, all three diagnostic groups could use a rule-based
strategy to determine category membership, often being able to infer implicit rules
as well.
Thus, rule acquisition in autism appears to be intact which could mean that
they may be able to infer traits using logic and rules. Moreover, any difficulty
with belief-desire reasoning in autism should not be an impediment given that
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making predictions on the basis of behavioural regularity is something that
preschoolers seem able to do at a point in development well before they can
demonstrate mastery of belief-desire reasoning.
Recently, Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White and Frith (2007) reported that
children with autism were able to use gender and race stereotypes to predict
behaviour. Preschool Racial Attitudes Measure (PRAM II) was used to assess
knowledge about gender and racial stereotype. Preschool Racial Attitudes
Measure uses a forced-choice format and presents scenarios using line drawings
as shown in figure 2.1. The child is shown life-like coloured drawings of people
with brown or pink skin and hears a short vignette following which s/he has to
choose which of the two people the vignette best describes.
Figure 2.1: The PRAM task used in Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White and Frith
(2007)
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PRAM - race trial
'Here are two girls. One of them is a
friendl y girl. She has lots of friends.
Vt/hich one is the friendly girl?'
PRAM - gender trial
'Here are two children. One of them
has four dolls. Which one has four
dolls?'
On the Preschool Racial Attitudes Measure eight year old children with
autism (mental age of seven), irrespective of whether they passed Theory of Mind
task , used gender and race stereotype to make predictions.
Hirschfeld et al. (2007) also presented a conflict task (Figure 2.2) where
the response would differ depending on whether the predictions were made based
on information about current mental states, habitual preference or social group
(race and gender) membership.
Figure 2.2: The conflict task used in Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White and
Frith (2007)
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Conflict task - race trial
'Here are two women. This is
Georgina (left) and this is Chloe.
Georgina likes to help people. One of
these women walked an old lady
across the road . \'Vhich wo man was it?'
Conflict task - gender trial
'Here are two people. This is James
and this is Grace. Grace doesn't like
to cook for people. One of these
people has baked biscuits. Vt/hich
person baked biscu its?'
Taking the example illustrated in figure 2.2, if participants base their
predictions on race stereotypy then they would predict that Chloe walked the old
lady across the road despite the information that Georgina likes to help people.
But, if the y use the given mental state information, then they would predict that it
was Georgina who helped the old lady. On the conflict task children with aut ism
who passed the Theory of Mind task were similar to typically developing seven
year olds, preferring mental state explanation of behaviour as opposed to
stereot ype-based explanation. But , children with autism who did not pass the
Theory of Mind task, like typically developing three year olds, continued to use
stereotype-based explanation for behaviour. In the conflict task , chi ldren with
autism who pass and who do not pass the Theory ofMind task were able to
attribute characteristics to people. The difference was that the former used mental
state information while the latter used stereotype-based information.
Stereotyping involves attributing traits and preferences to a person based
solely because he or she belongs to a particular social group. Stereotypes are not
explicitly taught to children. Hence, it has a strong albeit implicit cultural and
social learning component. This study suggests that individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders are able to grasp subtle, cultural cues regarding the assumed
characteristics of individuals belonging to different social categories. They use
this information to predict future behaviour. This study, thus, indirectly supports
the ability of individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders to infer and use traits to
predict behaviour.
2.1.3 Why study knowledge about traits in Autism Spectrum Disorders?
The well established equation of causal attribution assumes that behaviour
is a joint product of disposition and situation. Dispositional attribution places the
cause of an action within the individual, on some lasting characteristic, whereas
situational attribution places the cause outside the individual on environmental
circumstances that can be transient. Most early models of attribution posit that
ordinary people will examine the possible causes ofbehaviour in terms of stable
internal mental states and transitory external situational forces before making a
causal attribution. In other words, when confronted with a behaviour, ordinary
people consider whether the behaviour was the result of the kind of person the
actor is or the kind of situation the actor was in. For example, if someone refuses
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to give you directions, is it because he is an unhelpful person or because he is late
for an important appointment and is in a hurry? If the behaviour can be explained
by situational demands then the observer does not attribute the cause to
dispositions (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelly, 1973).
As early as 1943, Ichheiser suggested that people are prone to believe that
a person behaved in a certain way because s/he possessed certain personal
qualities rather than as a result of situational pressures to act in a particular
manner. In 1967, the classic study carried out by Jones and Harris provided
empirical evidence that this was indeed the case. They presented university
students with essays, allegedly written by another student, which either supported
or opposed the Cuban president Fidel Castro. Some of the participants were told
that the essayist was given freedom to choose whether to write pro-Castro or anti-
Castro essays. The other participants were told that the essayist was instructed by
his debate coach to defend a particular point of view. Based on the attribution
equation, participants were expected to attribute pro or anti-Castro attitude when
the essayist were free to choose their stance but not when the debate coach
dictated which stance to take. Jones and Harris (1967) reported that participants
did attribute the appropriate attitude when the essayist had the freedom of choice.
Surprisingly, though weaker, similar attributions were made by the participants
even when the essayist, presumably, took the position suggested by the debate
coach. This Observer bias, to use Jones and Harris' (1967) term, has been
replicated many times in Western culture by different researchers (for example,
Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990). The tendency to attribute the cause of behaviour to
the actor's disposition even when it is possible to provide a situational explanation
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for the action is predominant in Western culture. It is also referred to as the
fundamental attributional error (Ross, 1977) or correspondence bias (Gilbert &
Malone, 1995) and illustrates the influential role played by traits in social
cognition.
From the extensive Theory ofMind research we know that people with
Autism Spectrum Disorders have difficulty using situational information to
impute mental states to the protagonist which putatively explains why they make
errors in predicting behaviour. Tasks used to test Theory of Mind can be
considered as a special kind of attribution task where only the situation needs to
be considered and where the disposition of the protagonist need not be taken into
account for arriving at the correct answer. To predict Sally's behaviour
participants need to understand that the situation constrains Sally's knowledge
which then influences her behaviour. What kind ofperson Sally is (a forgetful
person, for example) is not relevant, and neither is Sally's ability to infer that Ann
has moved the marble. Because the participant is not required to consider traits,
one might argue that the task tests only part of the mentalistic understanding
involved in predicting other peoples' behaviour.
Furthermore, Theory of Mind investigations into Autism Spectrum
Disorders have been restricted to very few propositional mental states like beliefs,
desires and intentions. Hence, our understanding of social cognition in Autism
Spectrum Disorders is restricted to their inability to attribute these few mental
states to others. William's (2004) interpretative phenomenological analysis
revealed that individuals with autism often compensate for their lack of intuition
by using explicitly generated rules and logical strategies to deal with social
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situations. Oliver Sack's (1995) description of Temple Grandin, is suggestive of a
person who has used her autistic strengths of logic and visual memory to teach
herself social conventions, even though she feels she cannot understand them. In
fact, elsewhere Grandin (1995) does compare herself to Mr. Spock of the 'The
Star Trek' series and writes, "I have always used visualization and logic to work
out how people will react". Gaining a comprehensive understanding of social
cognition in autism requires investigating not only the deficits but also the
possible compensatory processes by which they use information in the social
environment to Yield causal explanations. Anecdotal evidence clearly points to the
use of explicit logical strategies. Propositional mental states partly explain an
individual's action in a particular situation. Traits, on the other hand are
conceived as stable and enduring across situations. Thus, traits may be relatively
more amendable to interpretation based on formal logical rules. Investigating how
individuals with autism conceptualize traits may provide scope for directly
investigating possible strategies used by some higher functioning individuals with
autism when navigating social situations.
Thus, traits are an important, hitherto ignored, socio-cognitive construct in
autism research. The aim of the experiments described in this thesis was to
investigate whether individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer traits from
descriptions of behaviour and if they do so, are they especially sensitive to traits?
2.2 How to study trait inference in autism: The paradigm
How humans perceive their social world and especially the other
individuals who live in that world, has been the focus of research for decades.
61
Many experimental paradigms have been developed for this purpose. Task
performance on these paradigms often depends on other skills like verbal ability,
memory and imagination to a great extent. However, when developing a paradigm
to test a special population like those with Autism Spectrum Disorders, one has to
consider whether difficulty doing the task is the result of difficulty in the area of
investigation (social inferences in this case) and not task demands specific to the
paradigm.
2.2.1 Drawing trait inference from textual behavioural descriptions
Studies on Spontaneous Trait Inference, which is an unintentional trait
inference that occurs when one attends to trait implying behaviour for any reason
other than inferring a trait has been studied extensively by Uleman and
colleagues. These experiments use textual descriptions ofbehaviour (for example,
'He smiled and said hello to everyone at the party. '), which participants are
instructed to read under a variety of conditions, although they are never told
explicitly to form impressions or infer traits. Studying inferences drawn from text
as the preferred method of investigation is done under the assumption that the
findings are informative about the way people function in real life situations
(Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). Sentence comprehension involves
selecting among the many meanings of each word and combining them to arrive
at an emergent meaning of the sentence. According to Uleman et al. (1996) this
process can be considered to be analogous to parsing the stream of behaviour and
disambiguating its parts to extract meaning.
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One possible drawback of using sentences as stimuli to test people with
Autism Spectrum Disorders comes from studies on the Weak Central Coherence
hypothesis (Frith, 2003). The theory suggests that individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders have a deficit in processing information at a global level
which includes sentence processing. The evidence for difficulty with extracting
meaning from sentences comes from two main lines of research. In one,
researchers have reported that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders are
not aided by structure when sentences were presented as opposed to random word
strings in free recall tasks (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967; Romondo & Milech,
1984). In the second, research has consistently found that individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders do not use sentence context to disambiguate homographs (for
example, 'tear') that have different meanings and pronunciations but are spelt the
same (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happe, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen 1999).
If indeed individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders do have difficulty
extracting meaning from text, then using a paradigm that uses sentences as stimuli
would not be suitable for studying trait inference in this population. The (global)
meaning conveyed in the sentence must be processed for the traits to be inferred.
The trait clumsy is implied in the behaviour described in the sentence 'He tripped
on the rug and twisted his ankle' and cannot be inferred from any single part of
the sentence. Hence, in case we do find that individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders are unable to infer traits from textual descriptions of behaviour, we
cannot to be certain whether the difficulty arises from inability to infer traits or
having what Frith and Snowling (1983) termed "sentence blindness" caused by
weak central coherence.
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2.2.2 Sentence processing in Autism Spectrum Disorders
In this section the literature on sentence processing in autism is reviewed
in order to assess the feasibility of using textual stimuli to investigate whether
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer traits.
Memory for sentence vs. memory for phrase
A much replicated study tapping into language deficits in autism was
carried out by Hermelin and O'Connor (1967). They compared children with
autism and children with learning difficulty on the recall of structured and
unstructured material. The two groups, matched on vocabulary and digit span,
were orally presented with sequences of one syllable words three to eight words
long. Immediately after a sequence was presented participants were required to
recall them in an unpaced manner. There were three kinds of sequences, simple
English sentences (for example, 'He went to town'), random order sequences
matched for frequency with the simple English sentences (for example, 'Some
that a went') and contextual sequences made of less frequent words (for example,
'Shade this young plant'). Results indicated that frequency did not affect recall
and that the children with autism had a higher immediate recall score than the
children with learning difficulty. But, while the children with learning difficulty
performed significantly better with sentences than with random sequences, no
significant difference was found in the children with autism. The authors
concluded that this pattern of recall is an indication that children with autism are
unable to use structure and meaning to code linguistic material, unlike their
vocabulary and digit span matched controls.
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Aumhammer-Frith (1969) investigated the effect of syntactic structure on
immediate recall in children with autism and clinically normal children. The
children were further divided into low span and high span groups based on their
digit span score. The results indicated that all groups recalled more of the
structured sequences than the unstructured sequences. Error analysis showed that,
as expected, reversal of word order occurred more frequently in the unstructured
than the structured sequences. This was true for all groups, including children
with autism. However, overall the high span groups benefited more from
structured linguistic material than the low span groups - the difference in recall
and order reversal errors between structured and unstructured sequences was more
in the high span group. Since digit span is closely related to developmental age
and intelligence, Aurnhammer-Frith (1969) suggested that appreciation of
structure increases with development. The recall pattern within the low span
groups did not differ based on diagnosis. But, among the high span group the
difference in recall for structured and unstructured sequences was more for the
clinically normal group than the group with autism. However, the high span group
with autism showed order reversal effect to a similar degree to the clinically
normal group, suggestive of active coding. Frith suggested that the lack of benefit
from structure in autism reported in some studies can be interpreted partly but not
entirely in terms of lower developmental age.
Fyffe and Prior (1978) pointed out four' flaws' in Hermelin and
O'Connor's (1967) experiment. First, the children with autism recalled
significantly more random material than the children with learning difficulties
which suggests inadequate or unreliable matching. Second, since only sequences
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that were recalled entirely were scored, the result was based on three and four
word sequences which were well within the memory span ofparticipants and
required no recoding. Third, some of the sequences were questions, which are
more difficult to remember. And finally, some studies reported the effect of
structure on recall to be significantly more in the high span group than the low
span group, suggesting that increased use of structure may be a function of
developmental age rather than a deficit in processing which is specific to autism
(Aurnhammer-Frith, 1969). Fyffe and Prior (1978) modified Hermelin and
O'Connor's (1967) experiment to correct the perceived flaws. They used a stricter
procedure for matching digit span and included a group of children with learning
difficulty as well as a group of younger typically developing children as controls.
The participants (children with autism, children with learning difficulty and
children developing typically) were divided into high and low span groups based
on their performance on the digit span subtest of the Illinois test for
psycholinguistic abilities. The participants were presented with sentences and
random sequences, consisting of the same words in the sentence but rearranged. It
was ensured that all the sequences presented to a given participant were well
above his or her memory span, containing more words than their digit span score.
They found that both the high span and the low span group of children,
irrespective of their diagnosis, recalled more words when the material was
structured. Recency effect which is characteristic of recall of unstructured input
and recall of sentences by very young children was observed in all diagnostic
groups for random lists, irrespective of memory span. But, the low span group
with autism did not benefit from structure as much as their controls and showed
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recency effect with structured sequences as well. A further experiment, compared
recall for proper sentences and anomalous sentences (syntactically consistent but
semantically meaningless, for example, 'The house and church can dig like me').
Again, the performance of low span groups differed from the performance of high
span groups. Significantly greater recall ofproper sentences as opposed to
anomalous sentences was observed in the low span typically developing children
but not children with autism or learning difficulties. In the high span group, there
was no significant difference in performance between the clinical groups. These
results suggest that children with autism, irrespective of their developmental age,
are aided by meaning contrary to the hypothesis. Fyffe and Prior (1978) suggested
that an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) related deficit rather than a specific processing
deficit must be considered.
Another study investigating whether the deficit observed in the recall of
structured material in autism is specific to autism or whether it could be explained
by lower developmental age was carried out by Ramondo and Milech (1984).
This study involved immediate recall of sequences by digit span and verbal
mental age matched participants with autism, with learning difficulty and children
who were developing typically. There were four kinds of sequences - high on
syntactic and semantic aspects (for example, 'Last week we all went by train to
see the big farm'), low on syntactic and semantic aspects (for example, 'week
went see big last the all to train we farm by'), high on syntactic but low on
semantic aspects (for example, 'Last six we all went by tree to see the big box'),
and low on syntactic but high on semantic aspect (for example, 'red, white, blue,
green, dog, cat, bird, horse, train, car, bus, boat'). When the sentences were low
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on syntactic aspect all groups performed similarly. However when syntactically
well formed sentences were presented the typically developing participants
performed the best and the participants with autism performed the worst. But, the
performance of the group with learning difficulty was not differentiated from
either the typically developing group or the group with autism. Hence, it is
inconclusive whether the processing deficit is specific to autism or a result of
more general developmental delay. The authors suggested this to be the result of
low statistical power of the design due to the small size of the sample tested. In
other words, they assumed that the group with autism performed differently than
the group with learning difficulty, but that a lack of sensitivity in the design
prevented this effect from being detected.
The only result that was consistently obtained in the above mentioned
studies was the differential effect of structure on recall of sentences in the clinical
groups being based on their digit span. In the low span group, poor performance
could be the result of either autism or low developmental age. The high span
group with autism showed reduced effect of structure on sentence recall compared
to the clinically normal group in Aumhammer-Frith's (1969) experiment.
However error analysis suggested that the participants with autism were actively
coding the linguistic material. Fyffe and Prior (1978) did not find significant
difference in recall of sentences and random sequences or sentences and
anomalous sentences between high span group with autism, learning difficulty
and typical development. The participants in Fyffe and Prior (1978) study had the
highest digit span score in comparison to the other studies described here. The
mean digit span of the high span participants in Fyffe and Prior's (1978) study
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was 6.5 while the digit span ofparticipants in Aurnhammer-Frith's (1969) and
Ramondo and Milech's (1984) study was 5.21 and 5.6 respectively. This could
explain why there was no difference in performance of the three high span clinical
groups in Fyffe and Prior's (1978) study whereas in Aurnhammer-Frith's (1969)
and Ramondo and Milech's (1984) study the high span typical participants
showed significantly larger effects of structure than the group with autism. This
suggests that a developmental account could explain the reduced effect of
structure on recall of sentences reported in some studies.
Hence, none of the studies provided conclusive evidence for diminished
effect of structure of linguistic material on recall in autism in general. The
possible effect of developmental factors cannot be ruled out.
The homograph task
Homographs are words which have the same spelling but different
pronunciations and meanings ('bow', for example). Many researchers have found
that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders have difficulty using sentence
context to determine the pronunciation and therefore disambiguate the meaning of
the homograph. This difficulty in autism was first demonstrated in a study by
Frith and Snowling (1983). Children with autism, children with dyslexia and
children developing typically, matched in terms of their reading age (as measured
by British Ability Scales word reading test), were compared on a variety of
reading tasks. The study found the phonological and syntactic aspects of reading
performance intact in children with autism. This was demonstrated by appropriate
use of lexical and phonological strategy to read regular words, irregular words
and non-words, their ability to differentiate abstract and concrete words as classes
69
of semantic representation and their ability to immediately access to meaning of
individual words. However, participants with autism had a specific difficulty in
using semantic cues to disambiguate the pronunciation of homographs. Children
with autism were found to be as sensitive as clinically normal children to
syntactic constrains when pronouncing singular and plural words in a sentence,
but were significantly poor at a task that required choosing one of three
alternatives to complete sentences within a short story. Thus, difficulty with the
homograph task was explained as an inability to utilize semantic rather than
SYntactic information. The authors suggested that children with autism fail to use
contextual semantic cues while reading.
Other researchers (Happe, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Lopez &
Leekam, 2003) have found similar performance by individuals with autism on the
homograph task. Happe (1997) examined the relationship between theory of mind
deficits and weak central coherence by testing relatively able individuals with
autism, who differed in their theory ofmind task performance, on the homograph
task. Happe (1997) used a modified version of the homograph task (Snowling &
Frith, 1986). In some of the sentences the homograph appeared with the frequent
pronunciation (for example, 'There was a big tear in her eye') and in other
sentences the homograph appeared with the less frequent pronunciation (for
example, 'There was a big tear in her dress'). The position of the homograph was
manipulated so that in half the sentences it was placed before the sentence context
and in the other half after the sentence context (for example, Molly was very
happy, but in Lilly's eye there was a big tear). Happe (1997) found that most of
the participants with autism, who passed Theory of Mind tasks made little use of
the preceding sentence context when pronouncing the homographs indicating a
cognitive characteristic separate from a theory of mind deficit.
Jollife and Baron-Cohen (1999) tested a group of participants with high
functioning autism and Asperger's Syndrome using a homograph task similar to
the one used by Happe (1997). Both the clinical groups did not make use of the
sentence context to disambiguate homographs.
Lopez and Leekam (2003) found their subjects with autism were as able as
the comparison group in the use of visual contextual information to facilitate
object identification. Both groups of participants were faster and more accurate
naming the object when it followed a visual scene appropriate for the object (for
example, picture of a kitchen followed by a picture of a jug). Surprisingly this
ability was extended to verbal information as well where words were used instead
of pictorial representations. These participants with autism, however, were
impaired in using sentence context to correctly pronounce the homograph.
The homograph task used by Happe (1997), Jollife and Baron-Cohen
(1999) and Lopez and Leekam (2003) was developed by Snowling and Frith
(1986). They compared children with autism and children with learning difficulty
who had high or low verbal ability as well as younger typically developing
controls of similar mental age and reading age. Apart from presenting the frequent
and rare pronunciation of the homographs and placing the homographs before and
after the sentence context, the task was presented twice. The task was presented
the second time after training was given about the nature of homographs. There
was a significant effect of verbal ability on performance, with the high verbal
ability groups performing better than the low verbal ability groups. The high
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verbal ability groups (with autism, with learning difficulty and typically
developing) performed identically and took the sentence context into account
when pronouncing the homographs while the low ability groups (irrespective of
diagnosis) were insensitive to sentence context. All subjects improved from the
first to second session, with the less frequent pronunciation being used correctly
more in the second session. Since the insensitivity to sentence context was
observed only in the low verbal ability groups and all participants improved on
the task with training, the authors concluded that the inability to disambiguate
homographs based on context was not an "autism-specific phenomenon".
In Joliffe and Baron-Cohen's (1999) study the effect of training was not
tested. Thus, they concluded that the participants were not using sentence context
to disambiguate homographs because of a processing preference rather than an
absolute deficit. This conclusion was based on Snowling and Frith's (1986)
finding that even the younger and less able individuals with autism could be
trained to disambiguate homographs according to the context. Lopez and
Leekam's (2003) series of experiments was carried out to test whether " ....the
context impairment proposed by the Weak Central Coherence theory is simply a
reflection of difficulties in processing complex verbal stimuli rather than making
semantic connections between different items." Since the participants with autism
were using contextual verbal information presented textually to identify objects
quickly and accurately, they concluded that the difficulty with homographs may
be specific to particularly complex characteristic of the homograph task.
Overall, people with autism perform poorly on the homograph task.
However this could be the result of more general developmental delay (Snowling
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and Frith, 1986), a processing preference rather than a deficit (Joliffe and Baron-
Cohen, 1999) or complexity specific to the nature of homographs (Lopez and
Leekam, 2003) about which participants may not have been aware until training
was given. Definite conclusions about whether participants with autism have
difficulty with extracting meaning from sentences cannot be drawn based on
failure to correctly pronounce the homographs alone. Direct testing of the
comprehension of homographs and the whole sentence was suggested by Happe
(1997).
Neurological evidence
The cortical activation during sentence comprehension of a group of high
functioning individuals with autism was compared to age and verbal intelligence
quotient matched controls by Just, Cherkassky, Keller and Minshew (2004) using
functional MRI. The fMRI was carried out when the participants read active and
passive sentences and responded to a probe identifying either the agent or the
recipient of an action. The results indicated an increased activation of Wernicke's
area and a decreased activation of Broca's area in the participants with high
functioning autism compared to typical participants, who showed the opposite
pattern of activation. Wernicke's area is concerned with comprehension ability
and Broca's area is concerned with production including organisation of words
into a meaningful syntactic and semantic structure. The results from the fMRI
suggested that participants with high functioning autism have an enhanced ability
to process single words during comprehension but have difficulty integrating the
meaning of the individual words into a coherent and meaningful sentence. This
result is consistent with Frith's (2003) theory of Weak Central Coherence which
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suggests that detail-focused processing is spared and maybe even enhanced in
autism but the integrating processes involved in maintaining coherence is
impaired. The behavioural data suggested that participants with high functioning
autism made more errors than typical participants. Error rates of the participants
with high functioning autism were relatively high for the passive sentences than
for the active sentences. This suggests that difficulty with integration is observed
with only the more complex passive sentences at the behavioural level.
This study provides evidence at the biological level for enhanced detail-
focused word processing and impaired global-focused sentence processing in
autism resulting in impaired ability to process the meaning of sentences. In
conjunction with the behavioural data, these results suggest difficulty with
complex (passive) sentences in particular.
2.2.3 'Monitoring' text comprehension
In order to test decoding skills with larger units of text, Snowling and Frith
(1986) adapted two stories from children's nature stories and presented them to
children with autism and children developing typically who had high or low
verbal ability as measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale. In one story
participants had to choose, at intervals, one word from three alternatives that fit
the contents of the story. One alternative was appropriate to the immediate
context of the sentence but not the story as a whole, the second alternative was
appropriate to the immediate sentence as well as the story and the third was
inappropriate for both in terms of the sentence and the story. With the second
story no alternatives were given; instead, the subjects had to read the story and
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detect words that were not appropriate to the text. Some of the words were
appropriate to the sentence context but not the story (plausible), whereas others
were inappropriate to both the immediate sentence as well as the story context
(implausible). The authors argued that the first task imposes a "monitor" (authors'
quotes) by focusing the reader's attention. This may simulate a metalinguistic
process by artificially enhancing text processing. In the second story the
processing would be more automatic. Verbal ability was found to be a relevant
factor. The autistic and non autistic readers ofhigh verbal ability were able to
process the sentences and the story units as well as the matched normal readers.
Irrespective of diagnosis, the high verbal ability children preferred story-
appropriate over sentence-appropriate words and avoided implausible words when
monitoring was stimulated and to a great extent when it was not. The lower ability
typically developing group performed similarly to the higher ability groups;
however this was not so with the lower ability handicapped group. The
handicapped group, irrespective ofwhether they also had autism, was able to
reject implausible alternatives when monitoring was stimulated but otherwise
were not able to distinguish between story-appropriate and sentence-appropriate
words. Thus, difficulty at comprehending text at the level of sentences and stories
was observed in the lower ability group with autism but not the higher ability
group. With 'monitoring' even the lower ability groups were able to comprehend
text at the level of the story.
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2.2.4 Conclusion
To sum up, the evidence for impairment with sentence processing in
autism is persuasive, but the possibility that this impairment results from a more
general developmental delay or is specific to complex tasks like disambiguating
homographs remains open. Evidence for enhanced word processing ability but
deficient integrating processes involved in comprehending sentences may be
identifiable at biological level. However, behavioural data suggest that this pattern
of strength and weakness results in difficulty with complex sentences in
particular. Hence, a paradigm presenting simple textual descriptions of behaviour
might be suitable in some circumstances for investigating whether people with
Autism Spectrum Disorders infer traits.
2.3 Chapter summary
Social impairment is observed across the autistic spectrum independent of
successful adjustment in other areas of life. The Theory ofMind hypothesis
explains social impairment as the result of a deficit in attributing mental states, a
skill required to understand and predict others' behaviour. Attribution research
posits that lay explanations ofbehaviour are based on assumptions about stable
dispositions and the effect of transient situations. Dispositions are an important
socio-cognitive construct as people tend to attribute the cause of behaviour to the
actor's disposition even when it is possible to provide a situational explanation for
the action. Extensive Theory ofMind research suggests that people with Autism
Spectrum Disorders have difficulty using the situational information to impute
mental states to the protagonist which putatively explains why they make errors in
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predicting behaviour. However, whether individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders can make behavioural predictions based on information about the
protagonist's disposition has not been investigated so far. Some researchers
suggest that understanding traits as psychological entities follows the awareness
of the subjective nature ofmental states. Thus individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders, who reputedly have difficulty with belief-desire reasoning, should have
difficulty with traits as well. However, children who have not yet acquired belief-
desire reasoning can still understand traits in terms ofbehavioural regularity,
using rules. Considering that people with Autism Spectrum Disorders sometimes
successfully learn and apply rules, they might draw on this ability to good effect
when inferring traits. Investigating how individuals with autism construe traits
would provide a broader understanding of social cognition in autism than
provided by the narrow focus of the Theory ofMind hypothesis. Thus, the aim of
the experiments described in this thesis was to investigate whether individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer traits from descriptions ofbehaviour and if
they do so, are they especially sensitive to traits? A paradigm presenting simple
textual descriptions ofbehaviour was used for the purpose.
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Qillpter Three
Do individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer traits from
textual descriptions ofbehaviour?
3.1 Introduction
In order to investigate whether individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders infer traits from behaviour a simple paradigm was constructed that did
not place much demand on skills like memory, imagination and verbal ability.
The paradigm involved presenting sentences that describe a behaviour which
implies a trait (for example, 'He picked out the best biscuits for himself before the
guests arrived'). Participants read the sentence and then chose the word from a
pair of words that best relates to the sentence. There were two categories of word
pairs: trait cue-distracter word pair (greedy in the above example paired with an
unrelated word) and a semantic associate of one of the words in the sentence (tea
in the above example) paired with a distracter word.
Research (discussed in Chapter Two) suggests that participants with
autism who have a lower developmental age often show impairment in processing
sentences. They were not aided in recall when structured sentences were
presented as opposed to random sequences of words and were not using sentence
context to disambiguate homographs. Similar difficulties were not observed
consistently in individuals with autism whose developmental age was in the
average range. According to Hill and Frith (2003), co-morbidity of learning
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difficulty may lead to generally depressed task performance. Hence, it was
ensured that the participants chosen for the series of experiments described in this
thesis have Intelligence Quotients (IQ) in the average range. Difficulty was
occasionally observed in higher functioning individuals with autism when
complex verbal stimuli like passive sentences were used. Hence, none of the
sentences were passive. Straight forward descriptions of actions observable in
daily life and within the scope of experience of individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders were used. Furthermore, the forced choice nature of the paradigm can
be compared to the "monitor" used by Snowling and Frith (1986) in their story
task. Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders show difficulty focusing their
attention on a task, unless the task is related to one of their narrow interests (Quill,
1997). The forced choice nature was expected to help focus the reader's attention
on the task, and as suggested by Snowling and Frith (1986), this was expected to
support text processing. Of primary interest was whether people with Autism
Spectrum Disorders decode the meaning conveyed in textual descriptions of
behaviour in terms of traits.
Predicting performance of individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders on the
semantic associate cue condition
In studies on the recall of sentences versus non-sense word strings by
children with autism (Fyffe & Prior, 1998; Ramondo & Milech, 1984) there was
no significant difference between the experimental and the control group with
regards to overall recall of the non-sense word strings suggesting that the group
with autism were able to keep a string of words in their memory.
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The literature on autism provides evidence for both intact and impaired
semantic processing. Studies using free recall paradigms consistently report
impairment in semantic processing in individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders.
Hermelin and O'Connor (1967) tested children with autism and children
with learning difficulty, matched on digit span, on a free recall task. A list of
words was presented to participants ensuring that the list presented to a given
participant contained more words than their digit span score. The lists consisted of
words which could be grouped into semantic categories (for example, blue, three,
red, five, six, white, green, eight). The recall pattern of children with learning
difficulty showed clustering of words based on semantic relatedness. But,
clustering was not characteristic of recall by children with autism.
Tager-Flushberg (1991) also tested free recall of two types of word lists;
the first list contained twelve nouns each drawn from a different semantic
category (airplane, apple, brown, cabin, drum, elephant, lamp, onion, pencil, pot,
shirt, thumb) and the second list contained twelve words from a single category
(all animals). Children with autism, children with learning difficulty and typically
developing children participated in this study. The typically developing children
recalled significantly more items from the semantically related list than the
unrelated list. In contrast, the children with autism performed no better with the
related than the unrelated list. Bowler, Matthews and Gardiner (1997) replicated
this study with a group of adults with Asperger's Syndrome and verbal
intelligence matched typical participants.
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However, Toichi and Kamio (2001) found that when semantic cues were
provided in an immediate recall task, participants with autism succeed in
processing semantic information. In their study, participants (adolescents and
young adults with high functioning autism and chronological age, mental age and
verbal and performance intelligence matched controls) had to complete
fragmented words which were primed by another word. The prime and the target
words were either semantically related (for example, bus - train) or unrelated (for
example, clock - soup). Analysis of accuracy revealed that both groups showed
similar priming effects, with performance for the related items being significantly
better than for the unrelated items. The authors concluded that the relationships
between concepts of simple common words may not be impaired in high
functioning autism, which suggests intact semantic memory for words.
Lopez and Leekam (2003) found that their participants with autism were
as able as members of a typically developing comparison group in the use of
visual contextual information as well as verbal contextual information to aid
object identification and word identification respectively. The verbal contextual
task was similar to the semantic priming task used by Toichi and Kamio (2001)
but here the participants were required to read the second word rather than
complete a fragmented word and the primes were contextual in nature, for
example, Kitchen - Jug (appropriate context) or office -lemon (inappropriate
context). They found that all children, both those with autism and those with
typical development, were faster at recognising (reading) words when preceded
by an appropriate context than when preceded by a neutral (a series of five X's) or
an inappropriate context.
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Hence the impairment in semantic processing in autism seems to be
dependent of the kind of task used. While semantic relatedness of words in a list
does not aid participants with autism in a free recall task, they can nevertheless
use semantic cues to retrieve words from memory.
In the experiment being introduced here, a strong semantic associate of
one of the words in the sentence was presented as a cue in half the trials. The cues
were presented immediately after each sentence was read. Participants with
Autism Spectrum Disorders were expected to be able to perform well on the trials
when the cue was a semantic associate. This condition will serve as a point of
comparison for the focal condition where a trait word serves as the cue.
3.2 Experiment 1: Pilot Test 1
A preliminary study was carried out with a group of typical adults to
ensure that the sentences developed do imply the intended traits and that the
distracter words were not associated with the sentences.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
Twelve participants were recruited during the open day organised by the
School of Psychology at the University ofNottingham. All participants were
native English speaking males studying for an undergraduate degree in
Psychology. Their age ranged from 1 8 ~ ~ years to 2 0 ~ ~ years (M= 19.24. SD =
0.69)
Apparatus and Stimuli
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The experiment was programmed and presented using E-Prime on an Acer
Aspire 1522WLMi laptop with 15.4" widescreen.
Twenty-four trait implying sentences (twenty-two experimental trials and
two practice trials) were developed based on a database compiled by Uleman and
colleagues (1988). Some of the sentences were slightly modified to make it
conform to British English instead of American (for example, 'closet' was
changed to 'cupboard'). Nine new sentences were constructed ensuring that all
sentences were straight forward descriptions of behaviour, observable in daily life
and within the scope of experience of individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders. For example, the sentence for the trait honest in the database was, 'She
told the prospective buyer about her problems with her car'. It was felt that
buying and selling cars may not be an experience familiar for many individuals
with autism. Hence, the sentence 'He told the teacher that he broke the window'
was constructed and used instead.
The experimental trial consisted of two sentences each for the traits,
clever, strong, honest, friendly, tidy, careful, clumsy, selfish, forgetful, lazy, and
shy, making a total of 22 sentences. The first six traits have positive valance
(generally considered desirable) and the rest have negative valance (generally
considered undesirable). As was the case with the sentences used in studies on
Spontaneous Trait Inference, "descriptive action verbs" (Semin & Fielder, 1988)
were used in the experiments described in this thesis. Descriptive action verbs like
call. meet and kick refer to an action with a clear beginning and end, their
interpretation is highly context bound and hence they do not have positive or
negative semantic valence. For each sentence, two word pairs were identified.
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One word pair consisted of the implied trait word and a distracter word that was
not related to the sentence. The other word pair consisted of a semantic associate
of one of the words in the sentence and a distracter word. The cue word and the
distracter word were matched for frequency (Children's Printed Word Database,
Version 1.3,2002, available online), syllable count, word length as well as word
type (adjective or noun). The difference between frequency of the cue and the
distracter ranged from 0 to 8 for traits and 0 to 10 for semantic associates. The cue
and distracter were also matched for syllable count at a tolerance of+ 1 and for
number of letters within the range of+ 3. All the participants were given two
practice trials. The practice sentences were the same for all participants and
consisted of one sentence each for the traits kind and messy, presented with a trait
cue-distracter word pair and a semantic associate cue-distracter word pair
respectively. The two practice sentences and the associated word pairs were not
presented again in any of the experimental trials. Table 3.1 illustrates the stimuli
used for the trait friendly. See Appendix B for the full set of stimuli.
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Table 3.1: Examples ofstimuli used in experiment 1 (Pilot Test 1). The underlined
words are the associates ofthe semantic cue. The semantic cues were taken from
the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus, available online.
Sentence Trait cue-Distracter Semantic associate-
Distracter
He invited his new neighbour friendly - cracked cup - ship
to his house for tea.
He chatted with the stranger friendly - cracked ticket - sweater
next to him on the bus.
All the sentences and the cue-distracter pairs were presented in 18 point
Times New Roman font in the centre of the computer screen. The stimuli were
presented in black font on a white background. The cue-distracter word pairs were
separated by 19.5cms. Each participant was presented with all the sentences. The
stimuli were organised into two forms (as shown in Appendix B). Taking the
example shown in Table 2.1, one form presented the first sentence ('He invited
his new neighbour to his house for tea') with the trait cue (friendly-cracked) and
the second sentence ('He chatted with the stranger next to him on the bus') with
the semantic associate cue (ticket-sweater). The second form presented the same
sentences but the cues were reversed. The sentence 'He invited his new neighbour
to his house for tea' was presented with the semantic associate cue (cup-ship) and
the sentence 'He chatted with the stranger next to him on the bus' was presented
with the trait cue (friendly-cracked). By presenting the two forms to equal number
of participants it was ensured that a given sentence was presented with the trait
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cue to half the participants and with the semantic associate cue to the rest. The
position of the cue was counterbalanced so that it appeared on the right and left
part of the screen equally often for both the traits and the semantic associates.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet room. The participants
were assigned to the two forms using systematic allocation, so that the first
participant who was tested did form 1, the second did form 2, the third did form 1,
and so on till the final participant. They sat half a metre from the laptop.
Participants were told that the study deals with "aspects of reading ability" and
were instructed (both verbally and textually) as follows; "You will be shown
some sentences one by one on the computer screen. Read the sentence aloud once
and press the space bar. The sentence will disappear and two words will appear on
the screen, one on the left and one on the right. Your task is to match the word
that best relates to the sentence that you have just read by pressing 1 if you think
it is the word on the left and 0 if you think it is the word on the right."
After ensuring that participants were successful with the practice trials, the
experimental sentences were presented. The order of the sentences was
randomised for each participant. The procedure was selfpaced and there was a
blank screen for 2000 milliseconds between the sentence disappearing (when the
spacebar was pressed) and the onset of the words. The keys that were to be used,
namely the spacebar, keys' l ' and '0' were highlighted. The program was also set
so that all the keys except for these were locked.
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3.2.2 Results
A score of one was given for each correct response. The maximum score a
participant could obtain was 22 (with a maximum of 11 for trait cues and
semantic associate cues individually). The performance was at ceiling with
accuracy being 98 percent and 93 percent respectively for trait cues and semantic
associate cues.
The reaction time was measured from the onset of the word pair to when
the participants responded by pressing' l' or '0'. The reaction time for only the
correct responses was included in the analysis. The mean reaction time for the
trait cue was 926.28 ms (SD = 192.26 ms) and for the semantic associate cue was
1069.09 ms (SD = 254.2 ms). The reaction time data were normally distributed
and parametric analysis was carried out. A paired samples t-test revealed that the
reaction time for the trait cues was significantly less than that for the semantic
associate cues, t> 2.62,p < .05, d= 0.63. See figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Mean Reaction Time (RT) for trait cue and semantic associate cue
(experiment 1, Pilot Test 1). The error bars represent the standard error of
the mean.
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3.2.3 Discussion
The accuracy of the group was at ceiling and this was irrespective of
whether the cue was a trait or a semantic associate. This confirms that the target
cues were implied in the sentence and that the distracter words were not
perceived to be as strongly related to the sentence.
The mean reaction time for trait cues was found to be significantly less
than that for semantic associate cues. This cannot be explained by a speed-
accuracy trade off, as being fast in the trait condition was not at the cost of more
errors in that condition.
Errors were made in three sentences which were presented with a trait cue
and six sentences which were presented with a semantic associate cue. It was
suspected that in some of the sentences the errors may have been the result of the
distracter being related to the sentences. For example, in the sentence, "He tripped
on the bearskin rug and twisted his ankle' the semantic associate-distracter word
pair was 'floor- lion'. 'Floor' was set as the target word as it is a semantic
associate of the word 'rug' in the sentence. However, arguably the distracter word
'lion' is a semantic associate of the word 'bear' (in 'bearskin').
Though the results suggest that overall the sentences developed do imply
the intended traits and that the distracter words were not perceived to be related to
the sentences, the stimuli in which errors were made by some participants could
be due to the distracters being related to the sentence. These stimuli were removed
or modified.
3.3 Experiment 1: Pilot Test 2
In the previous test two forms of the experiment were developed so that a
sentence was not presented with its trait cue and its semantic associate cue to the
same participant. However, while the trait cues were the same in the two forms
the semantic associate cues were not (See Table 3.1). This was corrected so that
both the trait cues and the semantic associate cues were the same in the two
counterbalanced forms as shown in table 3.2. See Appendix C for the full set of
stimuli.
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Table 3.2: Examplesfrom the modified stimuli used in experiment 1 (Pilot Test 2).
The underlined words are the associates ofthe semantic cue. The semantic cues
were taken from the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus, available online.
Sentence Trait cue- Semantic associate-
Distracter Distracter
He invited his new neighbour to his friendly - cracked cup - ship
house for coffee.
He smiled and said hello to everyone friendly - cracked cup-ship
at the tea party.
3.3.1 Method
Participants
Sixteen participants, none of whom had taken part in Pilot Test 1, were
recruited. All were native English speakers who responded to advertisements
placed on various notice boards within the University ofNottingham campuses.
There were eight males and eight females. Their mean age was 23;8 years (SD =
3;4) ranging from 19;6 to 37;7 years. Half the participants were administered
form 1 and the other half form 2. Participants were assigned to the two forms
using systematic allocation, as described previously.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus was the same as described in Pilot Test 1. The stimuli used
in Pilot Test 1 were modified so that the same semantic associate cue appeared in
both forms as shown in table 3. In order to achieve this some of the sentences
used in Pilot Test 1 were changed as shown in Appendix C. The basic nature of
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the stimuli in terms of number and type of cues and sentences remained the same
as outlined in Pilot Test 1. The cue word and the distracter word were matched for
frequency (Children's Printed Word Database, Version 1.3, 2002, available
online), syllable count, word length as well as word type (adjective or noun). The
difference between frequency of the cue and the distracter ranged from 0 to 8 for
traits and 0 to 10 for semantic associates. The cue and distracter were also
matched for syllable count at a tolerance of + 1 and for number of letters within
the range of+ 3.
Procedure
The procedure was as described in Pilot Test 1.
3.3.2 Results
As was the case with Pilot Test 1, a score of one was given for each
correct response. The maximum score a participants could obtain was 22 (with a
maximum of 11 for trait cues and semantic associate cues individually). The
performance was at ceiling with accuracy being 100 percent and 89 percent
respectively for trait cues and semantic associate cues.
The reaction time was measured from the onset of the word pair to when
the participants responded by pressing' l' or '0'. The reaction time for only the
correct responses was included in the analysis. The mean reaction time for the
trait cue was 1461.55 ms (SD = 378.17 ms) and for the semantic associate cue
was 2210.8 ms (SD =736.37 ms). The reaction time data were normally
distributed and parametric analysis was carried out. A paired samples t-test
91
revealed that the reaction time for trait cues was significantly less than that for
semantic associate cues, t = 6.72,p < .001, d = 1.43 . See figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Mean Reaction Time (RT) for trait cue and semantic associate cue
(experiment 1, Pilot Test 2). The error bars represent the standard error of
the mean.
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The pattern of results obtained in Pilot Test 1 was replicated with the
modified set of stimuli. Accuracy was at ceiling and the reaction time for trait
cues was significantly less than that for semantic associate cues. It was observed
that the reaction time increased in Pilot Test 2 in comparison to Pilot Test 1,
though the pattern was maintained. This might be because Pilot Test 1 was carried
out as part of the 'research day' organised by the School of Psychology.
University ofNottingham. Interested undergraduate students of psychology at the
university attend the 'research day". which was organised over an afternoon, to
participate in paid experiments. The participants could do as many experiments as
they wanted over the afternoon. Earning depended on the number of studies they
did. Hence, Pilot Test 1 participants may have been motivated to perform faster in
an attempt to do as many studies as possible. In comparison, participants in Pilot
Test 2 received a fixed payment as they were recruited specifically for this study
and came to the lab at a pre-arranged time convenient for them.
3.4 Experiment 2
Performance of participants with Asperger's Syndrome
The stimuli constructed and tested in Pilot Test 2 were used to investigate
whether participants with Asperger's Syndrome infer traits on reading sentences
which imply traits.
3.4.1 Method
Participants
Twelve adult participants with a diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome took
part in this study. Individuals were only selected if they had been diagnosed by an
experienced clinician and met DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) for Asperger's Syndrome. Twelve participants without
Asperger's Syndrome were also tested. Participants with Asperger's Syndrome
were recruited from a social support group specifically for individuals with
Asperger's Syndrome in Leicestershire, U.K. All 24 participants were native
English speakers. Each participant with Asperger's Syndrome was matched
individually with a participant in the control group in terms of chronological age
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(CA), verbal intelligence quotient (VIQ) and gender. The Wechsler's Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence (WASI, Psychological Corporation, 1999) was used to
estimate VIQ. The Wechsler's Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence is a battery of
four subsets, two verbal and two performance tests, and provides a brief and
reliable estimate of a person's intellectual functioning. The VIQ was based on
their scores on the two verbal subsets, vocabulary and similarities. Independent
samples t-tests did not identify any significant difference between participants
with Asperger's Syndrome and control participants on CA, t < 1 and VIQ, t < 1.
Table 3.3 displays participants' details.
Table 3.3: Details ofparticipants with Asperger 's Syndrome (AS) and typical
participants (TYP) who took part in experiment 2
Group Male Female CA (Years/Months) VIQ
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
AS 9 3 28·4 9·6 18·11-48·6 117.5 12.88 97-143, , , ,
TYP 9 3 29·5 10·1 18;11-52;11 117.75 11.09 97-135, ,
The participants in each diagnostic group were divided equally between
the two counterbalanced experimental forms.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus and the stimuli used were as described in experiment 1
(Pilot Test 2).
Procedure
The procedure was as described in experiment 1 (Pilot Test 1).
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3.4.2 Results
A score of one was given for each correct response. The maximum score a
participant could obtain was 22 (with a maximum of 11 for trait cues and
semantic associate cues individually). Both groups performed at ceiling. With
respect to the trait cues, the typical participants and the participants with
Asperger's Syndrome were correct on 100 percent and 99 percent of the trials
respectively. With respect to the semantic associate cues participants in both
groups made the correct response 89 percent of the time.
The reaction time was measured from the onset of the word pair to when
the participants responded by pressing' l' or '0'. The reaction times for only
correct responses were included in the analysis. For typical participants the mean
reaction time for trait cue was 1452.5 ms (SD = 411.16 ms) and for semantic
associate cue was 2314.72 ms (SD = 967.19 ms). For the participants with
Asperger's Syndrome the mean reaction time for trait cue was 2052.46 ms (SD =
651.65 ms) and for semantic associate cue was 3177.69 ms (SD = 1032.9 ms).
The distribution of reaction time did not meet the conditions for normality and
hence the data was submitted to logarithmic transformation and then analysed
using repeated measures ANOVA. Cue type (trait versus semantic associate) was
the within subject factor and group (Asperger's Syndrome versus typical) the
between subjects factor.
There was a significant main effect of cue type on reaction time, F (1.22)
= 126.69,p < .001,/= 2.39 with the reaction time for trait cue being less than that
for semantic associate cue. There was a significant main effect of group, F (1. 22)
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= 7.75,p < .05,f= 0.59 with typical participants responding more quickly. There
was no significant interaction between group and cue type, F < 1. See Figure 2.3.
Figure 3.3: Mean reaction time (RT) for trait cue and semantic associate cue
for participants with Asperger 's Syndrome (AS) and participants oftypical
development (TYP) (experiment 2). The error bars represent the standard
error ofthe mean.
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3.4.3 Discussion
The accuracy ofparticipants with Asperger's Syndrome and typical
participants were at ceiling. Though the participants with Asperger's Syndrome
were significantly slower than the typical participants, both groups showed the
same pattern of reaction times, with significantly faster responses for the trait
cues in comparison to the semantic associate cues. This cannot be explained by a
speed-accuracy trade off, as being fast in the trait condition was not at the cost of
more errors in that condition.
Some researchers have found that frequency and word length affect
response latencies (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Whaley, 1978);
the higher the frequency, the lower the reaction time. The frequencies of the trait
and semantic associate cues and their distracters were obtained from the
Children's printed word database (Version 1.3,2002). This database provides
printed word frequencies as read by children aged between five and nine. A
database specifically for young children was used as the initial plan was to test
teenagers. The word frequency measures might not be suitable for the adult
participant groups in the current study and hence it is not possible to determine if
frequency was relevant to the results obtained in this experiment.
As the number of syllables increases the longer it will take to pronounce
the word. The syllable count of cues and distracters was matched. However, the
syllable count of trait cues and semantic associate cues was not matched. It so
happened that the trait cues on average contained more syllables, t = 2.37, p <
0.05. This should lead us to expect longer reaction times for the trait cues. But, it
was found that participants were faster on the trait cues. Therefore, participants
were fast at inferring traits despite being disadvantaged by cues that had more
syllables in that condition. Hence, the pattern of reaction times cannot easily be
explained in terms of differences in syllable count.
3.5 Conclusion
Coupled with ceiling level accuracy, the reaction time data suggest that,
similar to typical participants, participants with Asperger's Syndrome infer traits
from a behavioural description with ease (Asch, 1946). Another possibility.
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though, concerns the fact that responding to a trait cue requires integration of the
different components of the description whereas responding to a semantic cue
requires no such integration. The semantic cue cup for the sentence 'He invited
his new neighbour to his house for coffee' is related to the word coffee in the
sentence but not to the overall meaning conveyed by the description. Even though
trait cues require more processing than semantic cues, participants might
naturally attend to the global meaning at the expense of attending to the meaning
of individual words. This implies that participants would be faster at inferring not
only traits but any feature that requires attention to the global meaning presented.
The theory of Weak Central Coherence (Frith, 2003) suggests that
individuals with autism have enhanced ability to process local features of stimuli
but are impaired at processing global features. Frith suggested that this is a
'cognitive style' as it is observed in both lower level visual tasks (such as the
block design subset of the WASI) and higher level tasks, such as extracting
meaning from sentence. Explaining faster response to trait cues in terms of
attending to the global meaning at the expense of attending to the meaning of
individual words does not support the presence of a 'cognitive style'
characterised by weak central coherence.
The next experiment reported in Chapter Four aimed to disentangle these
Issues.
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~ t e r F o u u
Do individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer traits
effortlessly?
4.1 Introduction
In experiment 2 both the typical participants and participants with
Asperger's Syndrome were significantly faster when the cue was a trait as
opposed to a semantic associate. This pattern could arise either because inferring
traits is especially easy or because participants naturally attend to the global
meaning conveyed. In order to look into these possibilities the experiments
described in this chapter employed action cues as controls. Action cues were
related to the behaviour described in the sentence and like the trait cues, inferring
action also required information presented in the description to be integrated. For
example, 'visited' is the action cue for the sentence, 'He took some hot dinner to
his ill neighbour'. The action 'visited' cannot be inferred from anyone part of the
sentence, but required that the global meaning conveyed in the behavioural
description be attended to and deciphered. If traits are still inferred faster than
actions then it implies that participants (including those with Autism Spectrum
Disorders) are especially sensitive to traits. and are inferring them with relatively
little effort and not just because traits are inferred from a global reading.
In the experiments described in chapter three. the trait inference could
have been triggered by the cues or made spontaneously as soon as the sentences
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were read (even before the cue-distracter word pairs were presented). Providing
the correct response as one of two possible alternatives would cue the reader to
the possible meaning conveyed by the sentence. While this helps focus the
reader's attention, the trait inference may have been triggered by the cues and not
made spontaneously on reading the sentence. Alternatively, if traits were inferred
spontaneously, it is possible that the trait inference interfered with performance
when the cue was a non-trait semantic associate, resulting in increased reaction
time. Such interference would be absent if the sentences were not trait implying,
resulting in faster response. Hence, we might enquire whether participants are
slower to respond to a semantic associate cue ('pills' , for example) when
presented with a trait implying sentence (for example, 'He took the sick puppy
that he found on the road to his house') than when with a sentence that is not trait
implying (for example, 'He found his puppy sick when he reached his house').
Thus, presenting two different types of sentence with a semantic cue allows us to
test for interference when the sentence is trait implying, the presence of which
would suggest that traits are being inferred spontaneously on reading the sentence,
before the cues are presented.
4.2 Experiment 3
Stimuli construction - Pre-testing
The stimuli consisted of two types of sentence, trait implying and neutral.
The neutral sentence contained more or less the same words as its corresponding
trait implying sentence, but did not imply a trait. Many of the trait implying
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sentences used in experiment 2 could be modified such that they do not imply a
trait. This provided 16 trait sentence-neutral sentence pairs. Eight additional trait
sentence-neutral sentence pairs were constructed, some of which were based on
the Trait inference norms (Uleman, 1988). All the sentences were straight forward
descriptions of actions observable in daily life and within the scope of experience
of individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Both the trait and the neutral
sentences used descriptive action verbs. Whether a sentence was trait implying or
not was pre-tested on a sample of 40 typical participants who were attending
various courses at the University of Nottingham. All participants were native
English speakers (aged 18 to 39). They were given a list of sentences and asked to
tick those sentences they thought implied a trait and to identify (label) the trait.
Two forms (each consisting of 16 items) were developed so as to ensure that both
sentences of a pair - a trait sentence and its neutral counterpart which was made
up of more or less the same words but did not imply a trait - were not presented to
the same participant. The 12 trait implying sentences and the neutral sentences
chosen finally were considered to be so by a minimum of75 percent of the pre-
test participants, ranging from 75 percent to 100 percent. The data were collected
from students while they travelled between campuses on the university shuttle bus
and when they were in the common areas around the university.
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Stimuli construction - Pilot test
4.2.1 Method
Participants
Twelve participants, none of whom had taken part in any of the earlier
studies, were recruited through advertisements placed on various notice boards
around the University ofNottingham campuses. All participants were native
English speakers. There were ten males and two females. Their ages ranged from
19;2 to 28;2 years (M = 24;2, SD = 4;4).
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment was programmed and presented using E-Prime on an Acer
Aspire 1522WLMi laptop with 15.4" widescreen.
The stimuli consisted of four types of sentence-cue pairs, trait sentence-
trait cue pair, trait sentence-action cue pair, trait sentence-semantic associate cue
pair and neutral sentence-semantic associate cue pair as shown in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Sentence-cue pair combinations (experiments 3 and 4)
Trait cue- Action cue- Semantic associate-
Distracter Distracter Distracter
Trait implying sentence ...; ...; ...;
Neutral sentence - - ~
The same set of 12 trait implying sentences was paired with trait cues and
action cues. A separate set of 12 trait implying sentences and their corresponding
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neutral sentences was paired with semantic associate cues. The 12 traits used were
- clever, honest, friendly, tidy, careful, strong, greedy, lazy, rude, messy. clumsy,
and shy. The first six traits in the list have positive valance (generally considered
desirable) and the rest have negative valance (generally considered undesirable).
The traits honest, rude and messy were not used in the previous experiments,
though honest was used as one of the practice trials. There were two sentences for
each trait except for the traits honest and messy which had one sentence each.
All the cue-distracter word pairs were matched for frequency (Children's
printed word database, Version 1.3,2002, was used as teenagers were to be tested
in the main study with individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders), syllable
count, word length as well as word type (adjective, verb or noun). In experiments
1 and 2 the distracter words in the trait cue-distracter word pair, though matched
for word type (adjective), were not specifically a trait. In the current experiment
the distracter words for the trait cues were also traits, but incorrect because they
were not implied in the sentence. The cue traits and the distracter traits were
matched on valence (positive/negative). The practice sentences were the same for
all and consisted of one each of the four sentence-cue pairs. The practice
sentences and the associated word pairs were not presented again in any of the
experimental trials. A few examples of the stimuli are given in table 4.2 and 4.3.
See Appendix D for the complete set of stimuli used.
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Table 4.2: Examples trait cue and action cue paired with trait implying sentences
(experiments 3 and 4)
Sentences Trait-Distracter Action-Distracter
He called the new comers to his friendly-powerful invited-boiled
house for dinner.
He just sat in front of the television lazy-cruel watched-pushed
the whole day long.
Table 4.3: Examples oftrait sentence and neutral sentence paired with semantic
associate cues (experiments 3 and 4). The underlined words are the associates of
the semantic cue. The semantic cues were taken from the Edinburgh Associative
Thesaurus available online.
Trait implying (Implied trait) Neutral Semantic-
Distracter
He smiled and said hello to He met all his friends at the cup-bus
everyone at the tea party. tea party.
(Friendly)
He sat alone in a comer at the He placed the tree in a comer teacher-
school Christmas party. (Shy) for the school Christmas country
party.
All the sentences and the cue-distracter pairs were presented in 18 point
Times New Roman font in the centre of the computer screen. The cue-distracter
word pairs were separated by 19.5cms. The stimuli were presented in black font
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on a white background. The stimuli were divided into two forms, each consisting
of six items from each of the four types of sentence-cue pairs. It was ensured that
trait implying sentences and their corresponding neutral sentences were not in the
same form and hence were never presented to the same participant. The position
of the cue was counterbalanced so that it appeared on both sides of the screen
equally often for each of the sentence-cue combinations.
Design
This experiment incorporated two separate repeated measures designs. In
the first design the ease of drawing trait inferences was tested by comparing how
quickly participants responded to trait cues in comparison to action cues. Both the
trait cue and action cue were presented with trait implying sentences and required
integration of the information provided in the description.
The second design enquired whether participants were slower to respond
to a semantic cue when presented with a trait implying sentence due to
interference from spontaneous trait inference. The reaction times for semantic
associate cues when they were presented with trait implying sentences and with
neutral sentences were compared. Presence of interference would suggest that
participants were inferring the traits before the cues were presented. The
participants were unaware of the existence of two separate parts to the experiment
as all the sentences were presented in a single session.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet room. The participants
were assigned to the two forms using systematic allocation, so that the first
participant who was tested did form 1, the second did form 2. the third did form 1.
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and so on till the final participant. They sat half a metre from the laptop.
Participants were told that the study deals with "aspects of reading ability" and
were instructed (both verbally and textually) as follows; "You will be shown
some sentences one by one on the computer screen. Read the sentence aloud once
and press the space bar. The sentence will disappear and two words will appear on
the screen, one on the left and one on the right. Your task is to match the word
that best relates to the sentence that you have just read by pressing 1 if you think
it is the word on the left and 0 if you think it is the word on the right."
The instructions were the same as in experiments 1 and 2, but the
participants were also explicitly told, "Keep your hands on the keyboard
throughout the task and try to respond as fast and as accurately as you can". This
instruction was added because it was observed in experiment 2 that while the
typical group had their hands on the keyboard or the table, members of the group
with Asperger's Syndrome sometimes placed their hand in their laps bringing
them up each time the keyboard 'had to be manipulated. The participants with
Asperger's Syndrome were significantly slower overall in responding to the cues
than the typical participants. It could be that this difference in posture contributed
to the slower reaction times in the group with Asperger's Syndrome. This
instruction explicitly told the individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders what
was required so as to respond quickly, at least in terms of posture. Only those
participants who complied with this instruction were included.
After ensuring that participants were successful with the practice trials, the
experimental sentences were presented. Each participant was presented a
randomised order of 24 trials consisting of six trials each from the four sentence-
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cue combinations. The procedure was self paced and there was a blank screen for
1500 milliseconds between the sentence disappearing (when the spacebar was
pressed) and the onset of the words. The keys that were to be used, namely the
spacebar, keys 'z' and 'rn' were highlighted. The keys' l ' and '0' were used in
the experiments described in Chapter Three. This was changed to 'z' and 'rn' in
the current experiment as they are closer to the spacebar, thus making the
manipulation of the three keys more comfortable and easy. The program was also
set so that all the keys except for these were locked.
4.2.2 Results
A score of one was given for each correct response. The maximum score a
participant could obtain was 24 (with a maximum of six for each of the four
sentence-cue pairs). The performance was at ceiling with respect to accuracy on
the four sentence-cue pairs as shown in table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Percentages ofcorrect responses on the four sentence-cue pairs
(experiment 3)
Sentence-cue pair Accuracy
Trait sentence-trait cue 98%
Trait sentence-action cue 97%
Trait sentence-semantic associate cue 920/0
Neutral sentence-semantic associate cue 970/0
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The sentences in which errors were made were looked at individually. The
errors did not appear to be systematic, with no more than two participants getting
any given sentence wrong.
The reaction time was measured from the onset of the word pair to when
the participants responded by pressing 'z' or 'm'. The reaction times for only the
correct responses were included in the analysis.
Part 1 of the design compared the reaction times when the sentences were
trait implying and the cues were traits (versus distracters) or actions (versus
distracters). The mean reaction time for trait cue was 953.15 ms (SD = 206.45 ms)
and for action cue was 1016.57 ms (SD = 172.96 ms). The reaction time data were
distributed normally and parametric analysis was carried out. A paired samples t-
test revealed that the reaction time for trait cues was significantly less than that for
action cues, t= 2.31,p < .05, d= 0.33. See figure 4.1. The syllable count and
frequency of the group of trait cues and the group of action cues were matched, t
<1.
108
109
Figure 4.1: Mean Reaction Time (RT) for trait and action cues (experiment 3).
The error bars represent the standard error ofthe mean.
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Part 2 of the design compared the reaction times when semantic associate
cues were presented with trait sentences and when with neutral sentences. The
mean reaction time for semantic associate cue when presented with trait implying
sentence was 1206.11 ms (SD = 271.8 ms) and when presented with neutral
sentence was 1144.57 ms (SD = 213.07 ms). The reaction time data were
distributed normally and parametric analysis was carried out. The reaction time
for semantic associate cues did not significantly differ when presented with trait
implying and when with neutral sentences, t < 1. See figure 4.2. The syllable
count and frequency could not have contributed to the results as each semantic
associate was presented with its trait implying and neutral sentence equally often
between participants.
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Figure 4.2: Mean Reaction Time (RT) for semantic associate cue when
presented with trait implying sentence and when presented with neutral
sentence (experiment 3). The error bars represent the standard error ofthe
mean.
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4.2.3 Discussion
The accuracy was found to be at ceiling for the four sentence-cue pairs
indicating that the cues were implied in the sentence more strongly than the
distracters. The reaction time for trait cues was found to be significantly less than
that for action cues which suggests the traits were inferred effortlessly and are
easy not just because they were inferred from a global reading. Traits may be a
social concept that participants are especially sensitive to which enables faster
processing. The reaction time for semantic associate cues was less when presented
with neutral sentences than when with trait implying sentences. However the
difference was not significant. The current experiment was carried out with a
small sample of 12 participants. Hence, though the pattern of raw reaction time
data suggests interference from the trait inference, we cannot be certain and
replication using a larger sample is warranted. The pattern of reaction time seen in
the two analyses cannot be explained in terms of speed-accuracy trade off as
being fast on trait cues and semantic associate cues when presented with neutral
sentences was not at the cost of more errors in those conditions.
4.3 Experiment 4
Performance of participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders
The stimuli constructed and tested in experiment 3 were used to
investigate whether participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders are inferring
traits with minimal effort and whether the inferences were made spontaneously
even before cues are presented.
4.3.1 Method
Participants
Seventeen participants with a diagnosis that falls within Autism Spectrum
Disorders, none of whom had participated in experiment 2, took part in this study.
Individuals were only selected as participants if they had been diagnosed by an
experienced clinician and met DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) for Autism Spectrum Disorders. Of the seventeen participants,
eleven had a diagnosis of high functioning autism and six had a diagnosis of
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Asperger's Syndrome. Seventeen participants without Autism Spectrum
Disorders were also tested. Those with Autism Spectrum Disorders were
recruited from two special schools in Northamptonshire and Shropshire in the
U.K. All 34 participants were male native English speakers. Each participant with
a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorders was matched individually with a
participant in the control group in terms of Chronological Age (CA) and Verbal
Intelligence Quotient (VIQ). The VIQ was based on their scores on the
vocabulary and similarities subset of Wechsler's Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence (WASI, Psychological corporation, 1999). Independent samples t-
tests did not identify any significant difference between participants with Autism
Spectrum Disorders and control participants on CA and VIQ, t < 1 for both. Table
4.5 displays participants' details.
Table 4.5: Details ofparticipants with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and
participants developing typically (TYP) who took part in experiment 4.
Population Chronological age VerbalI.Q ASSQ
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
ASD 14;96 0.93 13'2- 109.06 16.17 77- 25.18 8.38 13-36,
16'4 139,
TYP 14;79 0.67 13'6- 111.82 15.69 86- 2.33 2.84 0-10,
15'6 142,
The High functioning Autism Spectrum Screening Questionnaire (ASSQ,
Ehlers, Gillberg & Wing, 1999) was administered to all the participants in order
112
to estimate levels of autistic features at the time of testing. The questionnaire was
completed by the form tutor of each participant. The group of participants with
Autism Spectrum Disorders scored significantly more than the typical group with
respect to the ASSQ rating, t = lO.87,p < .001. Ehlers et al. (1999) suggested 22
as the cut-off for teacher rating and the average rating for the group with Autism
Spectrum Disorders falls well above this cut-off, though some (4) with a
diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorders had a score less than 22.
The participants in each group were divided between the two forms
equally.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus and stimuli used were the same as those described in
experiment 3.
Design
This experiment incorporated two separate 2x2 factorial designs. In the
first design participants of typical development and participants with Autism
Spectrum Disorders were compared on the ease of drawing trait inference by
assessing how quickly they responded to trait cues and action cues. Both the cues
were presented with trait implying sentences and required integration of the
information provided in the description. The within subjects factor was cue type
(trait versus action) and the between subjects factor was group (Autism Spectrum
Disorders versus typical).
The second design enquired whether participants were slower to respond
to a semantic cue when presented with a trait implying sentence due to
interference from the trait inference. This was investigated by comparing the
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reaction time to semantic associate cues when they were presented with trait
implying sentences and when with neutral sentences that do not imply a trait. The
within subjects factor here was sentence type (trait implying versus neutral) and
the between subjects factor was group (Autism Spectrum Disorders versus
typical). Of particular interest was whether participants with Autism Spectrum
Disorders show interference effect, the presence of which would suggest that the
traits were inferred spontaneously before the cues were presented.
The participants however were unaware of the existence of two separate
parts to the experiment as all the sentences were presented to the participants in a
single session.
Procedure
The procedure described in experiment 3 was followed.
4.3.2 Results
A score of one was given for each correct response. The maximum score
was a participant could obtain was 24 (with a maximum of six for each of the four
sentence-cue pairs) and both groups performed close to ceiling on the four
sentence-cue pairs as shown in table 4.6.
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Table 4.6: Percentages ofthe correct responses (experiment -l)
Autism Spectrum Typical
Trait sentence-trait cue 98% 95%
Trait sentence-action cue 94% 95%
Trait sentence-semantic associate cue 81% 84%
Neutral sentence-semantic associate cue 950/0 93°,,10
The reaction time was measured from the onset of the word pair to when
the participants responded by pressing 'z' or 'rn'. The reaction times for only the
correct responses were included in the analysis. The distribution of reaction times
did not meet the condition for normality and hence the data was submitted to
logarithmic transformation and then analysed using two separate 2x2 repeated
measures ANOVAs.
Part 1 of the design compared the reaction times when the sentences were
trait implying and the cues were traits (versus distracters) or actions (versus
distracters). For the typical participants the mean reaction time for trait cues was
1052.31 ms (SD = 245.77 ms) and for action cues was 1235.29 ms (SD = 371.08
ms). For the participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders the mean reaction time
for trait cues was 1280.5 ms (SD = 317.98 ms) and for action cues was 1451.36
ms (SD = 354.71 ms). There was a significant main effect of cue type on reaction
time, F (l, 32) = 31.32, p < .001 ,j= 0.99, with the reaction time for trait being
less than that for action. There was a significant main effect of group, F (1, 32) =
5.42, p < .05.j= 0.41, with the typical group responding faster. There was no
significant interaction between cue type and group, F < 1. See figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Typical (FYP) and Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) groups
reaction time (RT) lor trait and action cues presented with trait implying
sentences (experiment 4). The error bars represent the standard error 01the
mean.
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Part 2 of the design compared the reaction times when semantic associate
cues were presented with trait implying sentences and when with neutral
sentences. For the typical participants the mean reaction time for semantic
associate cue when presented with trait implying sentence was 1448.12 ms (SD =
513.05 ms) and 1278.06 ms (SD = 311.01 ms) when presented with neutral
sentence. For the participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders the mean reaction
time for semantic associate cue when presented with trait implying sentence was
1891.52 ms (SD = 620.89 ms) and 1750.08 ms (SD = 488.63 ms) when presented
with neutral sentence. There was a significant main effect of sentence type. F (1.
32) = 5.34, p < .05.1= 0.4 L and group, F (1. 32) = 9.43, P < .005.1= 0.54. but no
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significant interaction between sentence type and group, F < 1. Typical
participants were faster than participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders; but
both groups showed the same pattern of reaction time - being faster when the
sentences were neutral than when the sentences were trait implying. See figure
4.4.
Figure 4.4: Typical (TYP) and Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) groups'
reaction time (RT) for semantic associate cues when presented with trait
sentences and when with neutral sentences (experiment 4). The error bars
represent the standard error ofthe mean.
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The reading time for sentences was measured from the moment a sentence
appeared on the screen to when the spacebar was pressed. An independent
samples t-test revealed no significant difference between the typically developing
group and the group with Autism Spectrum Disorders with respect to the reading
time, t < 1.
4.3.3 Discussion
Both groups of participants, typically developing and those with Autism
Spectrum Disorders, were significantly faster on trait cues than action cues. Both
these cues require the sentence to be processed for global meaning. This pattern of
reaction time suggests that trait inference in particular is easier than action
inference, even though both kinds of inference depended on global processing.
Hence, these results indicate that participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders are
good at inferring traits not just because they required global processing; rather,
the relatively effortless processing suggests that they may be especially sensitive
to traits despite the need for global processing.
Furthermore, both the typically developing group and the group with
Autism Spectrum Disorders were significantly slower on semantic associate cues
when they were presented with trait implying sentences as opposed to neutral
sentences. Trait inference could have interfered with performance on the task in
the former case, thus increasing the reaction time. In the later case such
interference would be absent resulting in no impediment to fast performance.
This suggests that trait inference is not only effortless but also perhaps made
spontaneously on reading the behavioural description, even before the cues were
presented.
Frith (2003) suggested that enhanced local feature processing at the
expense of impaired global feature processing is a 'cognitive style' in autism and
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is observed in both higher and lower level tasks. The results obtained in this
experiment suggest that all participants, including those with Autism Spectrum
Disorders, were attending to the global meaning conveyed in the behavioural
description. This does not support weak central coherence in autism at the level of
sentences. Possibly, the use of a forced choice response type may have enhanced
text processing as suggested by Snowling and Frith (1986).
In experiment 2 participants with Asperger's Syndrome were significantly
slower than the participants of typical development. In experiment 4, unlike in
experiment 2, participants were given explicit instructions to respond as fast as
possible and were also asked to keep their hand on the keyboard throughout the
task, ready to respond. Only those who complied with this instruction were
included in the study. Still, the participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders were
significantly slower than the participants of typical development. The participants
were instructed to read the sentence aloud just once before pressing the space bar
to investigate whether the participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders had
slower reading time. The two groups were not significantly different in terms of
the time taken to read the sentences; however the participants with Autism
Spectrum Disorders were significantly slower at choosing the correct cue. This
does not lend support to the possibility that participants with Autism Spectrum
Disorders are generally slower to comprehend.
The clinical picture of Autism Spectrum Disorders is often characterised
by motor clumsiness (Campbell & Shay, 2005). Ghaziuddin, Butler. Tsai and
Ghaziuddin (1994) reported that children with Autism Spectrum Disorders
exhibited problems with motor co-ordination on Bruininks-Osetsky test of fine
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and gross motor skills. Miyanhara et al. (1997) administered the Movement
Assessment Battery for children to children with Aspergers Syndrome and
reported significant delay on task performance. Rinehart, Bradshaw, Brereton and
Tonge (2001) argued that performance on standardised tests of motor
performance can be confounded by attentional and intellectual ability. They
developed a reaction time based motor reprogramming task which also enabled
the researchers to separately analyse movement preparation and movement
execution times. The task involved depressing circular buttons in response to
illumination of an LED light within each button. Pressing the target triggered the
next target to be illuminated. The task involved reciprocally moving left or right
as quickly as possible between two target buttons. Once, during a given block of
eight trials, an oddball was introduced where the button next to the depressed
button but in the direction opposite to expected was illuminated. The programme
provided measures of two indices of response times. 'Down tirne' measures how
long a button is held down before the move to the next button was executed. This
measure arguably reflects aspects of movement preparation time. 'Movement
time ~ measures the time between the release of one button and the depression of
the next and reflects the time taken to execute the planned action. This task was
administered to children with Asperger's Syndrome, children with High
Functioning Autism and typically developing control children matched on
Chronological Age, gender and full scale Intelligence Quotient. The results
indicated that children with Autism Spectrum Disorders have a normal ability to
execute movements but showed anomalies in movement preparation.
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In the experiment described in the previous and this chapter, participants
had to execute a motor response depending on which side of the computer screen
the cue appeared. This entails a certain amount of motor planning. There is
evidence for motor planning and co-ordination difficulty in Autism Spectrum
Disorders from clinical descriptions, performance of standardised tests and
experimental studies. A motor movement planning deficit could possibly explain
why participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders were generally slower than the
participants of developing typically.
The pattern of the reaction time of the group with Autism Spectrum
Disorders was similar to that of the typically developing group and this pattern
suggests that both groups of participants are especially sensitive to traits and thus
infer them effortlessly and spontaneously in a way that interferes with their
performance on the task when the cue was not a trait. The pattern of reaction time
seen in the two analyses cannot be explained in terms of speed-accuracy trade off
as being fast on trait cues and semantic associates when presented with neutral
sentences was not at the cost of more errors in those conditions. There was no
significant difference in the mean frequency and mean syllable count of the trait
cue and action cue. Each semantic cue was presented an equal number of times
with its trait implying sentence and neutral sentence between participants. Hence,
neither could difference in the relative frequency or syllable count of the cues
have contributed to the reaction time pattern obtained.
If participants respond quickly to trait cues, then it implies that they
experience a strong association between the cue and the sentence. If we
conducted an independent test of the degree of association we might find that
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some trait cues were more strongly associated with the sentences than the action
cues. Conversely, we might find that some trait cues were no more associated
than action cues. Is it the case that fast responding to trait cues is explained
entirely as a high degree of association between cue and sentence or is it the case
that participants respond rapidly even to trait cues when they are not perceived to
be strongly associated with the sentence? To find the answer we conducted a post
hoc survey on the degree of relatedness between the sentence and trait/action cue.
4.4 Post-hoc
Sentence-cue relatedness and reaction time pattern
To test the relative degree of association between the sentence and the
trait/action cue a paper and pencil rating scale was constructed. Participants (52
first year psychology students at the University of Nottingham) read the sentences
and chose the correct word from the given cue-distracter word pair. The
participants also had to rate the chosen word on the degree to which they thought
it matched the sentence on a four point scale that ranged from a good match to a
perfect match. For each participant half the sentences were presented with a trait
cue-distracter word pair and half with an action cue-distracter word pair. Two
forms of the rating scale were used so that a given sentence was not presented
with both the trait cue and the action cue to the same participant. Between
participants, each sentence was presented with its trait cue and action cue equally
often.
1 ~ ~
As expected, participants chose the correct word 100 percent of the time.
An independent samples t-test carried out on the mean rating given to a sentence
on the implied trait and the implied action revealed that the difference was
approaching significance, t = 1.82,p = .08, d = 0.3, with the rating for trait (M =
2.61, SD = 0.26) being higher than that for action (M= 2.4, SD = 0.4). The
sentences were ranked based on their independent samples t-test value and effect
size comparing its rating for trait and action. The sentences could be divided into
two sets, one set where the sentence was rated higher on the trait than the action (t
> 0.5) and the other where there was minimal difference in the rating it was given
for the trait and the action (t < 0.5). Table 4.7 shows the ranked sentences along
with the respective trait cue and action cue.
Table 4.7: Sentences ranked based on t values comparing its rating on trait and
action cues. The cut-offvalue for t was set at 0.5. The Sentences having a t value
below 0.5 show minimal difference in the degree to which the trait and action are
implied and those above 0.5 can be said to be biased towards the traits. Two
sentences that were biased towards action and one sentence where no significant
bias was observed were also grouped with the former sentences.
Sentence Word cues Difference t p d
He called the newcomers to his Friendly- -0.69 -2.59 .01 1.17
house for dinner. Invited
He bumped into the cupboard Clumsy- -0.04 -0.12 .9 0.1
door and hit his nose. Hurt
He ate all the scones without Greedy- 0 0 1 0
leaving any for his younger Finished
brother.
He just sat in front of the Lazy- 0.04 0.15 .88 0.06
television the whole day long. Watched
He wore a spotless and well Tidy- 0.12 0.43 .67 0.27
ironed shirt each day. Dressed
He always drove a little below Careful- 0.19 0.7 .49 0.43
the speed limit. Slowly
He looked down when he said Shy- 0.31 1,24 .22 0.6
hello to his new classmate. Greeted
He did not wipe off the sauce Messy- 0.31 1.25 .22 0.6
that he dropped on his shirt. Spill
He left the dinner party without Rude- 0.54 1.96 .06 1.02
thanking the hostess. Went
He usually got all the answers Clever- 0.58 2.11 .04 1.07
correct in the math class. Solved
He carried the office chair with Strong- 0.85 3.18 .002 1.85
just one hand up three floors. Climbed
He took some hot dinner to his Kind- 0.88 3.96 0.0002 1.76
ill neighbour. Visited
Traits were given a significantly higher rating in the first set of sentences
in comparison to the second (t = 2.24, P < .05) whereas rating given to the action
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cue was not significantly different between the two (t = -1.23,p > .05). Thus the
first set shows a bias for a stronger trait association than the second set.
If participants were faster on trait cues as a result of their being the more
strongly associated cue and not because of the participants being especially
sensitive to traits per se, then the reaction time for traits would be significantly
less in the biased set in comparison to the non-biased set. The mean reaction time
for trait cues in the biased condition for the typical participants was 1064.93 ms
(SD = 282.62 ms) and 1234.53 ms (SD = 344.95 ms) for the participants with
Autism Spectrum Disorders. The mean reaction time for trait cue in the no-bias
condition was 1035.47 ms (SD = 256.51 ms) for the typical participants and
1322.68 ms (SD = 334.71 ms) for the participants with Autism Spectrum
Disorders. A 2x2 ANOVA was carried out with bias (presence versus absence)
being the within subject variable and group (Autism Spectrum Disorders versus
Typical) being the between subjects variable. The results indicated no significant
main effect of bias, F < 1. There was a significant main effect of group, F (1, 32)
= 5.93,p < .05,1= 0.43, with the typical participants being faster, but the
interaction between bias and group was not significant, F (1, 32) = 1.92, p > .05,1
= 0.24. Hence, the faster response to trait cues cannot be accounted for only in
terms of the strength of the cue alone. See figure 4.5.
125
126
Figure 4.5: Typical (FYP) and Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) groups'
reaction time (RT) to trait cues when the sentence set was biased and when
not biased towards a stronger trait association (experiment 4, Post-hoc). The
error bars represent the standard error ofthe mean.
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The results offered no evidence to suggest that participants responded
promptly to trait cues because they were perceived to be strongly associated with
the sentence. Instead the results suggest that participants seem compelled to make
the trait inference on reading the sentences even when the traits are not perceived
to be strongly associated with the sentence.
4.5 Conclusion
Participants of typical development and participants with Autism
Spectrum Disorders were attending to the global meaning conveyed by the
sentences. They were especially good at traits, inferring them faster than actions.
even though both required similar global processing. Furthermore, trait inference
apparently was not triggered by the cues. The traits were inferred before the cues
were presented, thus, interfering with the task and slowing down the participants
when the cue was not a trait. This result cannot be explained by differences in
frequency, syllable count or strength of the cue. The participants with Autism
Spectrum Disorders were generally slower than participants developing typically.
A motor movement planning deficit could possibly explain this difference. The
results suggest that participants, including those with Autism Spectrum Disorders,
are especially sensitive to traits, inferring them with relatively little effort and
spontaneously from textual descriptions of behaviour.
One possibility for participants being especially sensitive to traits could be
that traits were explicitly presented as cues in some of the trials. This may have
predisposed the participants to infer the traits on reading the sentences. The next
experiment investigated whether participants, especially those with Autism
Spectrum Disorders, continue to make trait inferences spontaneously even in the
absence of explicit presentation of trait cues.
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Does mere comprehension oftrait implying sentences result in trait
inference?
5.1 Introduction
Attribution theory concerns how the layman understands the cause of
others' behaviour. The traditional models of attribution present the layman as a
"naive scientist" who systematically observes and analyses behaviour over many
instances before drawing conclusions. Heider's concept of equifinality (1944)
suggests that the naive psychologist would attribute the cause ofbehaviour to a
person's intention when the behaviour leads to identical effects under different
conditions. According to Jones and Davis's (1965) Correspondence Inference
Model, correspondence between action and intention or disposition increases as
the non-common effects (unique to the particular action) and universal desirability
of effects decreases. Kelly's Covaraition Principle (1973) conceives of the causal
attribution made by people as being about the person, the entity or the
circumstance depending on which of the causes the person finds the effect
covaring with. Thus, based on traditional models of attribution traits are
comprehended based on logic rather than intuition. As discussed in Chapter Two
this implies that trait inference may be a spared socio-cognitive function in
Autism Spectrum Disorders. However, one criticism of traditional models of
attribution is that they do not describe what happens in real life. In reality,
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impressions are made rapidly, without the necessary information or the cognitive
resources required for carrying out complicated inferential processes, and rarely
as a result of instructions or an explicit aim.
Asch (1946) talks about the remarkable rapidity and great ease with which
impressions are formed and Kelly (1973) suggested that people use "causal
schemata", a general learned conception about how certain kinds of causes
interact to produce a specific kind of effect, in most everyday attributions.
However, the automatic nature of impression formation was never portrayed in
the traditional models. It was only in the late 1970's that models of attribution
started presenting impression formation as consisting of both automatic and
controlled processes interacting with one another. Furthermore, researchers
suggested that it was the automatic aspect of a process that determined its
ecological validity. The frequency of occurrence of a psychological process is
more in real life when it occurs without the person intending to engage in the
particular process (Uleman, 1999; Winter & Uleman, 1984). For example, we
would engage in impression formation far more often if the only condition
required for the process to be triggered was the presence ofbehaviour. If so, we
would automatically form impressions every time a person exhibits relevant
behaviour. If apart from the presence of a person exhibiting relevant behaviour,
we must intend to form impression and need to have sufficient attentional
resource then the process would occur less frequently. After all, we may not want
to form impressions of every person we meet or have the resource to do so with
each person.
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5.1.1 Automatically coding behaviour in terms of trait
Researchers have consistently found that people automatically code
behaviour in trait terms. Gilbert, Pelham and Krull's (1988) model of disposition
inference identifies three processes - categorisation, characterisation and
correction. First, the stimulus is identified and categorised in terms ofbehaviour,
situation, and disposition (Trope, 1986). Categorisation is followed by
characterisation which involves drawing dispositional inference about the actor.
Finally, the inference made is adjusted based on information available about
situational constraints. Gilbert et al. (1988) contended that of the three stages,
categorisation and characterisation are relatively automatic processes whereas
correction is more deliberate, relatively controlled and uses a significant portion
of the perceiver's processing resources. If this is the case, "cognitive busyness"
would not affect our ability to draw dispositional inferences from behaviour
(characterisation), but would disable our ability to use situational information to
correct the inferences. In order to test this Gilbert et al. (1988) showed silent
videotapes of a female target having a discussion with a stranger. In five of seven
clips the target was seen to behave anxiously. Half the participants were told that
in these five clips the target was discussing anxiety inducing topics. The other half
of the participants were told that all topics were relaxation inducing. All
participants were informed that they would be asked to make judgements about
the target's personality (regarding state and trait anxiety). Participants in both
conditions were divided into two groups. The cognitive resource of one group was
taxed as, apart from having to make personality judgements, they were also asked
to memorize the seven different topics discussed. The topics of discussion were
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presented in writing at the beginning of each video clip. Results indicated that
while the passive perceivers (who did not have to do the memory task) used
information about the situation provided by the discussion topics to correct their
inferences, the active perceivers did not, despite the fact that they were more
likely to remember the discussion topics. As hypothesised, having a heavier
cognitive load was not found to affect the task of characterising the behaviour and
person but did affect the ability to make corrections to the inferences based on the
information provided about the situation. Thus, participants were able to attribute
traits to the behaviour and the person even when their attentional resource was
limited, suggesting that trait inference is an automatic process.
Spontaneous Trait Inferences are said to occur when attending to another
person's behaviour produces a trait inference in the absence of any explicit
intention to infer traits or to form an impression of that person (Uleman, Newman
and Moskowitz, 1996). Initial studies on Spontaneous Trait Inferences employed
a cued recall paradigm based on Tulving and Thompson's (1973) encoding
specificity principle (for example, Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman &
Cunniff, 1985). Participants studied trait implying sentences for a later memory
test. Recall was compared under three cueing conditions - no cue, trait cue and
semantic cue. Semantic cues were related to the actor who was designated by his
occupation (for example, the semantic cue for the sentence 'The decorator tells
the dentist all about her neighbour's habits' was 'interior') or the verb in the
sentence ('talk' for the example given above). If traits were inferred
spontaneously when the sentences were comprehended then the inferred trait
would be stored in memory along with the respective sentence and act as a good
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retrieval cue for the sentence. The occurrence of such a process would be evident
if the trait, though not a strong semantic associate of the sentence, were as
effective as a retrieval cue as a strong semantic associate. This was indeed the
case even when the sentences were presented as distracters to the focal task of
remembering digit sequences. Winter, Uleman & Cunniff (1985) also tested the
participant's awareness ofmaking trait inferences while they memorised the
sentences. Following the presentation of the last sentence, the participants were
asked to report what he or she thought about while reading it. They rated how
much they had thought about visual images, word associations, who caused the
event in the last sentence, and the actor's personality or personal qualities on 11-
point scales. Awareness of making dispositional inferences was only weakly
correlated with disposition-cued recall.
Occurrence of Spontaneous Trait Inference has been demonstrated using
different paradigms, a few which are discussed here. Uleman, Hon, Roman and
Moskowitz (1996) used a recognition probe paradigm to study Spontaneous Trait
Inference. Participants read paragraphs of various lengths at the end of which a
single trait word was presented. The participants had to decide whether the word
was literally presented in the preceding paragraph or not. Some of the paragraphs
were trait implying while others were neutral. Ifparticipants, on reading trait
implying paragraphs, were inferring the traits spontaneously then the trait word
would be active while the participants made their decision. The activated trait
concept would make it harder for the participants to reject a probe, which was
implied but not actually presented. This would be evident in more errors and
increased reaction time when the probe followed a trait implying paragraph than a
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neutral paragraph, as similar activation would be absent in the latter case. Results
indicated that participants were indeed making Spontaneous Trait Inference.
Another paradigm used to study Spontaneous Trait Inference is the lexical
decision paradigm. Zarate and Uleman (1994) asked participants to decide as
quickly as possible whether a string of letters is a word. Sometimes the letters
(forming a trait word) followed a trait implying sentence and at other times it
followed a neutral sentence. Ifparticipants were forming Spontaneous Trait
Inference, they would be faster when the string of words followed a trait implying
sentence than a neutral sentence. This was a result of the inference possibly acting
as a prime, making the decision easier when the letter strings corresponded to the
implied trait. The results obtained by Zarate and Uleman (1994) supported
Spontaneous Trait Inference.
In a relearning paradigm used by Carlston and Skowronski (1994)
participants were presented with photographs ofpeople paired with self
descriptive statements that implied traits. After a period of time the same
participants attempted to learn photo-trait word pairs. Half of the photo-trait word
pairs were presented at time 1 (relearning pairs). Of course, the trait word was
only implied in the self description at time 1. The other half of the photo-trait
word pairs were novel. Finally, participants viewed the photographs and tried to
recall the paired traits. The recall for the relearning pairs and the novel pairs was
compared. It was observed that participants recalled the trait word for the
relearning pairs better than the novel pairs. This was irrespective of whether
participants were told to "form an impression" or "familiarise themselves with the
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material" at time 1. This is taken as evidence that participants were forming
impressions at time 1 even when there was no obvious reason to do.
Thus, there is compelling evidence that typical individuals automatically-
without intention (Winter & Uleman, 1984), with minimal awareness (Winter,
Uleman & Cunniff, 1985) and with diminished resources (Gilbert et al., 1988) -
process behavioural information in terms of traits. Spontaneously categorizing
behaviour in trait terms serves as the foundation on which conscious inferences
can be made when need arises. Even though individuals draw trait inferences in
the absence of current goals, Spontaneous Trait Inference serves the distal goal of
much human psychological functioning which deals with search for meaning and
understanding of the social world (Uleman et al., 1996).
In experiment 4, trait words were cues in only 25 percent of the trials, so
that making trait inferences would actually hinder performance in a majority of
the trials. Still participants, on reading the sentences, seemed to spontaneously
draw trait inferences and appeared unable to inhibit making these inferences.
However, it may be that explicitly presenting the trait cues, even in a minority of
trials, predisposed the participants to infer the traits on reading the sentences. In
other words, participants may not have inferred the traits had they never been
rewarded for it in any trial. Thus, spontaneousness of the inference may have been
as much the function of the trait cue as the trait implying sentences. In the current
experiment, trait cues were removed and trait implying and neutral sentences were
presented with action cue-distracter word pairs and semantic associate cue-
distracter word pairs. Under these conditions trait inference could only be
stimulated as a result of the nature of the sentences alone. The aim of the
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experiment was to assess whether participants (particularly those diagnosed with
Autism Spectrum Disorders) continue to interpret the behaviour described in the
sentences in terms of traits although participants had no intention or reason to do
so. The sentence-cue combinations used are illustrated in table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Sentence-cue pairs used in experiment 5
Semantic associate-Distracter Action cue- Distracter
Trait implying sentence ~ ~
Neutral sentence ~ ~
5.1.2 Interference as a measure of automaticity
Stroop experiments are often employed in studies on automaticity and
control. In Stroop experiments multidimensional stimuli are used, for example,
the word red written in blue. Participants are instructed to report one of the
dimensions while ignoring others. The degree to which the ignored dimension
interferes with the main task, indicated by increased response time latencies or
errors, is taken as an index of the degree to which attention is drawn to the
irrelevant dimension uncontrollably and without intention. Pratto and John (1991)
tested whether attention was directed to negatively evaluated stimuli by
presenting desirable and undesirable personality trait adjectives like honest and
sadistic to subjects who had to name the colour in which the adjectives were
presented. As hypothesised, although participants had no intention or reason to do
so, they attended to the undesirable traits more than to the desirable traits. The
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additional attention led to relatively longer response latencies for the undesirable
traits.
In the current experiment, as in experiment 4, the reaction times were
analysed to test for interference when the sentences were trait implying. Presence
of interference would be evident if the time taken to select the correct cue was
more when the sentence was trait implying than when the sentence was neutral.
Presence of interference would suggest that as with the stroop tasks participants
were presumably unable to ignore the irrelevant trait dimension of the stimuli
when the sentences were trait implying. This would presumably increase the time
taken to respond. In the case of neutral sentences the irrelevant and attention-
grabbing trait dimension was absent and hence there would be no impediment to
fast performance.
Unlike in experiment 4, the current experiment did not present trait words
as cues in any trial. But for the fact that the behaviour described 'implied' traits,
there was no explicit reason for participants to infer traits. In fact, making trait
inferences presents an obstacle to quick responding in all trials. Thus, the
presence of interference in the current experiment would suggest that participants
were compelled to code the behaviour described in trait terms, even when there
was no reason for or benefit from doing so.
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5.2 Experiment 5
Stimuli construction - Pre-testing
The stimuli consisted of four types of sentence-cue pairs as illustrated in
table 5.1. Twelve semantic associate cues to be presented with trait implying and
its corresponding neutral sentences and 12 action cues to be presented with a
separate set of trait implying and neutral sentences were constructed. The trait
implying and neutral sentences chosen for the experiment were considered to be
so by at least 68 percent of the pre-test participants described in experiment 3.
Experiment 3 (Post-hoc) revealed that the strength of association between
the cue and the sentence could vary. In this experiment a pre-test was carried out
to ensure that the degree of association of the action cues did not differ
significantly when the sentences were trait implying and when they were neutral.
Forty typical participants, who were studying for an undergraduate course
in psychology at the University of Nottingham, read the sentences and chose the
correct word from the given cue-distracter word pair. The participants also rated
the chosen word on the degree to which they thought it matched the sentence on a
four point scale that ranged from a good match to a perfect match. Half the
participants were presented with the trait implying sentences and the other half
with the neutral sentences so that each participant rated the action cue for either
trait implying sentences or neutral sentences alone. The data were collected at the
beginning of a lecture. There were 12 trait implying and 12 neutral sentences.
Accuracy was 100 percent indicating that the cues were implied by the sentence.
An independent samples t-test did not identify any significant difference in the
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degree to which the action cues were associated with the trait implying and
neutral sentences, t < 1.
Performance of participants with Asperger's Syndrome and chronological
age and verbal IQ matched controls
5.2.1 Method
Participants
Sixteen adult participants with a diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome
(fifteen males and one female) took part in the current experiment. Individuals
were only selected as participants if they had been diagnosed by an experienced
clinician and met DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for
Asperger's Syndrome. Sixteen participants without Asperger's Syndrome were
also tested. None of the participants had taken part in any of the earlier
experiments. Those with Asperger's Syndrome were recruited from a specialist
college for individuals with Asperger's Syndrome in Somerset, U.K. All 32
participants were native English speakers. The two groups were matched in terms
of Chronological Age (CA), Verbal Intelligence Quotient (VIQ) and gender. The
VIQ was based on their scores on the vocabulary and similarities subset of
Wechsler's Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI, Psychological corporation,
1999) and independent samples t-tests did not identify any significant difference
between participants with Asperger's Syndrome and control participants on CA
and VIQ, t < 1 for both. Table 5.2 displays participants' details.
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Table 5.2: Details ofparticipants with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) and typical
participants (TYP) who took part in experiment 5
Group Males Females CA (Years/Months) VIQ
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
AS 15 1 17;8 1·2 16·3-20·6 107.5 11.13 87-125, , ,
Typical 15 1 17·8 1·4 16·5-20·8 106.81 11.74 78-125, , , ,
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment was programmed and presented using E-Prime on an Acer
Aspire 1522WLMi laptop with 15.4" widescreen.
The stimuli consisted of four types of sentence-cue pairs. The
experimental trial consisted of 12 semantic associate cues presented with trait
implying and its corresponding neutral sentences and 12 action cues presented
with a separate set of trait implying and neutral sentences. The 12 traits implied
were friendly, clever, honest, tidy, helpful, kind, rude, lazy, careless, greedy,
forgetful and shy. The first six traits have positive valance (generally considered
desirable) and the rest have negative valance (generally considered undesirable).
All the traits have been used in the previous experiments described in this thesis.
As shown in Appendix E some of the sentences were new. Examples are given in
table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Examples ofthe stimuli used in experiment 5. The underlined words
are the associates ofthe semantic associate cue. The semantic cues were taken
from the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus, available online.
Trait implying (Implied trait) Neutral Cue- Distracter
He told the teacher that he He told the teacher about reported-appeared
broke the window. (Honest) the window that was stuck (action)
He did not offer his seat to the He sat next to an old lady ticket-forests
old lady on the crowded bus. on the crowded bus. (Semantic
(Rude) associate)
All the cue-distracter word pairs were matched for frequency (MRC
Psycholinguistic Database was used as adult participants were recruited for the
current experiment), syllable count, word length as well as word type (verb or
noun). All the sentences and the cue-distracter pairs were presented in 18 point
Times New Roman font in the centre of the computer screen. The stimuli were
presented in black font on a white background.
The cue-distracter word pairs were separated by 19.5cms. See Appendix E
for the full set of stimuli used in experiment 5.
Two forms of the experiment were constructed, with each form consisting
of 24 trials, six trials from each of the four sentence-cue pairs, so that a trait
implying sentence and its corresponding neutral sentence were not in the same
form. Each cue was presented with its trait implying and neutral sentence an equal
number of times between participants.
1..+0
Design
This experiment incorporated two separate 2x2 factorial designs,
enquiring whether traits were inferred on reading textual descriptions of
behaviour although participants had no intention or reason to do so. The first
design enquired whether participants were slower to respond to semantic cues and
the second design enquired whether participants were slower to respond to action
cues, when presented with a trait implying sentence than with a neutral sentence.
In both parts, the within subjects factor was sentence type (trait implying versus
neutral) and the between subjects factor was group (Asperger's Syndrome versus
typical). The participants were unaware of the existence of two separate parts to
the experiment as all the sentences were presented in a single session.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet room. The participants
were assigned to the two forms using systematic allocation, so that the first
participant who was tested did form 1, the second did form 2, the third did form 1,
and so on till the final participant. The participants sat half a metre from the
laptop and were told that the study deals with "aspects of reading ability". They
were instructed (both verbally and textually) as follows; "You will be shown
some sentences one by one on the computer screen. Read the sentence aloud once
and press the space bar. The sentence will disappear and two words will appear on
the screen, one on the left and one on the right. Your task is to match the word
that best relates to the sentence that you have just read by pressing z if you think it
is the word on the left and m if you think it is the word on the right." The
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participants were also explicitly told, "Keep your hands on the keyboard
throughout the task and try to respond as fast and as accurately as you can".
After ensuring that participants were successful with the practice trials, the
experimental sentences were presented. The sentences appeared in a different
random order for each participant. The procedure was selfpaced and there was a
blank screen for 1500 milliseconds between the sentence disappearing (when the
spacebar was pressed) and the onset of the words. The keys that were to be used,
namely the spacebar, keys 'z' and 'm' were highlighted. The program was also set
so that all the keys except for these were locked.
In the practice session participants were presented with a trait sentence-
action cue pair and with a neutral sentence-semantic associate cue pair. In the
experimental trials, each participant was presented a random order of 24 trials
consisting of six trials each from the four sentence-cue combinations. Which six
sentence-cue pair from each combination was presented varied between
participants depending on which experimental form was presented. A trait
implying and its corresponding neutral sentence were not presented to the same
participant and all 48 stimuli were presented an equal number of times between
participants.
5.2.2 Results
A score of one was given for each correct response. The maximum score a
participant could obtain was 24 (with a maximum of six for each of the four
sentence-cue pairs). Both groups performed close to ceiling for all four sentence-
cue pairs as shown in table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Percentages ofthe correct responses (experiment 5)
Asperger's Typical
Trait sentence- semantic associate cue 93% 98%
Neutral- semantic associate cue 900/0 980/0
Trait sentence-action cue 98% 98%
Neutral sentence-action cue 98% 100%
The reaction time was measured from the onset of the word pair to when
the participants responded by pressing 'z' or 'm'. The reaction times for only the
correct responses were included in the analysis. The distribution of reaction times
did not meet the condition for normality and hence the data was submitted to
logarithmic transformation and then analysed using two separate 2x2 repeated
measures ANOVA.
The first part of the design compared the reaction time for semantic
associate cues for trait implying and neutral sentences for participants with
Asperger's Syndrome and typically developed participants. The mean reaction
time of the typical participants for semantic associate cue when presented with
trait implying sentence was 1599.57 ms (SD = 742.61 ms) and when presented
with neutral sentence was 1298.91 ms (SD = 424.32 ms). The mean reaction time
of the participants with Asperger's Syndrome for semantic associate cue when
presented with trait implying sentence was 2215.61 ms (SD = 883.84 ms) and
when presented with neutral sentence was 2025.93 ms (SD = 900.1 ms). There
was a significant main effect of sentence type on reaction time, F (1, 30) = 15.51.
P < .001 ,f= 0.72, with the reaction time for trait implying sentences being longer
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than that for neutral sentences. There was a significant main effect of group, F (l,
30) = 8.33,p < .01,f= 0.53, with the typical group responding faster. There was
no significant interaction between cue type and group, F (l, 30) < 1. See figure
5.1.
Figure 5.1: The mean reaction time (RT) oftypical participants (TYP) and
participants with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) for semantic associate cue when
presented with trait implying and neutral sentence (experiment 5). The error
bars represent the standard error ofthe mean.
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The second part of the design compared the reaction time for action cues
for trait implying and neutral sentences for participants with Asperger's
Syndrome and typically developed participants. The mean reaction time of the
typical participants for action cue when presented with trait implying sentence
was 1284.71 ms (SD = 371.03 ms) and when presented with neutral sentence was
1190.09 ms (SD = 355.02 ms). The mean reaction time of the participants with
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Asperger's Syndrome for action cue when presented with trait implying sentence
was 1706.6 ms (SD = 597.24 ms) and when presented with neutral sentence was
1592.83 ms (SD = 561.81 ms).There was a significant main effect of sentence
type on reaction time, F (1, 30) = 6.22,p < .05,f= 0.45, with the reaction time for
trait implying sentences being longer than that for neutral sentences. There was a
significant main effect of group, F (1,30) = 6.64,p = .01,f= 0.47, with the
typical group responding faster. There was no significant interaction between cue
type and group, F < 1. See figure 5.2
Figure 5.2: The mean reaction time (RT) oftypical participants (TYP) and
participants with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) for action cue when presented
with trait implying and neutral sentence (experiment 5). The error bars
represent the standard error ofthe mean.
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5.2.3 Discussion
The accuracy ofparticipants with Asperger's Syndrome and participants
of typical development was close to ceiling on the four sentence-cue pairs. The
participants with Asperger's Syndrome were significantly slower than
participants of typical development. As discussed in Chapter Four this could be
explained in terms of a motor movement planning deficit. The pattern of reaction
time was similar in both groups ofparticipants. Both groups were faster at
responding when the sentences were neutral than when the sentences were trait
implying. This was so when the cue was a semantic associate and when the cue
was an action.
In the current experiment, as in the previous, the participants were told
that the study investigated "aspects of reading ability" and hence presumably they
were unaware of the social nature of the task. Furthermore, traits were not
presented as cues in any trials, which may have primed participants to make trait
inferences in the previous experiments. Thus, there was no reason for or benefit
from making trait inferences. Despite that, it seemed participants continued to
infer traits spontaneously on reading the trait implying sentences, without
intention. Like in stroop tasks, participants were presumably unable to ignore the
irrelevant trait dimension of the stimuli when the sentences were trait implying,
This probably explains the increased time taken to respond. In the case of neutral
sentences the irrelevant and attention grabbing trait dimension was absent and
hence responding was not hindered. The pattern of reaction time seen in the two
analyses cannot be explained in terms of speed-accuracy trade off as being fast
when the sentences were neutral was not at the cost of more errors in that
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condition. Neither can differences in the strength of association between the cues
and the sentences or frequency and syllable count of the cues used with trait
implying and neutral sentences explain the pattern of reaction time, as each cue
was presented with both the trait and the neutral sentence an equal number of
times.
5.3 Conclusion
The frequency of occurrence of a psychological process is more in real life
when it occurs without the person intending to do so (Uleman, 1999; Winter &
Uleman, 1984). The results obtained in the current experiment provide indirect
evidence that participants infer traits when comprehending trait implying
sentences even in the absence of any intention to do so. Since participants were
told that the study deals with "aspects of reading ability", they were presumably
unaware of the social nature of the task. Since trait cues were not presented in any
of the trials there was no reason for or benefit from making trait inference either.
IfUleman (1999) is correct, this is a sign that participants, including individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorders, readily and frequently make trait inferences in
the real world.
The only requirement for the traits to be inferred was that the participant
attend to and be motivated to comprehend the meaning of the information
(behaviour) presented. Coding the information in relation to traits hindered
performance in every trial. Possibly, the participants were unable to ignore the
trait dimension and thus inhibit drawing the inference, even though it was
irrelevant to the task. Hence, the trait inference observed can be considered to be
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the unintended consequence of the intended comprehension of the sentence. It
reflects what Bargh (1989) referred to as an "unintended side effect of another
intended process".
1.+8
Do individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders associate the
inferred trait with the actor?
6.1 Introduction
Results from experiments 4 and 5 suggest that individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders infer traits spontaneously, with minimal effort and in the
absence of reason for or benefit from making the inference. In other words,
participants presumably inferred the traits implied in the behavioural descriptions
even though they did not intend to do so. The frequency of occurrence of a
psychological process is more in real life when it occurs without the person's
intention (Winter & Uleman, 1984; Uleman, 1999). This suggests that
participants, including individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders, probably
make trait inferences readily and frequently in the real world. But what does the
trait relate to? The inference 'clumsy' drawn on reading the sentence, "He slipped
on the rug and twisted his ankle" could be about the action or the person carrying
out the action (actor). Being able to infer traits might not be of much practical use
unless the traits are associated with the actor. People regard traits as a relatively
stable and enduring characteristic of a person. A person attributed as having a
particular trait is expected to behave consistently with the trait across time and
across situations. Attributing a trait to a person serves the social function of
making predictions about his or her future behaviour. For this purpose the inferred
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trait should be linked to a representation of the actor. The representation chosen
should enable us to distinguish the actor from other people (of the same age and
gender, for example) and thus allow us to predict how hislher behaviour would
differ from those of other people. Faces are a perceptually salient and relatively
stable representation of a person (Todorov & Uleman, 2004). Furthermore they
are unique, unlike a person's gender, colour and attire. Being stable and unique
makes faces an ideal representation of the actor in attributional processes. Hence
the current study investigated whether individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders identify people, represented by frontal photographs of their faces, based
on traits implied in behavioural descriptions provided about them.
6.1.1 The paradigm
A forced choice reaction time paradigm was used in this study. Each
experimental trial consisted of a 'study phase' and a 'test phase'. In the study
phase a pair of colour photographs (frontal view of the face, chosen from a
database developed in the School of Psychology, University of Sterling, which is
available online) of Caucasian males was presented along with a single sentence
description of each person. In the test phase the same pair of photograph was
presented, either in the same or in the opposite spatial orientation as in the study
phase, with a single word (see figure 6.1). The word was implied in the
description of one of the person in the pair. The participants were required to
identify the person the word best described based on the information provided in
the study phase.
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Figure 6.1: Illustration ofthe two phases in experim ent 6 and 7
Study phase
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Sentence
Test phase (Opposite orientation)
Word
Sentence
This paradigm is a modification of one used by Todorov and Uleman
(Experiment 4, 2004) to study whether Spontaneous Trait Inference is related to
the person who performed the behaviour or restricted to classifying the behaviour.
In Todorov and Uleman' s (2004) experiment, the study phase consisted of 36
trials in which participants were presented with pairs of faces and trait implying
sentences similar to the illustration of the study phase in figure 6.1. In some cases
the traits were implied (for example, ' Judith picked out the best chocolates before
the guests arri ved ' ) and in others the traits were literall y present in the sen tence
(for example, 'Tom was so aggressi ve that he threatened to hit her unless she took
back what she said ' ). Th e test phase, which followed the 36 trials, showed the
faces individually from the first part accompanied by a single word (trait).
Participants had to decide whether the word was part of the sentence presented
specifically about the person shown. The authors argued that if Spontaneous Trait
Inference is about the person carrying out the behaviour then the participants
would be more likely to recognize the implied trait and recognize the explicitly
presented traits in the context of the actor's face than the control face (the other
face in the pair). Analysis of reaction time and errors showed that traits were
associated spontaneously with the actor carrying out the behaviour. In other
words, participants seemed to draw inferences about the kind ofperson the actor
is and not just what kind of behaviour the actor carried out, without intending to
do so.
Todorov and Uleman (2004) used a memory-based recognition probe
paradigm as they were interested in the spontaneousness with which inferred
traits are associated with the actor. Given the evidence for difficulty with face
recognition in Autism Spectrum Disorders (discussed later), our interest in this
study was whether participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders were able to use
trait information to differentiate and identify people. This ability can be viewed as
the minimum necessary requirement for the inferred trait to be applied in social
perceptual processes to make predictions about future behaviour. For this purpose
we modified Todorov and Uleman's (2004) paradigm so that each trial consisted
of a study phase immediately followed by the test phase.
The information provided by the sentences was of two types - traits and
facts. Facts referred to relatively concrete characteristics of the actor like
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physique (tall) and occupation (waiter). Traits, on the other hand, referred to
more abstract mental characteristic like rude and clever.
6.2 Experiment 6: Pre-test
The stimuli were pre-tested to ensure that the sentences implied the
intended trait or fact. A rating scale questionnaire was developed in which each
item consisted of a face paired with a sentence. The pre-test participants were
asked to rate the person shown on the trait or fact implied in the sentence, which
shall be called the "target characteristic". They were also required to rate a
trait/fact about which no information was given, called the "random
characteristic".
The face database used did not provide information about the actors' age
and hence the pre-test participants were asked to guess the age of the person
shown in the picture. This information was used to ensure that the face pairs used
in the main experiment were matched on age.
Figure 6.2 illustrates items from the rating scale. In the first example (A),
forgetful (trait) is the target characteristic and sick (fact) is the random
characteristic. In the second example (B) non-smoker (fact) is the target
characteristic andfriendly (trait) is the random characteristic.
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Figure 6.2: Two items used in the rating scale.
4 5 7 8 9 10
Forgetful Does not apply at all
He left his bag of groceries on the bus.
Appl ies very well
Applies very wellDoes not apply at allSick
A
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Age
B
He is six and a half feet in height.
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Careful
Does not apply at all
3 4 5 6
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Traits and facts were paired randomly ensuring that pairs were matched
for valance as far as possible. For example, Tall (fact) and careful (trait) are
desirable and henc e have positive valance, whereas sick (fact) and lazy (trait) are
und esirabl e and henc e have negative va lance. The trai t-fac t pairs used were :
Careful-Tall, Clever-Waiter, Tidy-Vegetarian, Friendly- on-smoker,
Fashionable-St udent, Detem1ined-American, Kind-Rich. Funny-Pil ot , Careless-
Deaf, Poor-Clumsy, Forgetful-Sick, Daring-Smoker, Shy-Actor, Rude-Thin,
Greedy-Short and Ignorant-Fat.
Each questionnaire consisted of 16 items with half the photographs
presented along with trait sentences and the other half of the photographs
presented with fact sentences. Thus, in the former the fact was the random
characteristic and in the later the trait was the random characteristic. A given trait
or fact was presented only once to a participant either as the target characteristic
or the random characteristic. Each photograph was presented with all 16 traits and
16 facts as the target characteristic between participants.
Sixty-four native English speaking psychology undergraduate students
filled in the questionnaire at the beginning of one of their lectures. Participants
were asked to read the sentences and then rate the person on a scale from one to
ten on the two characteristics given so that a rating of ten means that the
characteristic aptly describes the person and a rating of one means that the
characteristic does not describe the person at all. They were also asked to guess
the person's age.
The ratings given were analysed at the level of the stimuli to see whether
the traits and facts were implied in the sentence or not. If they were then the actor
would be rated higher on the target characteristic than on the random
characteristic. A Mann-Whitney U test was carried out, as the data were not
normally distributed, which revealed this was indeed the case, U = 0.00, N1 = 16,
N2 = 16, two tailed p < .001. This result also indicates that the face stimuli are
apparently neutral, such that a person was rated high on the trait/fact when it was
the target characteristic but not when it was the random characteristic.
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Comparison between the ratings for traits and facts did not reveal any
significant difference between the mean rating given for traits (M = 3.69, SD =
0.87) and facts (M = 3.69, SD = 0.6) when both were random characteristics, t <
1. However the mean rating for facts (M = 7.88, SD = 0.86) was significantly
more than for traits (M= 7.19, SD = 0.4) when both were the target characteristic,
t = 2.83,p < 0.01.
A higher rating for the facts suggests that participants were more
confident labelling a person based on factual information than trait information.
This was expected as describing someone as "six and a half feet in height" does
not leave much doubt about the actor being tall in the population tested; whereas
describing someone "who left his bag of groceries on the bus" as forgetful is
merely a possible explanation.
Many of the fact sentences differed from the trait sentences in terms of
being statements as opposed to descriptions (doing something which implied the
characteristic). Hence the fact sentences were modified so that they too were
descriptive (for example, 'He has to bend down to enter most doors'). This was
not expected to affect the rating given to facts as we assume that the
comparatively greater confidence with which participants label a person based on
inferred facts comes from inherent differences between traits and facts as a
concept. As mentioned before, facts refer to concrete characteristics whereas
traits are more abstract mental characteristics. Traits and facts differ in terms of
ambiguity as well. There are potentially a large number of behaviours that can
imply a given trait and a single behaviour can be perceived to imply different
traits. For example "He carried the old lady's bag of groceries to her car" can be
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thought of as kind or helpful. This is not the case with facts. The behaviour used
to describe facts unambiguously refers to the particular fact. For example, "He
carried the lunch ordered by the customer to their table" is a relatively
unequivocal description of a waiter. To ensure that all the facts were descriptive,
some of the factual statements which were pre-tested were removed and new ones
introduced.
A pilot study of the computer based task was carried out with three
participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders in order to ensure that they do not
experience difficulties with the task in terms of understanding instructions or
processing the information required to carry out the task.
6.3 Experiment 6, Pilot Test 1 on a few individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders
6.3.1 Method
Participants
Three individuals who were diagnosed by an experienced clinician and
met DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for Asperger's
SYndrome were tested. There were two males and one female (CA range: 21;6-
30;7; VIQ range: 98-112; PIQ range: 102-121).
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment was programmed and presented using E-Prime on an Acer
Aspire 1522WLMi laptop with 15.4" widescreen.
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The stimuli consisted of six pairs of trait implying sentences and six pairs
of fact implying sentences. The fact implying sentences used in the pre-test were
modified to make them descriptive, similar to trait implying sentences. As far as
possible only those traits that were descriptions of a "mental characteristic" were
included; traits that refer to "physical characteristics" like strong were not
included.
The traits and facts were grouped into pairs by random assignment
ensuring that they were matched on valence as far as possible. The degree of
desirability/undesirability was not taken into account when matching because at
least in the case of traits, evaluative extremity was not found to affect response
latencies, suggesting that traits are evaluated categorically in the first instance
(Pratto and John, 1991). Trait pairs selected were: Clever-Friendly, Daring-
Confident, Determined-Careful, Impulsive-Ignorant, Shy-Forgetful and Lazy-
Careless. And the fact pairs were: Waiter-Student, Vegetarian-Actor, Non-
smoker-Tall, Deaf-Wet, Sick-Poor and Foreigner-Father. The photographs
(coloured, frontal view of the face of Caucasian males, matched on age which was
the average of the age guessed by the 64 pre-test participants) were also grouped
into pairs by random assignment.
The study phase consisted of a pair of photographs presented with a pair
of one-sentence descriptions. In half the trials the sentence pair consisted of trait
implying sentences and in the other half of the trials the sentence pair consisted of
fact implying sentences. The trait and fact implying sentences were assigned to
photographs by random assignment. In the experimental and practice trials the
dimension of the photographs was 6.5 x 6.5 em (length x breadth). The
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photograph pairs were separated by 12 em. The sentences were presented directly
beneath each photograph in two single spaced lines. There was a distance of at
least 3 em between the two sentences. The word in the test phase was presented in
the same line as the sentences but in between the two photographs as illustrated in
figure 6.1 and 6.3 . The textual description and the word were presented in 12
point Arial black font. The background was white. Figure 6.3 illustrates examp les
of stimuli used in experiment 6, Pilot Test 1.
Figure 6.3: Examples ofstimuli used in experiment 6 (Pilot Test 1 and Pilot
Test 2) and experiment 7
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Study phase
(Fact condition)
Test phase
(Opposite orientation)
This is Andrew who went to
bed with a sore throat and a
bad cold .
This is Mathew who can afford
to buy only from sales at
charity shops .
sick
Study phase (Trait condition) Test phase (Same orientation)
This is Victor who ignored
his injuries and completed
the race.
This is Gordon who always
drove a little slower than the
speed limit.
determined
Each participant was administered a different form of the experiment such
that each photograph was presented with both sentences of its pair equally often,
each photograph pair in the test phase was presented in the same and opposite
spatial orientation as the study phase an equal number of times, and the trait/fact
implied in both the sentences of a pair was presented equally often in the test
phase.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet room. The participants
were assigned to the different forms using systematic allocation, so that the first
participant who was tested did form 1, the second did form 2, the third did form 3,
and so on till the final participant. The participants sat half a metre from the
laptop and were instructed (both verbally and textually) thus; "On each slide you
will be shown a pair ofpictures with some information about each written below
it. Read the information given one by one and then press the space bar. A pair of
pictures will come up on the screen again but this time with a single word in
between the two pictures. Your task is to identify the picture you think best
matches the word, by pressing 'z' if you think it is the picture on the left and 'm' if
you think it is the picture on the right, based on the information you read. Please
keep your hands on the keyboard ready to respond throughout the task. You will
have two practice trials."
The first practice trial presented a face pair with a pair of trait implying
sentences and the second presented a different face pair with a pair of fact
implying sentences. The spatial orientation was same in study and test phase for
the first trial and opposite for the second trial. No feedback was given during the
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practice session. Each participant was presented a random order of 12
experimental trials - six trials with trait implying sentence pairs and six trials with
fact implying sentence pairs. The correct answer was on the left side in half the
trials and on the right in the rest. The procedure was selfpaced and the test phase
came up on the screen 1500 milliseconds after the participants pressed the space
bar. The keys that were to be used, namely the spacebar, keys 'z' and 'm' were
highlighted. The program was also set so that all the keys except for these were
locked.
The photograph-sentence pairing in the study phase, spatial orientation of
the photograph in the test phase and the words presented in the test phase were
counterbalanced between participants.
6.3.2 Results
The rate of accuracy for the three participants was found to be 50 percent.
The three participants showed the same pattern of accuracy in the practice and
experimental trials. All of them got 100 percent correct when the face pair in the
test phase was presented in the same spatial orientation as in the study phase. But,
when the spatial orientation of the face pair was opposite in the two phases, the
three participants were 100 percent wrong. The reaction time was not analysed
because the accuracy rate was at chance. In order to ascertain that this pattern was
not the result of some flaw in the experimental procedure, three typical
postgraduate students were administered the same experiment. It was observed
that the accuracy rate of the three control participants was well above chance for
traits and facts irrespective of spatial orientation. The percentage of correct
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response for traits and facts was 89 percent and 98 percent respectively for same
spatial orientation and 85 percent and 89 percent respectively for opposite spatial
orientation.
6.3.3 Discussion
The typical participants were able to identify the actor based on both traits
and facts. However, the participants with Asperger's SYndrome appeared to
associate the trait and fact implied in the sentences spatially but not with the
actor's identity. This may be due to general difficulty with face processing in
Autism Spectrum Disorders as suggested by some researchers. Boucher and
Lewis (1992) investigated unfamiliar face recognition in children with autism.
They presented 30 black and white photographs to three groups of children
namely, children with autism, children with learning disability and typically
developing children. The three groups ofparticipants were matched on
Chronological Age, gender and non-verbal ability. Performance on a forced
choice recognition test which followed immediately afterwards revealed that
participants with autism made significantly fewer correct responses than either the
typical or the learning disabled groups. This impaired ability to recognise recently
viewed faces was observed even when the groups were matched on verbal ability.
Further, their ability to discriminate between faces was significantly poorer
compared to their ability to discriminate between buildings. Klin, Sparrow, Bildt,
Cicchetti, Cohen and Volkmar (1999) found that participants with autism
performed significantly worse than participants diagnosed with Pervasive
Developmental Disorder - Not Otherwise Specified (PDDNOS, an umbrella term
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for people who show some features of autism but not enough to warrant a
diagnosis of autism) and non-PDD groups on the face recognition subset of the
Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC). The Face Recognition
subtest of the K-ABC measures the child's ability to attend closely to one or two
faces whose photographs are exposed briefly, and then to select the correct face(s)
shown in a different pose and/or emotional expression, from a group photograph.
Williams, Goldstein and Minshew (2005) administered the Wechsler
Memory Scale - III to a group of high functioning adults with autism and found
their performance to be significantly poorer than typical controls on delayed as
well as immediate recall of the face recognition subset.
As with research on most areas in autism, research on face recognition too
has its share of contradictory results. Celani, Battacchi and Archidiacono (1999)
did not find individuals with autism to be significantly different from verbal
mental age matched individuals with Down's syndrome and typical individuals on
face recognition using a matching task. In this task a target photograph was
presented on the screen for 750ms following which a choice of three photographs
were presented and the participants were asked to identify which of the three
photographs was the target photograph initially presented. The levels of accuracy
between the three groups ofparticipants did not differ significantly.
Jemel, Mottron and Dawson (2006) reviewed behavioural and
physiological evidence of face processing in autism and concluded that
peculiarities in processing may be present without a deficit in recognising faces.
Thus conclusive evidence for impaired face recognition in autism is lacking.
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Another possible reason for the pattern of accuracy rate obtained could be
that, unlike typical participants, the participants with Asperger's Syndrome may
not have spontaneously paid attention to the faces in the practice trials. The term
"social orienting impairment" was coined by Dawson and colleagues (Dawson,
Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; Dawson et al., 2004) to refer to the
failure of young children with autism to spontaneously orient to naturally
occurring social stimuli in their environment, including faces.
Beeger, Rieffe, Terwogt and Stockmann (2006) found that high
functioning children with autism were less attentive to emotional expression when
asked to sort photographs depicting smiling or frowning faces. Instead, they
sorted the photographs based on non-social features like presence ofmoustache or
glasses. However, when attending to the face was made crucial to the task (by
instructing the participants to focus on how the people in the photographs would
behave towards them) participants with High Functioning Autism sorted the
photographs based on the emotional expression. In contrast, the typical control
participants sorted the photographs based on the emotional expression in both
conditions.
For the participants to realise that the spatial orientation of the
photographs would be changed in some trials they needed to attend to the
photographs. However, the three participants with Asperger's Syndrome appeared
not to attend to the photographs at all. Had the three participants with Asperger's
Syndrome realised in the practice trials that the spatial orientation of the
photographs would be changed in some trials maybe they would have attended to
the photographs in the experimental trails. In order to encourage participants with
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Autism Spectrum Disorders to attend to the photographs, and thus be made aware
of the possibility that the spatial orientation of the photographs would be changed
in some trials, it was decided to modify the current experiment. One modification
was to use non-social stimuli and feedback in the practice session. If part icipants
with Autism Spectrum Disorders were oblivious to the change in the spatial
orientation of the photographs as a result of difficulty with faces, the non-social
stimuli were expected to make the change in spatial orientation more obvious.
Apart from being non-social these stimuli maybe more distinct from one another
than faces (see figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4: Illustration ofthe two practice trials used in experiment 6 (Pilot
Test 2) and experiment 7
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Study phase
T r i i 1 1
The apple was smelly
and had worms in it.
Trial 2
The pizza had steam
comin g up from it.
The banana was hard and
green in colour.
The curry had lots of
chillies in it.
Test phase
rotten
spic y
A further modification involved beginning all sentences in the
experimental trials with a name (for example, 'This is George who checked the
soup packet to make sure that it does not contain any meat. '). This was expected
to direct the attention of the participant to the person in the photograph as the
agent of the described action. In the test phase apart from traits and facts, a third
condition, name, was also introduced. The name condition differs from the other
two conditions in that the stimuli were present in the study phase. In the trait and
fact condition participants have to draw an inference and then associate this
inference with the actor. One possible difficulty that participants with Autism
Spectrum Disorders could have with the trait and fact conditions was the level of
difficulty. The difficulty level of the name condition is relatively less as the
information needed to identify the person was explicitly presented.
The modified experiment was piloted on a group of typical participants to
ensure that the new set of sentences implied the intended facts.
6.4 Experiment 6: Pilot Test 2
6.4.1 Method
Participants
There were 16 participants, eight males and eight females, none of whom
had taken part in the earlier pre-testing or in any of the earlier experiments. All
participants were native English speaking students recruited through
advertisements placed on various notice boards around the University of
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Nottingham campuses. The mean age of the participants was 20;8 years (SD = 3;1
years) ranging from 18;1 years to 34;11 years.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment was programmed and presented using E-Prime on an Acer
Aspire 1522WLMi laptop with 15.4" widescreen.
Apart from the six pairs of trait implying and fact implying sentences used
in Pilot Test 1, three more pairs of trait (funny-kind, nosy-fussy, greedy-rude) and
fact (pilot-barber, rich-slim, Scottish-short) implying sentences were introduced
for the name condition. The names were selected from a database for popular
English names available online. All sentences began with a name, for example,
'This is Neil who is going to learn skydiving over the summer holidays'.
The nature of the stimuli in terms of the dimension of the photograph, font
of the sentences and words and positioning of the stimuli were the same as
described in Pilot Test 1. Figure 6.5 demonstrates the name condition used in this
experiment. The trait and fact conditions are the same as demonstrated in figure
6.4. The complete set of stimuli used in the current experiment is listed in
Appendix F.
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Figure 6.5: Illustration ofthe name condition used in experiment 6 (Pilot Test
2) and experiment 7
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Study phase
(Name condition/Trait sentence)
Test phase
(Opposite spatial orientation)
This is Alex whose jokes
make everyone laugh so
hard they hold their sides.
Procedure
This is James who took the
sick puppy he found on the
road to his house.
James
The instructions given to the participants were the same as in Pilot Test 1.
The only difference was that feedback was provided for the practice trials . If error
was made participants were told that the response was incorrect and were asked to
attempt that particular trial again. The experimental trials were administered only
after the participants successfully passed both practice trials. In the study phase,
each participant was presented a random order of 18 trials - nine trials with trait
implying sentence pairs and nine trials with fact implying sentence pairs . The test
phase consisted of six traits, facts and names (three from trait sentence pairs and
three from fact sentence pair). Similar to Pilot Test 1, the procedure was self
paced and the test phase came up on the screen 1500 milliseconds after the
participants pressed the spacebar. The keys to be used , namely the spacebar , keys
'z ' and ' rn' were highlighted. The program was also set so that all the keys except
for these were locked. The counterbalancing procedure followed in Pilot Test 1
was carried out with the current experiment too.
6.4.2 Results
A score of one was given for each correct response. The maximum score a
participant could obtain was 18 (with a maximum of six for traits, facts and
names individually). Table 6.1 gives the accuracy on the three words when the
spatial orientation of the photographs in the two phases was the same and when
opposite.
Table 6.1: Percentages ofcorrect responses on the three word condition in the
two orientations (experiment 6, Pilot Test 2)
Accuracy rate
Trait Fact Name
Same Orientation 92% 94% 800/0
Opposite Orientation 88°!cl 92% 78°!cl
Total 900/0 93% 79%
The participants' accuracy for traits and facts were close to ceiling. The
accuracy on names was not as high as on trait and fact but a one sample t-test
with test value set at 0.5 (which is the accuracy rate expected by chance)
indicated it to be well above chance when the spatial orientation was the same, t =
5.22,p <.001 and when opposite, t = 3.74,p < .01. On all three words the
participants were scoring higher when the photographs were in the same spatial
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orientation in the study phase and test phase, but a Wilcoxon signed ranks test
revealed that overall there was no significant effect of spatial orientation, N = 16,
z = 0.4, p > .05. Since spatial orientation was not found to significantly affect
accuracy, the total scores for the three words were analysed. The data did not
meet the condition for normality, hence a Wilcoxon signed ranks test was
administered. There was no significant difference between the mean score
obtained on traits and facts while the mean score on names was found to be
significantly less than traits, N= 16, Z = 2.64,p < .01, and facts, N= 16, Z = 2.56,
p < .01.
The reaction time was measured from the onset of the test phase to when
the participants responded by pressing 'z' or 'm'. The reaction times for only
correct responses were included in the analysis. The mean reaction time for the
trait condition was 2159.6 ms (SD = 884.22 ms) when the spatial orientation was
the same and 2385.79 ms (SD = 1112.69 ms) when the spatial orientation was the
opposite. The respective reaction times for the fact condition were 2379.31 ms
(SD = 1006.07 ms) and 2450.3 ms (SD = 779.61 ms); and 2599.48 ms (SD =
1176.38 ms) and 2821.32 ms (SD = 1742.73 ms) for name condition. The
distribution of reaction times did not meet the conditions for normality and hence
the data was submitted to logarithmic transformation and then analysed using a 3
(word: trait versus fact versus name) x 2 (orientation: same versus opposite)
repeated measures ANOYA. There was no significant main effect of word, F (2.
30) = 2.21,p > .05, or orientation, F (2,30) = 2.14,p > .05. Neither was the
interaction between word and orientation significant, F < 1. See figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: Mean reaction time (RT) for traits, facts and names (experiment
6, Pilot Test 2). The error bars represent standard error ofmean.
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6.4.3 Discussion
Trait Fact
Cue Type
Name
The raw data suggest that performance was better in terms of accuracy
and reaction time when the spatial orientation of the photographs was the same in
the study and test phases; although statistically this was not found to be
significant.
The accuracy was found to be close to ceiling for the traits and facts.
Thus, the modified descriptions used do imply the traits/facts as intended. The
accuracy data and the pattern of reaction times indicate that participants were
equally adept at discriminating between the actors based on the implied facts as
well as traits. Facts refer to concrete and unambiguous characteristics. Hence,
participants were expected to discriminate between the actors relatively quickly
and accurately based of factual information. Traits, on the other hand, referred to
relatively more abstract mental characteristics and are more ambiguous. Thus,
they were expected to be slower at discriminating between actors based on trait
information.
The finding that participants were not significantly different in terms of
accuracy and quickness in choosing the correct actor when based on concrete and
unambiguous facts and when based on relatively abstract and ambiguous traits
suggests that participants use trait and fact information with equal ease to identify
someone. In other words, participants seem to be equally good associating the
characteristic of tallness to a person as associating cleverness to a person based
on a single behavioural description.
The participants found identifying the actor based on a name
comparatively more difficult as indicated by significantly more errors on the
name condition than the trait or fact conditions. Though not significant, the
reaction time for the name condition was also more than for the trait or fact. This
finding is compatible with our common experience ofbeing unable to remember
the name of a person though we can recollect other details. Difficulty with
identifying faces based on names has been observed in many laboratory
experiments. Young, Hay and Ellis (1985) asked 22 people to describe and keep
records of errors and difficulties they experienced in recognising other people.
Diarists often reported knowing who an encountered person was, but still
searched for some details, including the person's name. Difficulty with name
retrieval has been demonstrated in reaction time studies as well. Scanlan and
Johnston (1997) presented a matching task where participants were presented
with face-name, face-occupation and face-nationality pairings of highly familiar
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celebrities. The task was presented on a computer and participants were asked to
identify whether the pairing were correct or incorrect by manipulating appropriate
keys. It was observed that adult participants took more time to match faces to
names than to occupation or nationality. But young children, up to the age of 12
years, showed the opposite pattern and were significantly faster with names than
with the other two types of semantic information. These patterns of reaction time
were also observed when the responses where vocal rather than key presses.
Rahman, Sommer and Olada (2004), however, found children also showed
advantage of retrieving semantic over name information when cartoon characters
were used instead of celebrities, as was the case in Scanlan and Johnston's (1997)
study. McWeeny, Young, Hay and Ellis (1987) used faces of unfamiliar people
which were presented one by one to participants along with their (invented) name
and occupation under instructions to try and remember both kinds of information.
Ambiguous labels (for example, carpenter and baker) which could be either a
surname or an occupation were used along with unambiguous labels to identify
the effect ofmeaningfulness and imageability. Surnames were found to be harder
to recollect irrespective of ambiguity. Participants recalled an occupation without
a name more often than recalling a name but not the occupation. Young et al.
(1985) found similar results in their diary study where no cases were reported
where the diarist retrieved additional information, like the name, without being
aware of 'who' the person was.
Thus, difficulty retrieving names is a well established finding in face
processing literature (Burton and Bruce, 1992). The relatively poor performance
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of the participants on the name condition in this experiment is consistent with
existing literature.
6.5 Experiment 7
Performance of participants with Asperger's Syndrome
6.5.1 Introduction
When forming an impression of someone we link the inferences we draw
from behaviour to a representation of the person based on their face. Experiments
2, 4 and 5 strongly suggest that participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders
infer traits from a behavioural description. But, on the basis of the results
obtained from studies on face recognition in autism, one could argue both for and
against the possibility of difficulty at a more basic level in identifying people
based on the inferred traits. If there was any difficulty with face recognition, this
would be evident in poor performance on all three word conditions.
The name condition was introduced as a test against the possibility that
people with autism may find difficulty associating traits and facts with the actor
as a result of the higher level of task complexity. Trait and fact conditions involve
associating inferences drawn from behavioural descriptions to the actor. On the
name condition explicitly presented stimuli merely needed to be remembered and
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders arguably do not have difficulty with
paired associative learning (Minshew et aI., 1992). Difficulty as a result of task
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complexity was expected to be evident in poor performance on the trait and fact
conditions but not the name condition.
Individuals with Autism Spectrum disorders may experience difficulty
with traits because of it being a social construct. This was expected to be evident
in poor performance on trait condition but not fact or name conditions.
6.5.2 Method
Participants
Sixteen adult participants with a diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome took
part in this study. There were 14 males and two females. Individuals were
selected as participants if they had been diagnosed by an experienced clinician
and met DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for
Asperger's Syndrome. Sixteen participants without Asperger's Syndrome were
also tested and none had any autistic features. Those with Asperger's Syndrome
were recruited from a specialist college for individuals with Asperger's Syndrome
in Somerset, U.K. All 32 participants were native English speakers. The two
groups were matched in terms of Chronological Age (CA), Verbal Intelligence
Quotient (VIQ), Performance Intelligence Quotient (PIQ) and gender. The VIQ
was based on their scores on the verbal subsets (vocabulary and similarities) and
PIQ on the performance subsets (block design and matrix completion) of
Wechsler's Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI, Psychological corporation,
1999). Independent sample t-tests did not identify any significant difference
between participants with Asperger's Syndrome and control participants on CA,
VIQ, PIQ or full-scale IQ t < 1 for all. Table 6.2 displays participants' details.
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Table 6.2: Details ofparticipants in experiment 7. There were two females and
fourteen males in each group.
Group CA VIQ PIQ IQ
Asperger's Mean 17'8 105.31 102.25 104.19,
SD 1'2 12.12 13.68 11.97,
Range 16'3-20'6 84-125 71-118 85-125, ,
Typical Mean 17;10 103.94 103.56 104.19
SD 1'6 10.01 10.54 8.61,
Range 16;5-21 78-123 86-121 84-117
All participants had taken part in experiment 5 which was administered
first followed by the WASI before this experiment was presented. It was ensured
that none of the sentences shown to a participant in experiment 5 were shown
again in this experiment by manipulating which form of the experiment the
participant got. Since experiment 5 never presented trait words as cues and the
participants were debriefed about the social nature of the experiment only at the
very end of the session, carrying out both experiments in a single session was not
expected to influence the results of either.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus and stimuli used are the same as described in experiment 6,
Pilot Test 2.
Procedure
This experiment followed the procedure described in experiment 6. Pilot
Test 2.
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6.5.3 Results
A score of one was given for each correct response. The maximum score a
participant could obtain was 18 (with a maximum of six for traits, facts and
names individually). Table 6.3 gives the accuracy of the participants with
Asperger's SYndrome and participants of typical development on the three words
when the spatial orientation of the photos in the two phases was the same and
when opposite.
Table 6.3: Percentage ofcorrect responses oftypical participants (TYP) and
participants with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) (experiment 7)
Fact Trait Name
Same Opposite Total Same Opposite Total Same Opposite Total
AS 96% 77% 86% 96% 85% 90% 83% 840/0 84%
TYP 90% 88% 89% 98% 88% 930/0 76% 76% 760/0
One sample t-tests with test value as 0.5 (which is the expected accuracy
by chance) was carried out. The results indicated that the accuracy rate of the
group of individuals with Asperger's SYndrome and the group of individuals of
typical development was significantly above chance in all three word conditions
irrespective of orientation. A parametric analysis taking spatial orientation as a
within subjects variable was not possible as the accuracy rate distribution did not
meet the condition of normality. However, the distribution of the total scores for
the three words was normally distributed and a repeated measures ANaYA with
word (trait versus fact versus name) as the within subject variable and group
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(Asperger's Syndrome versus Typical) as the between subjects variable revealed
a main effect of word type, F (2,60) = 12.6,p < .001,/= 0.21. Post hoc
(Bonferroni) revealed that the accuracy for the name was significantly less than
the fact,p < .01, and trait,p < .001. There was no significant main effect of
group, F < 1, and the interaction was not significant, F (2,60) = 1.29,p > .05.
The reaction time was measured from the onset of the test phase to when
the participants responded by pressing 'z' or 'm'. The reaction time for only the
correct responses was included in the analysis. For the participants of typical
development the mean reaction time for the trait condition was calculated to be
1915.75 ms (SD = 410.38 ms) and 2386.47 ms (SD = 611.07 ms) for the same and
opposite spatial orientation respectively; for the fact condition they were 1750.91
ms (SD = 611.12 ms) and 2063.73 ms (SD = 654.73 ms) respectively; and for the
name condition they were 2356.05 ms (SD = 945.38 ms) and 2330.03 ms (SD =
1007.09 ms) respectively. For the participants with Asperger's Syndrome the
mean reaction time for the trait condition was calculated to be 2750.44 ms (SD =
1165.99 ms) and 3085.41 ms (SD = 1154.62 ms) for the same and opposite spatial
orientation respectively; for the fact condition they were 2144.66 ms (SD =
662.81 ms) and 2864.98 ms (SD = 1409.51 ms) respectively; and for the name
condition they were 2475.06 ms (SD = 1144.68 ms) and 2774.03 ms (SD =
118.43 ms) respectively. The reaction times data did not meet the conditions for
normality and hence the data were submitted to logarithmic transformation and
then analysed using a 3 (word: trait versus fact versus name) x 2 (spatial
orientation: same versus opposite) x 2 (group: Asperger's versus typical) mixed
ANOYA. The analysis indicated a significant main effect for word, F (2,60) =
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4.24,p < .05,f= 0.38. Post hoc (Bonferroni) revealed that the reaction time for
facts was significantly less than for traits,p < .05. There was a significant main
effect of spatial orientation, F (2, 60) = 22.92,p < .001,f= 0.87, with the reaction
time being significantly less when the photographs in the test phase were in the
same spatial orientation as in the study phase. A significant main effect of group
was also observed, F (2,60) = 4.34,p < .05,f= 0.38, with the typical group being
significantly faster than the group with Asperger's Syndrome. None of the
interactions were significant. See figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7: Mean reaction time (RT) ofthe typical group (TYP) and the group
with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) on trait, fact and name conditions
(experiment 7)
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All the participants in this experiment had taken part in experiment 5 as
well. The two experiments were presented in a single session. It was ensured that
none of the sentences shown to a participant in experiment 5 were shown again in
this experiment by manipulating which form of the experiment the participant
got. Since experiment 5 never presented the trait cues and the participants were
debriefed about the social nature of the experiment only at the very end of the
session, carrying out both experiments in one session was not expected to
influence the results of either. In order to confirm this, performance of the pilot
participants (experiment 6, Pilot Test 2), who had not participated in experiment
5, was compared to performance of the typical participants in this experiment.
The scores obtained by the two groups on the traits, fact and names were analysed
using Mann Whitney tests since the data were not normally distributed. The
analysis did not reveal any significant difference between the two groups of
participants on any of the cue conditions in either spatial orientation. The reaction
time data were distributed normally and independent samples t-tests did not
reveal any significant difference between the two groups of participants on any of
the cue conditions in either orientation. Hence, administering the two experiments
in a single session may not have influenced the results obtained in experiment 7.
Accuracy was significantly above chance for participants with Asperger's
SYndrome and participants of typical development on the three word types
irrespective of spatial orientation. This suggests that participants of both groups
were associating the traits, facts and names with the actor. Participants could
either make the association in the study phase or in the test phase following the
presentation of the word. If participants were making the link in the study phase,
they might on seeing the word orient towards the spatial location where they had
initially seen the face matching the word. This would increase the reaction time
180
for the opposite spatial orientation condition as participants would, on finding the
incorrect face, need to re-orient to the opposite side. The results indicated that the
reaction time was significantly less when the spatial orientation was the same
compared to when opposite for both groups ofparticipants. Thus, participants
(including those with Asperger's Syndrome) were inferring the traits and facts
implied in the behavioural descriptions and associating the inference with the
actor in the study phase. In the test phase they used this information to correctly
identify the actor.
Difficulty with face recognition would have been evident in poor
performance on all three word conditions. Surprisingly, the performance of
participants with Asperger's Syndrome was comparable to participants of typical
development on all three word conditions. This result contradicts some research
that suggests difficulty with face recognition in autism, especially in immediate
recognition (Williams, Goldstein and Minshew, 2005). At least when the task
demanded that an impression be formed of a person, participants with Asperger's
Syndrome do process faces and distinguish between people. One possible reason
for successful processing of faces by individuals with Asperger's Syndrome in
this experiment may be that the task demanded elaborate processing of the
stimuli.
The name condition was introduced as a test against the possibility that
people with Autism Spectrum Disorders may perform poorly on the trait and fact
condition since they are of a higher level of complexity. In the trait and fact
condition participants have to draw an inference and then associate this inference
with the actor. The participants with Asperger's Syndrome were expected to
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perform better on the name condition than on traits and facts as the name
condition merely required participants to recall explicitly presented information.
An ANOVA revealed that the reaction time for names did not differ significantly
from traits or facts in either group. However, the accuracy for names was found to
be significantly less than for traits and facts in both groups. Thus, participants
with Asperger's Syndrome, like typical participants, were more accurate when
identifying actors based on inferences made rather than explicitly presented
names. Relatively poor performance on the name condition in this experiment is
consistent with existing literature on identifying faces based on names in typical
participants. However, it is surprising that participants with Asperger's Syndrome
were better at identifying people based on a social concept like traits which
required inferences to be drawn than simple labelling as was involved in the name
condition.
Participants with Asperger's Syndrome were significantly slower than
participants of typical development. As discussed in Chapter Four this could be
explained in terms of a motor movement planning deficit. The pattern of reaction
times was similar for participants with Asperger's Syndrome and typical
participants. This suggests a general delay in responding rather than difficulty on
any specific word type.
Both groups ofparticipants were faster on facts than traits. The accuracy
for traits was found to be more than for facts, though not significantly so. Thus,
though quicker, both participants with Asperger's Syndrome and typical
participants made slightly more errors identifying the actor based on facts than on
traits. Overall, the participants with Asperger's Syndrome performed similarlly to
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the participants of typical development, identifying the actor with relatively high
level of accuracy and speed based on trait, fact and name information.
Participants with Asperger's SYndrome were able to draw inferences about
straight forward facts as well as inherently ambiguous traits of an individual from
behavioural description. Furthermore, they were able associate names as well as
the inferred traits and facts with the actor, even when the actor was represented
by his face.
6.3 Conclusion
This experiment enquired whether individuals with Asperger's SYndrome
associate inferred traits with the actor representation. The speed and accuracy of
participants with Asperger's SYndrome was comparable on traits and facts. Facts
were relatively unambiguous and traits were about mental characteristics, apart
from being ambiguous. Associating the trait with the actor would be difficult for
individuals with Asperger's SYndrome if they lack understanding about the mind
on a very broad level. Surprisingly, participants with Asperger's SYndrome did
not have difficulty processing the relatively large amount of social information
and they were more accurate when identifying actors based on inferences drawn
from behavioural descriptions (facts as well as traits) than explicitly presented
names. Thus, individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders associated the inferred
traits with the actor without difficulty, even when the actor was represented by his
face.
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Qillpter Seven
Conclusions and General Discussion
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter the background literature is discussed along with the
summary of the four studies, followed by caveats and possible future studies. The
chapter concludes with the implications of the findings for our understanding of
Autism Spectrum Disorders.
7.2 Summary of the thesis
7.2.1 Background
Over the last three decades, since Premack and Woodruff's (1978) seminal
article was published, many studies investigating the theory of mind abilities in
autism have been carried out. The majority of these focus specifically on the
understanding of false beliefs. Thus, our understanding of social cognition in
autism is based on a large number of studies with a narrow focus. How we
understand and predict other's behaviour is a central theme in attribution research
as well. The well established equation of attribution considers behaviour to be the
joint product of stable dispositional factors and transient situational
circumstances. Research suggests that individuals, particularly in Western society,
tend to attribute the cause ofbehaviour to the actor's disposition even when it is
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possible to provide a situational explanation for the action. This phenomenon,
referred to as the observer bias (Jones and Harris, 1967), fundamental
attributional error (Ross, 1977) or correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995),
illustrates the influential role played by traits in social cognition.
The tasks used to study theory of mind can be considered to be a special
kind of attribution task where the participant need not consider the disposition of
the protagonist. The participants need to understand how the situation influences
the behaviour as the false belief is generated under specific situational contexts
which are transitory (Rosati et al., 2001). Because the participant is not required
to consider traits, one might argue that the task tests only part of the mentalistic
understanding involved in predicting other peoples' behaviour.
Thus, traits are a potentially important, hitherto ignored, socio-cognitive
construct in autism research. The aim of the experiments described in this thesis
was to investigate whether individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer
traits from descriptions ofbehaviour and if so, are they especially sensitive to
traits like typical individuals? Do they infer traits with minimal effort, even when
there is no obvious reason for or benefit from making the inference? And, can
they differentiate and identify people based on behavioural information which
imply traits?
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7.2.2 Summary of the experiments
Chapter Three: Do individuals with autism spectrum disorders infer traits from
textual descriptions ofbehaviour?
In the experiments described in Chapter Three, participants were presented
with textual descriptions ofbehaviour and asked to choose one of two words that
best relate to the sentence. There were two categories of word pairs: trait cue-
distracter word pair and a semantic associate of one of the words in the sentence
paired with a distracter word. Participants with Asperger's syndrome and typical
participants showed similar patterns of reaction time, being significantly faster
when the cues were traits as opposed to semantic associates.
Interpretation
The pattern of reaction time obtained cannot be explained in terms of
speed-accuracy trade off since the accuracy ofboth groups ofparticipants was at
ceiling. Coupled with ceiling level accuracy, the reaction time data suggests that
participants with Asperger's Syndrome infer traits from textual descriptions of
behaviour.
One possible reason for why participants were faster on trait cues than
semantic associate cues could be that they naturally attend to the global meaning
conveyed by the sentences. Responding to a trait cue required integration of the
different components of the description whereas the semantic associate cues were
related to just one of the words in the sentence and hence required no such
integration. Another possible reason for participants being faster on trait cues than
semantic associate cues could be that trait inferences were made as soon as the
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sentences were read, even before the cues were presented. If so, it is possible that
the trait inference interfered with performance when the cue was a non-trait
semantic associate, resulting in increased reaction time.
Chapter Four: Do individuals with autism spectrum disorders infer traits
effortlessly?
The experiments described in Chapter Four investigated whether
participants were faster on the trait cues as a result of a natural tendency to
process the text globally or because trait inference in particular was effortless.
The reaction time for action cues and trait cues, both of which required
information presented in the description to be integrated, was compared. If former
(global processing) was the case then participants would be faster at inferring not
only traits but any feature that required attending to the global meaning presented.
Thus, there would be no significant difference in the reaction time for trait cues
and action cues. But, ifparticipants find trait inference in particular effortless then
they would be faster on trait cues than action cues, despite the fact that both cues
required the sentences to be processed for global meaning. Results indicated that
the participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders (High Functioning Autism and
Asperger's Syndrome) and typical participants were significantly faster on trait
cues than action cues.
The experiments described in Chapter Four also investigated whether trait
inference was made spontaneously as soon as the sentences were read (even
before the cue-distracter pairs were presented). The semantic associate cues were
presented with two different types of sentence, trait implying sentence and neutral
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sentence. The neutral sentences were made of more or less the same words as
their corresponding trait implying sentences but did not imply a trait. Comparing
the reaction time for semantic associate cues when the sentences was trait
implying and when neutral allowed testing for interference which would be
present only in the case of trait implying sentence, resulting in increased reaction
time. The presence of interference would suggest that traits were being inferred
spontaneously. Alternatively, if the trait inference was triggered by the cues and
not made spontaneously (before the cues were presented) then the nature of
sentence would not affect reaction time. There would be no significant difference
when the sentence was trait implying and when neutral. Results indicated that
participants with Autism Spectrum Disorder and participants developing typically
were significantly faster when the sentence was neutral than when the sentence
was trait implying.
Interpretation
Significantly faster responding to trait cues than to action cues suggest that
participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders are good at inferring traits not just
because they required global processing. This pattern of reaction times cannot be
explained as a speed-accuracy trade off as the accuracy ofboth groups of
participants was at ceiling. Neither can it be explained in terms of difference in
frequency, syllable count or strength of cue-sentence association between the trait
cue and action cue. Indeed, participants seemed compelled to make the trait
inference even when the traits were not perceived to be strongly associated with
the sentence. This result challenges the concept of weak central coherence in
autism at the level of sentence processing. Possibly, the use of a forced choice
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response procedure may have enhanced text processing as suggested by Snowling
and Frith (1986). According to Frith and Happe (1994) weak central coherence is
expressed in autism as a non-strategic processing preference which is supposedly
most evident in open ended tasks.
The participants were significantly faster at choosing the semantic
associate cues when the sentence was neutral than when the sentence was trait
implying, The participants were possibly making trait inference spontaneously on
reading the sentence even before any cues were presented. Inferring the traits
spontaneously could have interfered with performance when the sentence was
trait implying, resulting in increased reaction time. Since the neutral sentences do
not imply a trait such interference would be absent resulting in no impediment to
fast performance. The presence of interference suggests that trait inference was
not only effortless but also perhaps made spontaneously on reading the
behavioural description, even before the cues were presented.
One possibility was that the effortless and spontaneous trait inference
could be the result of an artefact in the procedure. Having traits as cues in some
of the trials may have primed participants to attend to traits.
Chapter Five: Does merely comprehending trait implying sentence result in trait
inference?
In order to investigate whether trait inference was primed by explicit
presentation of trait cues in a few trials, experiment five compared the reaction
time for semantic associate cues and action cues when the sentence was trait
implying and when the sentence was neutral without presenting trait cues in any
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trial. In all the experiments in this thesis, including experiment 5, participants
were told that the study investigated "aspects of reading ability". Thus, the goal
was to comprehend the sentences and there was no explicit reason for participants
to infer the traits. Since trait cues were not presented in any trial, there was no
benefit from making the trait inference. Presence of interference would suggest
that participants inferred traits spontaneously on reading the sentence even though
they did not intend to do so. Results indicated that the participants with
Asperger's Syndrome and typical participants were significantly faster when the
sentence was neutral than when the sentence was trait implying, for both semantic
associate cues and the action cues.
Interpretation
Significantly faster response on semantic associate cues and action cues
when the sentence was neutral than when trait implying suggests that participants,
including those with Asperger's Syndrome, spontaneously code the behaviour
described in terms of traits, even in the absence of any explicit reason for or
benefit from making the inference. Similar to stroop tasks, participants were
presumably unable to ignore the irrelevant trait dimension of the stimuli when the
sentence was trait implying. This probably explains the increased time taken to
respond when the sentence was trait implying. In the case of neutral sentence the
irrelevant and attention grabbing trait dimension was absent and hence responding
was not hindered. Differences in the strength of association between the cues and
the sentence or frequency and syllable count of the cues used with the trait
implying and neutral sentence cannot explain the pattern of reaction time as each
cue was presented with both trait and neutral sentence an equal number of times.
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Along with ceiling level accuracy, the reaction time pattern suggests that
trait inference in autism can be considered to be automatic, occurring without
intention and reflecting what Bargh (1989) refers to as "an unintended side effect
of another intended process".
Chapter Six: Do individuals with autism spectrum disorders associate the inferred
trait with the actor?
Experiments described in Chapter Three, Chapter Four and Chapter Five
suggest that participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer traits effortlessly
and spontaneously. The inferences were made even in the absence of any explicit
reason for or benefit from making the inference. Being able to infer traits may not
be of much practical use unless the traits are associated with the person carrying
out the behaviour (actor). It is only by associating the trait with the actor that the
information can be used to predict his or her future behaviour.
The experiments described in Chapter Six investigated whether
participants with Asperger's SYndrome associate the inferred trait with the actor.
Participants were presented with a pair of different faces with a sentence each
(study phase). Subsequently the same face pair was presented with a single word
(test phase). Participants had to choose which of the faces best related to the word.
There were two types of sentences: trait implying and fact implying. The words
presented were of three types: trait word, fact word and name. The performance
of participants with Asperger's Syndrome was similar to the performance of
typical participants. Participants with Asperger's Syndrome were inferring the
traits and facts implied in the behavioural descriptions and associating them with
191
the actor's face in the study phase. They then used this information to correctly
identify the actor in the test phase. In fact, both groups ofparticipants were faster
and more accurate when identifying actors based on inferences about straight
forward facts as well as inherently ambiguous traits than the explicitly presented
names.
Interpretation
The results obtained in experiment 7 contradict research evidence
suggesting impaired face recognition in autism. When the task demanded that an
impression is formed of a person, participants with Asperger's SYndrome do
process faces and distinguish between people. Surprisingly, the participants with
Asperger's SYndrome, similar to typical participants, performed better on the trait
and fact condition than the name condition. Traits and facts involved associating
inferences drawn from behavioural descriptions to the actor. Furthermore, traits
are social constructs. Names involved making an association between two
explicitly presented stimuli. Intriguingly, participants, including those with
Asperger's SYndrome, performed better on traits than names. Thus, individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorders, under some circumstances, do process faces and
distinguish between people based on social information, like ambiguous mental
characteristics.
7.2.3 Overall conclusion
Results obtained in the experiments described in Chapter Three to Chapter
Six suggest that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders can infer traits from
textual descriptions of behaviour and they do so spontaneously: The inferences
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were not triggered by the cues and were made in the absence of any explicit
reason for or benefit from making trait inference. In fact, in experiment 6, making
trait inference always hindered efficient performance. Furthermore, when the task
required that impressions be made, they were able to associate the inferred trait
with the actor even when the actor was represented by his face. The results from
the four experiments conducted with individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders
suggest that they can not only make inferences about others' traits, but they are
especially sensitive to traits. This raises the possibility that understanding traits as
corresponding to behaviour may be a spared socio-cognitive ability in autism.
7.3 Caveats: Orienting attention, goals and spontaneous processing of
social information in Autism Spectrum Disorders
Impairment in social orienting
In order to infer traits, individuals need to first attend to the relevant
behaviour. Research suggests that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders
may not spontaneously attend to relevant stimuli in the environment, particularly
when the stimuli are social in nature. Many of the children described by Kanner
(1943) were more interested in objects than people. The term "social orienting
impairment" was coined by Dawson and colleagues (Dawson, Meltzoff,
Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; Dawson et al., 2004) to refer to the failure of
young children with Autism Spectrum Disordres to spontaneously orient to
naturally occurring social stimuli in their environment. Dawson et al. (1998)
investigated the ability of young children with Autism Spectrum Disorders and
chronological age, receptive language and verbal intelligence matched children
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with Down's syndrome and children developing typically, to orient to familiar
social (clapping hand and calling the child's name) and non-social (playing a
musical jack in the box and shaking a rattle) stimuli. Children with Autism
Spectrum Disorders exhibited a general impairment in orienting ability but this
impairment was significantly more severe for the two social stimuli.
In experiment 7, participants were presented with behavioural information
about two people represented by frontal photographs of their face. The
participants were then required to use this information to choose which actor a
given word best described. In an initial version of the experiment, the participants
were given two practice trials using stimuli, pairs of faces and sentences, similar
to the experimental session. Results from three participants with Asperger's
Syndrome revealed that they did not attend to the faces. They inferred the traits
and facts implied in the sentences but associated them with the spatial location
and not the actor identified by his face. This resulted in their response being 100
percent correct when the spatial orientation of the photograph was the same in the
study phase and the test phase. But when the spatial orientation of the photograph
was opposite in the study and the test phase, the three participants were incorrect
in every trial. Three participants of typical development, however, were able to
correctly identify the actor when the spatial orientation was the same and when
opposite suggesting that they spontaneously attended to the faces. Though three is
a very small sample to consider social orienting deficit, other researchers have
reported improved task performance under instructions which encouraged
participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders to focus their attention on social
stimuli relevant to the task. For example, Beeger et al. (2007) reported that high
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functioning children with autism do not attend to faces when sorting photographs
of people having a smiling or frowning face. Instead they used non-social features
like presence of moustache or glasses. However, when attending to the face was
made crucial to the task (by instructing the participants to focus on how the
people in the photographs would behave towards them) participants with High
Functioning Autism sorted the photographs based on the emotional expression.
In experiment 7, the procedure was modified so as to encourage
participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders to focus on the pictures as well.
This was achieved by the use ofnon-social stimuli like fruits in the practice trials.
For example, the study phase presented a picture of an apple paired with the
sentence, 'The apple was smelly and had worms in it' and a picture of a banana
paired with the sentence, 'The banana was hard and green in colour'. In the test
phase the same pictures were presented with the word 'rotten'. It was felt that the
use of non-social cues would make the change in spatial orientation more obvious
to the participants with Asperger's Syndrome, encouraging them to pay attention
to the pictures (faces) in the experimental session. When this paradigm was
administered to sixteen individuals with a diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome, it
was observed that most of them spontaneously detected the change in spatial
orientation in the practice session. By making the importance of focusing on the
pictures evident to participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders by using non-
social stimuli, it was observed that they continued to focus on the pictures in the
experimental trials even when they were faces. Thus, they performed similar to
the control typical participants and associated the names as well as traits and facts
with the actor.
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The results obtained in the experiments described in this thesis suggest
that if individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders attend to others' behaviour
they can draw inferences about social constructs like traits. Future research could
investigate whether individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders spontaneously
attend to others' behaviour.
Goal dependent automaticity
There is compelling evidence that typically developing individuals
process behavioural information in terms of traits in a largely automatic manner-
without intention (Winter & Uleman, 1984), with minimal awareness (Winter,
Uleman & Cunniff, 1985) and with diminished resources (Gilbert et al., 1988).
The frequency of occurrence of a psychological process is more in real life when
it occurs without the person intending to do so (Uleman, 1999; Winter & Uleman,
1984). The results obtained in the experiments described in Chapter Four and
Chapter Five yielded indirect evidence to suggest that participants, including
those with Autism Spectrum Disorders, make trait inferences without intending to
do so. IfUleman is correct, this is a sign that participants readily and frequently
make trait inferences in the real world provided that they attend to the relevant
behaviour.
According to Bargh (1989), the activity of encoding behaviour in trait
terms is a goal dependent automatic process where the goal of understanding the
meaning of the behavioural information was a pre-requisite for spontaneous
encoding to occur. In other words, individuals not only have to observe behaviour
but also be motivated to attribute meaning or cause to it. However, the tendency
to impute social meaning to events could be hyper potent in people, as suggested
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by Heider and Simmel's (1944) study. They presented a short (two and a half
minute) moving picture film of geometrical figures moving in various directions
and speeds to participants who were given a very general instruction to ''write
down what happened in the picture". All but one of the 34 participants interpreted
the movements as actions of animate beings, in most cases of humans. The
participants often attributed human characteristics like 'aggressive' and
'possessive' to the geometric shapes. Thus, people seem to have a pervasive
tendency to understand and give meaning to what is happening in their
environment, often in social terms. Klin (2004) presented Heider and Simmel's
(1944) procedure to individuals with Asperger's SYndrome and higher
functioning adults with autism. While the control participants used
anthropomorphic terms and referred to fundamentals of social relationships, the
group with Autism Spectrum Disorders used geometric terms and referred to
fundamentals ofphysical relationships, to describe the scene. The participants
with Autism Spectrum Disorders showed reduced capacity for deriving
personality features from the geometric character's actions. Most of the
attributions made were physical in nature and the few social attributions made
were simplistic, based on one or two behaviours. Thus, participants with Autism
Spectrum Disorders showed a marked deficit in the spontaneous search for social
meaning in visual stimuli. One possible criticism of this study may be that the use
of geometric shapes was too far removed from reality, especially for individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorders who are known to have poor imagination and
who often understand events literally. Further research could test directly whether
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individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders naturally attend to behaviour with
the goal of attributing social meaning using more naturalistic stimuli.
The textual descriptions used in the series of experiments reported here
presented instances of individual behaviour. In everyday life behaviour rarely
occurs in isolation. There would be many contextual cues which would provide
further information about the behaviour. One of the behavioural descriptions used
in the experiments described in this thesis was 'He bumped into the cupboard
door and hurt his nose'. By itself the behaviour clearly implies clumsiness.
However, if we were actually seeing the behaviour happening, we may notice that
the actor walked unsteadily, smelt of alcohol and his speech was slurred. This
extra information would tell us that the behaviour was clumsy but not due to a
stable disposition but the result of a temporary drunken state.
Scenes we observe in our daily life usually consist of many people doing
different things simultaneously and we are rarely able to focus our attention
entirely on a specific event unless it is particularly interesting or important to us.
Comprehending the textual description 'He smiled and said hello to everyone at
the party' is comparatively easy compared to making the same observation at an
actual party. In the latter case the observation would have to be made amidst
many people doing different things and while we ourselves are engaged in
socialising.
Further research using visual presentation of behaviour, for example using
video clippings, would help test whether individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders naturally attend to the relevant behaviour and use the different
contextual cues to draw inferences.
7.4 Other relevant issues and future studies
The experiments described in this thesis represent a first attempt to tackle
a vast and important field in autism. A few related areas which require further
investigation are discussed below.
7.4.1 Heterogeneous nature of traits
Fletcher (1984) argued that the behaviourist approach (traits as
corresponding to behaviour) that many models of attribution follow is wrong as
dispositions are not homogeneous in nature. He made a distinction between
behavioural, mental and character dispositions. Behavioural dispositions, like
untidy, refer to observable behaviour and therefore can be inferred from explicitly
manifested behaviour. Mental dispositions, on the other hand, refer to sensations
or internal perceptions (like emotions) or abstract unspecified mental structures
(like states of knowledge or attitudes), the meaning of which cannot be equated
with their corresponding behavioural manifestation. Many traits, referred to as
character traits by Fletcher (1984), are characterised by both cognitive/affective
components as well as behavioural components to varying degrees. For example,
the trait shy entails certain behaviours but also mental events in the form of
feelings (uncomfortable in company) or maybe beliefs (about how to behave),
which are enduring.
Consistent with Fletcher's character traits, Aloise (1993) suggested that
traits fall on different points of a continuum from concrete instances of behaviour
to abstract psychological categories. Aloise (1993) investigated whether traits
differed in the extent to which they relate to overt behaviour by asking adult
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participants to indicate on a rating scale whether their judgement about a list of
traits was based on psychological information (1 on the rating scale) or
behavioural information (9 on the rating scale). The mean ratings suggested that
although participants believe behaviour to be a strong element when judging all
traits, the traits differed in the extent to which inferences were made directly from
behaviour. Some traits were more psychological and other traits were more
behavioural. The traits which were rated to depend predominantly on
psychological information were also rated as more abstract and the behavioural
traits were rated as more concrete by the same group ofparticipants. Aloise
(1993) also observed different developmental patterns for psychological and
behavioural traits. Children in the third (mean age: 9 years), fourth (mean age:
10;1 years) and fifth grade (mean age: 10;11 years) were asked to describe one
person they liked and one person they disliked. Though there was no significant
difference in the overall number of traits used, there was an increase in the use of
psychological traits and a decrease in the use ofbehavioural traits with age.
Yuill (1992) differentiated between what she termed social-intentional
terms and internal-state terms. Traits like kind and helpful are social-intentional
terms as they are directed towards other people and internal-state terms like brave
and anxious refer to mental states experienced by a person. Social-intentional
terms have a moral value whereas internal-state terms, even though they can be
assigned positive and negative values, are not moral. For example being brave is
desirable but is not considered to be morally praiseworthy. Yuill (1992) found
that when five to ten year old children were asked to provide definitions of trait
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terms and label trait descriptions, internal-state terms were understood and
produced later than social-intentional terms.
According to both Aloise (1993) and Yuill (1992) children's
conceptualisation of traits becomes more complex with age. They understand
traits not only as concrete, observable behavioural manifestations but as abstract
psychological characteristics of an individual. This developmental change is
considered, by both authors, to be suggestive of an increased emphasis on and the
ability to explain than describe behaviour with age. According to Livesley and
Bromley (1973), the ability to think reflectively and understand that others may
not share the child's opinion increases with age. By middle childhood, children
often attempt to explain others' behaviour and offer examples and illustrations to
support their statements about others. In order to explain behaviour, traits need to
be understood not only in terms of simple behavioural regularity (like the Aloise's
behavioural traits) or evaluations (like Yuill's social-intentional terms) but as
causing a stable mental state in the actor which drives the behaviour. Such a
conceptualization of traits arguably develops after children acquire an
understanding of subjective mental states (emotions and propositional attitudes,
which is the focus of theory of mind research in autism) as discussed in Chapter
Two (Gnepp and Chilamkurti, 1988; Yuill & Perason, 1998).
In the experiments reported here, different types of traits were used which
were presented as they relate to behaviour. The results suggest that trait inference
in Autism Spectrum Disorders is a spared socio-cognitive function at least at the
level of relating to behaviour. Further research could look into whether
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders also understand how traits are
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mediated by stable mental states. For example, a generous person is not just
someone who displays behaviours that imply generousness in various situations,
but one who 'wants' to share and is 'happy' to do so. Thus, the generous action is
viewed as intentional and lay explanations take into account the trait that is a
desire to share as forming the causal link between the disposition of generosity
and the generous act. Is it possible that individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders only understand traits as they relate to behaviour? Do they also
understand traits as they relate to mental life? For example, a nervous person
might feel anxious in some situations which do not elicit anxiety in others. Would
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders infer a trait such that they make
sensible predictions about how a person will feel in a given situation? If
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders understand traits in relation to
behaviour and not in relation to mental entities then one might argue that they are
'trait behaviourists' rather than 'trait mentalist'.
7.4.2 Higher order rules of attribution and contextual processing of behaviour
As discussed in Chapter One, research shows that on tasks like the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task although individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders do not show difficulty learning rules, they do find shifting to a new rule
difficult. According to the Cognitive Complexity and Control theory, put forth by
Frye, Zelazo and Palfai (1995), judging how to sort a card on this task involves
integrating two incompatible rules into a single higher order rule which arbitrarily
states, 'If colour game, if red triangle, then sort into red pile, but if shape game, if
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red triangle, then sort into triangle pile'. Difficulty with higher order rules of the
nature 'if-if-then' leads to poor performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task.
In the experiments described in this thesis participants were provided with
descriptions ofbehaviour that implied a trait, but no additional information was
provided. The effortless and spontaneous inference of implied traits by
participants with and with out Autism Spectrum Disorders suggest that they have
no difficulty using the rule 'Behaviour = Disposition', that is, a person's
behaviour is a reflection of his inner self. However, can a person's behaviour be
considered to reveal his or her true character always? Kelly (1973) suggests that
people do not always consider behaviour to reflect a person's true nature.
According to Kelly's discounting principle, if an obvious situational cause is
present, people discount the extent to which they attribute a dispositional cause to
behaviour. But, we are apt to make a dispositional attribution if a person behaves
in a manner that is inconsistent with the requirements of the situation. This is
referred to as augmenting principle. For example, we would not be inclined to say
that someone is shy based on his or her sitting quietly at a funeral. However, if a
person sits quietly in a comer at a party we would be quick to assume that he or
she is shy. Thus, people use higher order rules of the nature 'ifbehaviour, ifno
contextual reason then infer trait' but 'ifbehaviour, if contextual reason then infer
situation' when attributing cause to behaviour. If individuals with autism do have
difficulty using hierarchical rules, as proposed by Frye, Zelazo and Palfai (1995).
then they might wrongly attribute a dispositional cause even when the behaviour
could be explained in terms of the context. They might fail to take into account
the situational pressure to behave in a particular manner. Future research could
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investigate the ability of individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders to use
complex social reasoning like discounting and augmenting principles.
Social reasoning, like discounting and augmenting, involves processing
behaviour in the context of the situation in which the behaviour occurs. In the
experiments described in this thesis behavioural descriptions were presented
without contextual information. For example, one of the sentences used "He
invited the newcomers to his house for coffee" implies the trait friendly.
Contextual information could either increase or decrease our tendency to attribute
traits by the use of discounting or augmenting principle. For example, on reading
the sentence "He invited his new boss to his house for dinner", we may take into
account the possibility that the invitation was extended only because the
newcomer is his boss. 'He' might not have invited a newcomer who is his junior,
and thus not attribute a disposition of friendliness. The Weak Central Coherence
hypothesis suggests that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders have
difficulty taking into account contextual information. When asked to attribute
meaning to a person's behaviour, it is possible that individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders may focus 'locally' on what the actor is doing but not on the
'global' context in which the behaviour occurs. They may understand the
behaviour to be friendly but not the ingratiating context which suggests that the
person need not be friendly by nature though he exhibits a friendly behaviour in
this situation. Future research could investigate whether individuals with autism
take into account the context in which the behaviour is expressed when making
trait inferences.
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7.5 Implications of the thesis
Research documenting deficits experienced by individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders in social functioning is extensive. However, this thesis
provides evidence for a spared socio-cognitive function in autism. Individuals
with Autism Spectrum Disorders are able to code behaviour in terms of traits
spontaneously and use trait information to identify actors by their faces. This
result emphasises the need for research on theory of mind abilities to expand from
the current narrow perspective on propositional attitudes.
In typical individuals coding behaviour in terms of traits is automatic.
Although the process is dependent on the goal of comprehending the behavioural
information, there is evidence that such a goal may be prepotent. The experiments
reported in this thesis indicate that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders
also infer traits automatically. However, in everyday life it is possible that
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders may not spontaneously attend to the
relevant behaviour. If this is the case, then social skills training in autism should
encourage individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders to focus on the social
aspects of the environment, including others' behaviour.
Further research into whether individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders
spontaneously focus on behaviour and how they conceptualise traits would go a
long way in helping us to understand the scope of social deficits observed in this
disorder. Such an investigation may also provide some insight into strategies used
by some high functioning individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders to function
efficiently in the social world. The social deficit observed in Autism Spectrum
Disorders may not be the result of a difficulty with processing social information
"'0-
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per se, but difficulty with spontaneously attending to the relevant cues or
comprehending the social event in all its complexities. This could potentially
explain the variations observed in the social abilities in individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders.
206
REFERENCE
Aloise, P. A. (1993). Children's use ofpsychological and behavioral traits: a
forced choice assessment. Social Development, 2, 36-41.
Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions ofpersonality. Journal ofAbnormal and
Social Psychology, 41, 258-290.
American Psychiatric Association. (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders (3rd edition). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric
Association.
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders (3rd edition, Revised). Washington, DC: American
Psychiatric Association.
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders (lh edition, Text Revision). Washington, DC: American
Psychiatric Association.
Bailey, A., LeCouteur, A., Gottesman, I., Bolton, P., Simonoff, E., Yuzda, E., &
Rutter, M. (1995). Autism as a strongly genetic disorder: Evidence from a
British twin study. Psychological Medicine, 25, 63-77.
Baird, G., Simonoff, E., Pickles, A., Chandler, S., Loucas, T., Meldrum, D., &
Charman, T. (2007). Prevalence of disorders of the autism spectrum in
apopulation cohort in south Thames: The special need and autism project
(SNAP). The Lancet, 368, 210-215.
Bargh, J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic influence in
social perception and cognition. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.),
Unintended thought (pp. 3-51). New York: Guilford Press.
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the
automatic attitude activation effect. Journal ofPersonality and Social
Psychology, 64, 753-758.
Bamby, M., & Monaco, A. P. (2004). Strategies for autism candidate gene
analysis. In G. Bock & J. Goode (Eds.), Novartis Foundation Symposium
on Autism: Neural basis and treatment possibilities (pp. 48-69).
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1991). Do individuals with autism understand what causes
emotions? Child Development, 62, 385-395.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory ofmind.
Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., Baldwin, D. A., & Crowson, M. (1997). Do individuals with
autism use speaker's direction ofgaze strategy to crack the code of
language? Child Development, 68,48-57.
Baron-Cohen, S., Campbell, R., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Grant, J., & Walker, J.
(1995). Are children with autism blind to the mentalistic significance of
the eyes? British Journal ofDevelopmental Psychology, 13, 379-398.
Baron-Cohen, S., Jolliffe, T., Mortimore, C., & Robertson, M. (1997). Another
advanced test of theory of mind: evidence from very high functioning
adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome. Journal ofChild Psychology
and Psychiatry, 38, 813-822.
208
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a
'theory of mind'? Cognition, 21, 37-46.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1986). Mechanical, behavioural and
intentional understanding ofpicture stories in autistic children. British
Journal ofDevelopmental Psychology, 4, 113-125.
Baron-Cohen, S., Ring, H. A., Wheelwright, S, Bullmore, E. T., Brammer, M. J.,
Simmons, A., & Williams, S. C. R. (1999). Social intelligence in the
normal and autistic brain: An ±MRI study. European Journal of
Neuroscience, 11, 1891-1898.
Begeer, S., Rieffe, C., Meerum Terwogt, M., & Stockmann, L. (2006). Attention
to facial emotion expressions in children with autism. Autism, 10,37-51.
Bennetto,L., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1996). Intact and impaired
memory functions in autism. Child Development, 67, 1816-1835.
Bettelheim, B. (1959). Feral children and autistic children. The American Journal
ofSociology, 64, 455-467.
Bloom, P., & German, T. P. (2000). Two reasons to abandon the false belief task
as a test of theory of mind. Cognition, 77, 25-31.
Bowler, D.M. (1992). Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome. Journal ofChild
Psychology and Psychiatry, 33, 877-893.
Bowler, D. (2006). Autism spectrum disorders: Psychological theory and
research. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Bowler, D. M.., Briskman, J. A., Gurvidi, N., & Fomells-Ambrojo, M. (2005).
Autistic and non-autistic children's performance on a non-social analogue
209
of the false belief task. Journal ofCognition and Development, 6, 259-
283.
Bowler, D. M., Matthews, N. J., & Gardiner, J. N. (1997). Asperger's syndrome
and memory: similarity to autism but not amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 35,
65-70.
Burton, A. M., & Bruce, V. (1992). I recognize your face but I can't remember
your name: A simple explanation? British Journal ofPsychology, 83, 45-
60.
Campbell, M., & Shay, J. (1995). Pervasive developmental disorders. In H. I
Kaplan., & B. J. Sadock, (Eds.), Comprehensive Textbook ofPsychiatry
(6th ed., pp. 2277-2293). New York: Williams and Wilkins.
Carlston, D. E., & Skowronski, J. J. (1994). Saving in the relearning of trait
information as evidence for spontaneous inference generation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 840-856.
Carpenter, M., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (2001). Understanding others'
intention in children with autism. Journal ofAutism and Developmental
Disorders, 31, 589-599.
Celani, G., Battacchi, M. W., & Arcidiacono, L. (1999). The understanding of the
emotional meaning of facial expressions in people with autism. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29, 57-66.
Courchesne, E. (and 15 others). (2001). Unusual brain growth patterns in early
life in patients with autistic disorder: a MRI study. Neurology, 57, 245-
254.
210
Dawson, G., Meltzoff, A. N., Osterling, J., Rinaldi, J., & Brown, E. (1998).
Children with autism fail to orient towards naturally occurring social
stimuli. Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders, 28, 479-485.
Dawson, G., Toth, K., Abbott, R., Osterling, J., Munson, 1., Estes, A., & Liaw, J.
(2004). Early social attention impairment in autism: Social orienting, joint
attention, and attention to distress. Developmental Psychology, 40, 271-
283.
Dozier, M. (1991). Functional measurement assessment of young children's
ability to predict future behavior. Child Development, 62, 1091-1099.
Ehlers, S., Gillgerg, C., & Wing, L. (1999). A screening questionnaire for
asperger syndrome and other high functioning autism spectrum disorders
in school age children. Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders,
29, 129-141.
Fein, S., Hilton, J. L., & Miller, D. T. (1990). Suspicion of ulterior motivation and
the correspondence bias. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology,
58, 753-764.
Ferguson, T.J., Olthof, T., Luiten, A., & Rule, B.G. (1984). Children's use of
observed behavioral frequency versus behavioral covariation in ascribing
dispositions to others. Child Development, 55, 2094-2105.
Fine, C., Lumsden, J., & Blair, R. 1. R. (2001). Dissociation between theory of
mind and executive functions in a patient with early left amygdale
damage. Brain, 124, 287-298.
Flavell, J. H. (1999). Cognitive development: Children's knowledge about the
mind. Annual Review ofPsychology, 50, 21-45.
211
Fletcher, G. J. O. (1984). Psychology and common sense. American Psychologist,
39,203-213.
Fombonne, E. (2003). Epidemiological Surveys of Autism and Other Pervasive
Developmental Disorders: An Update. Journal ofAutism and
Developmental Disorders, 33, 365-382.
Frith, C. (2003). What do imaging studies tell us about the neural basis of autism?
In G. Bock & J. Goode (Eds.), Novartis Foundation Symposium on
Autism: Neural basis and treatment possibilities (pp. 149-165). Chichester:
John Wiley & Sons.
Frith, C., & Frith, U. (2005). Theory of Mind. Current Biology, 15, 644-645.
Frith, U. (1989). Autism: Explaining the enigma. (1st ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Frith, U. (2003). Autism: Explaining the enigma. (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Frith, U. (1969). Emphasis and meaning in recall in normal and autistic children.
Language Speech, 12, 29-38.
Frith, U., & Happe, F. (1994). Autism: Beyond theory of mind. Cognition, 50,
115-132.
Frith, U., Morton, J., & Leslie, A. M. (1991). The cognitive basis of a biological
disorder: Autism. Trends in Neurosciences, 14, 433-438.
Frith, U., & Snowling, M. (1983). Reading for meaning and reading for sound in
autistic and dyslexic children. Journal ofDevelopmental Psychology, 1,
329-324.
Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Palfai, T. (1995). Theory of mind and rule based
reasoning. Cognitive Development, 10, 483-427.
212
Fyffe, C., & Prior, M. (1978). Evidence for language recoding in autistic, retarded
and normal children: A re-examination. British Journal ofPsychology, 69,
393-402.
Ghaziuddin, M., Butler, E., Tsai, L., & Ghaziuddin, N. (1994). Is clumsiness a
marker for Asperger syndrome? Journal ofIntellectual Disability
Research, 38, 519-527.
Gilbert, D.T., & Malone, P.S. (1995). The Correspondence Bias. Psychological
Bulletin, 117,21-38.
Gilbert, D., Pelham, B., & Krull, D. (1988). On cognitive busyness: When
perceivers meet persons perceived. Journal ofPersonality and Social
Psychology, 54, 733-740.
Gnepp, J., & Chilamkurti, C. (1988). Children's use ofpersonality attributions to
predict other people's emotional and behavioral reactions. Child
Development, 59, 743-754.
Grandin, T. (1995). Thinking in pictures: and other reports from my life with
autism. New York: Doubleday.
Griffith, E. M., Pennington, B. F., Wehner, E.A., & Rogers, S. J. (1999).
Executive functions in young children with autism. Child Development,
70, 817-832.
Hadwin, J., Baron-Cohen, S., Howlin, P., & Hill, K. (1997). Does teaching theory
of mind have an effect on the ability to develop conversation in children
with autism? Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders, ] 7, 519-
537.
11""
- .)
Happe, F. G. E. (1994). An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of
story characters' thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally
handicapped, and normal children and adults. Journal ofAutism and
Development Disorders, 24, 129-154.
Happe, F. G. E. (1995). The role of age and verbal ability in the theory of mind
task performance of subjects with autism. Child Development, 66, 843-
855.
Happe, F. G. E. (1996). Studying weak central coherence at low levels: Children
with autism do not succumb to visual illusions. A research note. Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 37, 873-877.
Happe, F. G. E. (1997). Central coherence and theory of mind: Reading
homographs in context. British Journal ofDevelopmental Psychology, 15,
1-12.
Heider, F. (1944). Social perception and phenomenal causality. Psychological
Review, 51,358-374.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology ofinterpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
Heider, F., & Simmel, S. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behavior.
American Journal ofPsychology, 57, 243-259.
Hermelin, B., & O'Connor, N. (1967). Remembering of words by psychotic and
subnormal children. British Journal ofPsychology, 58, 213-218.
Hermelin, B., & O'Connor, N. (1986). Idiot savant calendrical calculators: rules
and regularities. Psychological medicine, 16, 885-893.
Hill, E. (2004). Executive dysfunction in autism. Trends in cognitive sciences, 8,
26-32.
21.+
Hill, E. (2004a). Evaluating the theory of executive dysfunction in autism.
Developmental Review, 24, 189-233.
Hill, E., & Frith, U. (2003). Understanding autism: Insights from mind and brain.
Philosophical Transactions ofthe Royal Society London, Biological
Sciences, 358, 281-289.
Hirschfeld. L., Bartmess, E., White, S., & Frith, U. (2007). Can autistic children
predict behavior by social stereotypes? Current Biology, 17, 451-452.
Houston, R., & Frith, U. (2000). Autism in history. Oxford: Blackwell.
Jarrold, C., Butler, D. W., Cottington, E. M., & Jimenez, F. (2002). Linking
theory of mind and central coherence bias in autism and in the general
population. Developmental Psychology, 36, 126-138.
Jemel, B., Mottron, L., & Dawson. M. (2006). Impaired face processing in
autism: Fact or artifact? Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders,
36,91-106.
Jolliffe, T., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). A test of central coherence theory:
Linguistic processing in high functioning adults with autism or asperger's
syndrome: Is local coherence impaired? Cognition, 71, 149-185.
Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The attribution
process in social psychology, in L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Volume 2, pp. 219-266), New York:
Academic Press.
Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 3, 1-24.
215
Just, M. A., Cherkassy, V. L., Keller, T. A., & Minshew, N. J. (2004). Cortical
activation and synchronization during sentence comprehension in high-
functioning autism: evidence of underconnectivity. Brain, 127, 1811-
1821.
Just, M. A., Cherkassky, V. L., Keller, T. A., Kana, R. K., & Minshew, N. J.
(2007). Functional and anatomical cortical underconnectivity in autism:
Evidence from an fMRI study of an executive function task and corpus
callosum morphometry. Cerebral Cortex, 17, 951-961.
Kana, R. K., Keller, T. A., Minshew, N. J., & Just, M. A. (2007). Inhibitory
control in high functioning autism: Decreased activation and
underconnectivity in inhibition networks. Biological Psychiatry, 62, 198-
206.
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. In L. Kanner (1973),
Childhood psychosis: Initial studies and new insights (pp. 1-43).
Washington, D. C: V. H. Winston & Sons.
Kanner, L., & Eisenberg, L. (1957). Early Infantile Autism, 1943-1955. In L.
Kanner (1973), Childhood psychosis: Initial studies and new insights (pp.
91-101). Washington, D. C: V. H. Winston & Sons.
Kelly, H. (1973). The process of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 28,
107-128.
Klin, A. (2000). Attributing social meaning to ambiguous visual stimuli in higher-
functioning autism and asperger syndrome: The social attribution task.
Journal ofChild Psychology and Psychiatry, 41, 831-846.
116
Klin, A., Sparrow, S. S., de Bildt, A., Cicchetti, D. V., Cohen, D. J., & Volkmar.
F. R. (1999). A nonned study of face recognition in autism and related
disorders. Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders, 29, 499-508.
Klinger, L. G., & Dawson, G. (2001). Prototype formation in autism.
Development and psychopathology, 13, 111-124.
Koshino, H., Kana, R. K., Keller, T. A., Cherkassky, V. L., Minshew, N. J & Just
M. A. fMRI investigation of working memory for faces in autism: Visual
coding and underconnectivity with frontal areas. Cerebral Cortex.
Advance Access published May 20,2007, doi:10.1093/cercorlbhm054.
Le Couteur, A., Lord, C., & Rutter, M. (1994). The autism diagnostic interview -
revised: A revised version of a diagnostic interview for caregivers of
individuals with possible pervasive developmental disorders. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24, 659-685.
Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1988). Autistic children's understanding of seeing,
knowing, and believing. British Journal ofDevelopmental Psychology, 6,
315-324.
Leslie, A. M., & Thaiss, L. (1992). Domain specificity in conceptual
development: Evidence from autism. Cognition, 43, 225-251.
Livesley, W. J., & D. B. Bromley (1973). Person perception in childhood and
adolescence. London: John Wiley.
Lopez, B., & Leekam, S. R. (2003). Do children with autism fail to process
information in context? Journal ofChild psychology or psychiatry. 44.
285-300.
Lotter, V. (1966). Epidemiology of autistic conditions in young children. Social
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 1, 124-135.
Mcintosh, H. (1998, November). Autism is likely to be linked to several genes.
APA Monitor, 29. Retrieved July 19, 2007, from
http://www.apa.org/monitor/nov98/gene.html
McWeeny, K. H., Young, A. W., Hay, D. C., & Ellis, A. W. (1987). Putting
names to faces. British Journal ofPsychology, 78, 143-149.
Meltzoff. A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of
intended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31,
1-16.
Minshew, N. J., Goldstein, J., Muenz, L R., & Payton, J. B. (1992).
Neuropsychological functioning in nonmentally retarded autistic
individuals. Journal ofClinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 14,
741-761.
Minter, M., Hobson, R. P., & Bishop, M. (1998). Congenital visual impairment
and theory of mind. British Journal ofDevelopmental Psychology, 16, -
183-196.
Miyahara, M., Tsujii, M., Hori, M., Nakanishi, K., Kageyama, H., & Sugiyama,
T. (1997). Briefreport: Motor incoordination in children with asperger's
syndrome and learning disabilities. Journal ofAutism and Developmental
Disorders, 27, 595--603.
Mottron, L., & Belleville, S. (1993). A study of perceptual analysis in a high-level
autistic subject with exceptional graphic abilities. Brain and Cognition.
23, 279-309.
218
Mottron, L., Dawson, M., Soulieres, I., Hubert, B., & Burack, J. (2006). Enhanced
perceptual functioning in autism: An update, and eight principles of
autistic perception. Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders, 36,
27-43.
Ozonoff, S., & Jensen, J. (1999). Briefreport: Specific executive dysfunction
profiles in three neurodevelopmental disorders. Journal ofAutism and
Developmental Disorders, 29, 171-177.
Ozonoff, S., & Miller. J. N. (1995). Teaching theory of mind: A new approach to
social skills training for individuals with autism. Journal ofAutism and
Developmental Disorders, 25, 415-433.
Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B.F. & Rogers, S.J. (1991). Executive function deficits
in high functioning autistic individuals: Relationship to theory of mind.
Journal ofChild Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 1081-1105.
Ozonoff, S., Rogers, S.J., & Pennington, B.F. (1991). Asperger's syndrome:
Evidence of an empirical distinction from high functioning autism.
Journal ofChild Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 1107-1122.
Ozonoff, S., & Strayer, D. L. (1997). Inhibitory function in nonretarded children
with autism. Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders, 27, 59-77.
Pellicano, E., Maybery, M., & Durkin, K. (2005). Central coherence in typically
developing preschoolers: does it cohere and is it related to mindreading
and executive control? Journal ofChild Psychology and Psychiatry, 46,
533-547.
219
Pemer, J., Frith, U., Leslie, A. M., & Leekam, S. (1989). Exploration of the
autistic child's theory of mind: knowledge, belief, and communication.
Child Development, 60, 689-700.
Phillips, W., Baron-Cohen, S., & Rutter, M. (1998). Understanding intention in
normal development and in autism. British Journal ofDevelopmental
Psychology, 16,337-348.
Plaisted, K., Swettenham, J., & Rees, L. (1999). Children with autism show local
precedence in a divided attention task and global precedence in a selective
attention task. Journal ofChild Psychology and Psychiatry, 40, 733-742.
Plaisted, K., O'Riordan, M., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1998). Enhanced visual search
for a conjunctive task in autism: A research note. Journal ofChild
Psychology and Psychiatry, 39, 777-783.
Pratto, F. & John, O.P., (1991). Automatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing
power ofnegative social information. Journal ofPersonality and Social
Psychology, 61, 380-391.
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of
mind? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515-526.
Prior, M., Dahlstrom, T. L. & Squires, T. L. (1990). Autistic children's
knowledge of thinking and feeling states in other people. Journal ofChild
Psychology and Psychiatry, 31, 587-601.
Quill, K. A., (1997). Instructional considerations for young children with autism:
The rationale for visually cued instructions. Journal ofAutism and
Developmental Disorders, ] 7, 697-714.
220
Rahman, R. A., Sommer, W., & Olada, E. (2004). I recognize your face but I
can't remember your name: A question of expertise? The Quarterly
Journal ofExperimental Psychology, 57, 819-834.
Rajendran, J., & Mitchell, P. (2007). Cognitive theories of autism. Developmental
Review, doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2007.02.001
Rapacholi, B. M., & Gopnik, A. (1997). Early reasoning about desires: Evidence
from 14- and 18-month olds. Developmental Psychology, 33, 12-21.
Rinehart, N. J., Bradshaw, J. L., Moss, S. A., Brereton, A. V., & Tonge, B. J.
(2000). Atypical interference on local detail on global processing in high
functioning autism and Asperger's syndrome. Journal ofChild
Psychology and Psychiatry, 41, 769-778.
Rinehart, N. J., Bradshaw, J. L., Brereton, A. V., & Tonge, B. J. (2001).
Movement preparation in high-functioning autism and asperger's
syndrome: A serial choice reaction time task involving motor
reprogramming. Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders, 31, 79-
88.
Rimland, B. (1964). Infantile autism: The syndrome and its implications for a
neural theory ofbehavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Rodier, P. M., & Hyman, S. L. (1998). Early environmental factors in autism.
Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews, 4,
121-128.
Romando, N., & Milech, D. (1984). The nature and specificity of language coding
deficit in autistic children. British Journal ofPsychology, 75, 95-103.
221
Ropar, D., & Mitchell, P. (1999). Are individuals with autism and Asperger's
syndrome susceptible to visual illusions? Journal ofChild Psychology and
Psychiatry, 40, 1283-1293.
Ropar, D., & Mitchell, P. (2001). Susceptibility to illusions and performance on
visuo-spatial tasks in individuals with autism. Journal ofChild Psychology
and Psychiatry, 42, 539-549.
Rosati, A. D., Knowles, E. D., Kalish, C. W., Gopnik, A., Ames, D. R., & Morris,
M. W. (2001). The rocky road from acts to dispositions: Insight for
attribution theory from developmental research on theory of mind. In B. F.
Malle., L. J. Moses., & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and
Intentionality: Foundations ofsocia I cognition (pp 287-303). London:
Bradford books/MIT Press.
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in
the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology (Volume 10, pp. 173-240), Orlando, FL: Academic
Press.
Russell, J., & Hill, E. L. (2001). Action-monitoring and intention reporting in
children with autism. Journal ofChild Psychology and Psychiatry, 42,
317-328.
Russell, J., Mauthner, N., Sharpe, S., & Tidswell, T. (1991). The 'windows task'
as a measure of strategic deception in preschoolers and autistic subjects.
British Journal ofDevelopmental Psychology, 9, 331-349.
Rutter, M. (1978). Diagnosis and definition of childhood autism. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders. 8, 139-161.
222
Rutter, M. (2003). Introduction: autism - the challenges ahead. In G. Bock & J.
Goode (Eds.), Novartis Foundation Symposium on Autism: Neural basis
and treatment possibilities (pp. 1-9). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Sacks, O. (1995). An anthropologist on mars. London: Picador.
Scanlan, C. S., & Johnston, R. A. (1997). I recognize your face but I can't
remember your name: A grown up explanation. The Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 50, 183-198.
Shah, A., & Frith, U. (1983). An islet of ability in autistic children: A research
note. Journal ofChild Psychology and Psychiatry, 24, 613-620.
Shah, A., & Frith, U. (1993). Why do autistic individuals show superior
performance on the block design task? Journal ofChild Psychology and
Psychiatry, 34, 1351-1364.
Sigman, M., Mundy, P., Ungerer, J., & Sherman, T. (1986). Social interactions of
autistic, mentally retarded, and normal children and their caregivers.
Journal ofChild Psychology and Psychiatry, 27, 647-656.
Skuse, D. (2003). X-linked genes and the neural basis of social cognition. In G.
Bock & J. Goode (Eds.), Novartis Foundation Symposium on Autism:
Neural basis and treatment possibilities (pp. 84-97). Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons.
Skuse, D.,Warrington, R., Bishop, D., Chowdhury, U., Lau,J., Mandy, W., &
Place, M. (2004) The developmental, dimensional and diagnostic
interview (3di): a novel computerized assessment for autism spectrum
disorders. Journal ofthe American Academy ofChild and Adolescent
Psychiatry, 43, 548 -558.
-.,.., ....
--oJ
Szatmari, P., Jones, M. B., Zwaigenbaum, L., & MacLean, J. E (1998). Genetics
of autism: Overview and new directions. Journal ofAutism and
Developmental Disorders, 28, 351-368.
Semin, G, R., & Fiedler, K. (1991). The linguistic category model, its bases,
applications and range. European Review ofSocial Psychology, 2, 1-30.
Skuse, D., Warrington, R., Bishop, D. V. M., Chowdhury, D., Mandy, W., &
Place, M. (2004). The Developmental, Diagnostic and Dimensional
Interview (3di): a novel computerised assessment for autistic spectrum
disorders. Journal ofthe American Academy ofChild and Adolescent
Psychiatry, 43, 548-558.
Snowling, M., & Frith, D. (1986). Comprehension in hyperlexic readers. Journal
ofExperimental Child Psychology, 42, 392-415.
Tager-Flusberg, H. (1991). Semantic processing in free recall of autistic children:
Further evidence for a cognitive deficit. British Journal ofDevelopmental
Psychology, 9, 417-430.
Tager-Flusberg, H. (1992). Autistic children's talk about psychological states:
Deficits in early acquisition of a theory of mind. Child Development, 63,
161-172.
Tager-Flusberg, H., & Sullivan, K. (1994). Predicting and explaining behavior: A
comparison of autistic, mentally retarded and normal children. Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 35, 1059-1075.
Tan, J., and Harris, P. L. (1991). Autistic children understand seeing and wanting.
Devlopmental Psychopathogy, 3, 163-174.
224
Todorov, A., & Uleman, J. S. (2004). The person reference process in
spontaneous trait inference. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology.
87, 482-493.
Toichi, M., & Kamio, Y. (2001). Verbal association for simple common words in
high functioning autism. Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders,
31, 483-490.
Trope, Y. (1986). Identification and Inferential Processes in Dispositional
Attribution. Psychological Review, 93, 239-257.
Tuchman, R., & Rapin, I. (2002). Epilepsy in autism. The Lancet Neurology, 1,
352-358.
Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval
processes in episodic memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352-373.
Uleman, J. S. (1988). [Trait inference norms]. Unpublished raw data. New York
University, New York.
Uleman, J.S. (1999). Spontaneous versus intentional inferences in impression
formation. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.). Dual-process theories in
social psychology (pp. 141-160). New York: Guilford.
Uleman, J.S., Hon, A., Roman, R.J., & Moskowitz, G.B. (1996). On-line evidence
for spontaneous trait inference at encoding. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 22, 377-394.
Uleman, J. S., Newman, L.S., & Moskowitz, G.B. (1996). People as flexible
interpreters: Evidence and issues from spontaneous trait inference.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 28, 211-279.
Wellman, H. M. (1990). The child's theory ofmind. London: Bradford books/MIT
Press.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of mind
development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655-
684.
Wellman, H. M., & Woolley, J. D. (1990). From simple desires to ordinary
beliefs: The early development of everyday psychology. Cognition, 35,
245-275.
Whaley, C. P. (1978). Word-nonword classification time. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17, 143-154.
Williams, E. (2004). Who really needs a theory of mind? Theory and Psychology,
14, 704-724.
Williams D. L., Goldstein. G., & Minshew N. J. (2005). Impaired memory for
faces and social scenes in autism: Clinical implications of the memory
disorder. Archives ofClinical Neuropsychology. 20, 1-15.
Wimmer, H., & Pemer, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and
constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding
of deception. Cognition, 13, 103-128.
Wing, L. (1981), "Asperger's syndrome: A clinical account". Psychological
Medicine, 11, 115-130.
Wing, L., & Gould, G. (1979). Severe impairments of social interaction and
associated abnormalities in children: Epidemiology and classification.
Journal ofAutism and Developmental Disorders, 9, 11-29.
226
Winter, L., & Uleman, J. S. (1984). When are social judgements made? Evidence
for the spontaneousness of trait inferences. Journal ofPersonality and
Social Psychology, 47,237-252.
Winter, L., Uleman, J. S., & Cunniff, C. (1985). How automatic are social
judgments. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 49, 904-917
Woodruff, G., & Premack, D. (1979). Intentional communication in the
chimpanzee: The development of deception. Cognition, 7,333-362.
Woolfe, T., Want, S.C. & Siegal, M. (2002). Signposts to development: theory of
mind in deaf children. Child Development, 73, 768-778.
World Health Organisation (1977). International Classification ofDiseases (9th
edition). WHO Press.
World Health Organisation (1994). International Classification ofDiseases (l dh
edition). WHO Press.
Young, A. W., Hay, D. C., & Ellis, A. W. (1985). The faces that launched a
thousand slips: Everyday difficulties and errors in recognizing people.
British Journal ofPsychology, 76, 495-523.
Yuill, N. (1992). Children's production and comprehension of trait terms. British
Journal ofDevelopmental Psychology, 10, 131-142.
Yuill, N., & Pearson, A. (1998). The development of bases for trait attribution:
Children's understanding of traits as causal mechanisms based on desire.
Developmental Psychology, 34, 574-586.
Zelazo, P. D., Jacques, S., Burack, J. A., & Frye, D. (2002). The relationship
between theory of mind and rule use: Evidence from persons with autism
spectrum disorders. Infant and Child Development, 11. 171-195.
227
Appendix A
Diagnostic criteria for Autistic Disorder/Childhood autism
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental disorders (4th edition, Text Revision)
A. A total of six (or more) items from (1), (2), and (3), with at least two from (1),
and one each from (2) and (3):
(1) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of
the following:
(a) marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-
eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social
interaction
(b) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level
(c) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements
with other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of
interest)
(d) lack of social or emotional reciprocity
(2) qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one of the
following:
(a) delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not
accompanied by an attempt to compensate through alternative modes of
communication such as gesture or mime)
(b) in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to
initiate or sustain a conversation with others
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(c) stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language
(d) lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play
appropriate to developmental level
(3) restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns ofbehavior, interests, and
activities, as manifested by at least one of the following:
(a) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted
patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus
(b) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals
(c) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or
twisting, or complex whole-body movements)
(d) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects
B. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with
onset prior to age 3 years: (1) social interaction, (2) language as used in social
communication, or (3) SYmbolic or imaginative play.
C. The disturbance is not better accounted for by Rett's Disorder or Childhood
Disintegrative Disorder.
International Classification of Diseases (10th edition)
At least 8 of the 16 specified items must be fulfilled.
a. Qualitative impairments in reciprocal social interaction, as manifested by at
least three of the following five:
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1. failure adequately to use eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body posture and
gesture to regulate social interaction.
2. failure to develop peer relationships.
3. rarely seeking and using other people for comfort and affection at times of
stress or distress and/or offering comfort and affection to others when they are
showing distress or unhappiness.
4. lack of shared enjoyment in terms of vicarious pleasure in other peoples'
happiness and/or spontaneous seeking to share their own enjoyment through joint
involvement with others.
5. lack of socio-emotional reciprocity.
b. Qualitative impairments in communication:
1. lack of social usage of whatever language skills are present.
2. impairment in make-believe and social imitative play.
3. poor synchrony and lack of reciprocity in conversational interchange.
4. poor flexibility in language expression and a relative lack of creativity and
fantasy in thought processes.
5. lack of emotional response to other peoples' verbal and non-verbal overtures.
6. impaired use of variations in cadence or emphasis to reflect communicative
modulation.
7. lack of accompanYing gesture to provide emphasis or aid meaning in spoken
communication.
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c. Restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns ofbehaviour, interests and
activities, as manifested by ate least two of the following six:
1. encompassing preoccupation with stereotyped and restricted patterns of
interest.
2. specific attachments to unusual objects.
3. apparently compulsive adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals.
4. stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms.
5. preoccupations with part-objects or non-functional elements of play material.
6. distress over changes in small, non-functional details of the environment.
d. Developmental abnormalities must have been present in the first three years for
the diagnosis to be made.
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Appendix B
Table Bl
Experimental stimuli used in experiment 1 (Pilot Test 1). The numbers in the
bracket are the frequency/syllable count/word length.
Sentences Trait cue Distracter Semantic Distracter
(Trait) cue (Semantic)
He won first prize in the clever full question keyboard
countrywide high school (292/2/6) (300/1/4) (19/2/8) (19/2/8)
general knowledge quiz.
He defeated the world boxing strong fair gloves church
champion in the very first (224/1/6) (230/1/4/) (49/1/6) (49/1/6)
round.
He tripped on the bearskin rug clumsy extra floor lion
and twisted his ankle. (41/2/6) (41/2/5) (314/1/5) (314/2/4)
He picked out the best selfish deepest milk years
chocolates for himself before (3/2/7) (3/2/7) (289/1/4) (289/1/5)
the guests arrived.
He told the cashier that he was honest central money paper
given too much change. (14/2/6) (14/2/7) (365/2/5) (365/2/5)
He invited his new neighbour to friendly cracked cup ship
his house for tea. (38/2/8) (38/1/7) (216/1/3) (214,1/4)
He dusted and vacuumed his tidy damp rooms pocket
house everyday. (62/1/4) (59/1/4) (78/1/5) (782 6)
I
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He took the garbage out on the forgetful thinner dustbin torch
wrong day. (14/3/10) (14/2/7) (87) (87/1/5)
He laid around the house all day lazy darker channel battery
watching television. (16/2/4) (16/2/6) (16/2/7) (14/3/7)
He could not bring himself to shy furry hello job
greet his new classmate. (32/1/3) (32/2/5) (292/2/5) (292/1/3)
He always drove a little slower careful nearby wheel soup
than the speed limit. (68/2/7) (68/2/6) (51/1/5) (51/1/4)
He scored a 100 percent in his clever full numbers SCIssors
maths A level. (292/2/6) (300/1/4) (16/2/7) (16/2/8)
He carried the heavy stereo with strong fair mUSIC toys
one hand Up three floors. (224/1/6) (230/1/4/) (122/2/5) (127/1/4)
He bumped into the closet door clumsy extra face pond
and hurt his nose. (41/2/6) (41/2/5) (262/1/5) (268/1/4)
He would not share the biscuits selfish deepest tea eyes
with his brother. (3/2/7) (3/2/7) (503/1/3) (498/1/4)
He told the teacher that he broke honest central glass frog
the window. (14/2/6) (14/2/7) (211/1/5) (211/1/4)
He chatted with the stranger friendly cracked ticket sweater
next to him on the bus. (38/2/8) (38/1/7) (11/2/6) (22/2/7)
He was always seen in a tidy damp collar knife
spotless and well ironed shirt. (62/1/4) (59/1/4) (11/2/6) (1111/5)
23.+
He left his groceries on the bus forgetful thinner shop grass
when he got off. (14/3/10) (14/2/7) (311/1/4) (306/1/5)
He drove to the bakery just half lazy darker bread forest
a block away. (16/2/4) (16/2/6) (224/1/5) (227/2/6)
He sat quietly in a comer at the shy furry birthday rainbow
party. (32/1/3) (32/2/5) (233/2/8) (230/2/7)
He double checked that all the careful nearby keys pizza
doors and windows were locked (68/2/7) (68/2/6) (58/1/4) (68/2/5)
before leaving home.
Note: Both forms of the experiment contained all the 22 sentences but the cues
were different. The cues in red were used in one form and the cues in blue in the
other. Each cue was matched for frequency, syllable and word length with its
distracter. The frequency was based on Children's printed word database (Version
1.3, 2002), available online. The semantic cues were taken from the Edinburgh
Associative Thesaurus, available online.
Appendix C
Table Cl
Experimental stimuli used in experiment 1 (Pilot Test 2) and experiment 2. The
numbers in the bracket are the frequency/syllable count/word length.
Sentences Trait cue Distracter Semantic Distracter
(Trait) cue (Semantic)
He won first prize in the high clever full question SCIssors
school quiz competition. (292/2/6) (300/1/4) (19/2/8) (16/2/8)
He gets the first rank in his class
examinations every year.
He carried the office chair with strong fair gloves bead
just one hand up three floors. (224/1/6) (230/1/4) (49/1/6) (3/1/4)
He defeated the world boxing
champion in the very first
round.
He slipped on the bearskin rug clumsy extra mat fan
and twisted his ankle. (41/2/6) (41/2/5) (32/1/3) (32/1/3)
He bumped into the cupboard
door and hurt his nose.
He picked out the best biscuits greedy useful tea eyes
for himself before the guests (76/2/6) (73/2/6) (503/1/3) (498/1/4)
arrived.
He ate all the scones without
leaving any for his younger ,
brother.
He took the sick puppy that he kind deep pills coms
found on the road to his house. (192/1/4) (187/1/4) (3/1/5) (5/1/5)
He took some hot dinner to his
ill neighbour.
He invited the newcomers to his friendly cracked cup ship
house for coffee. (38/2/8) (38/1/7) (216/1/3) (214/1/4)
He smiled and said hello to
everyone at the tea party.
He dusted and vacuumed his tidy frozen night car
house every morning. (62/1/4) (65/2/6) (725/1/5) (714/1/3)
He wore a spotless and well
ironed shirt each day.
He left his mobile phone on the forgetful thinner food fox
shelf in the supermarket. (14/3/10) (14/2/7) (925/1/4) (919/1/3)
He left his bag of groceries on
the bus.
He drove to the park that was lazy itchy garden town
just half a block away. (16/2/4) (16/2/5) (663/2/6) (681/1/4)
He laid around the house all day
watching television.
Y' 6
-.)
He could not bring himself to shy furry teacher I country
greet his new class mate. (32/1/3) (32/2/5) (249/217) (249 2 7)
He sat alone in a comer at his
school Christmas party.
He always drove a little below careful mixed road bag
the speed limit. (68/217) (68/1/5) (398/1/4) (393/1/3)
He checked that everyone's
seatbelts were fastened before
starting the car.
Note: Both forms of the experiment contained all the 22 sentences but the cues
were different. The first sentence of each sentence pair was presented with the
trait cue and the second with the semantic associate cue in form 1. In form 2 it
was the opposite. Each cue was matched for frequency, syllable and word length
with its distracter. The frequency was based on Children's printed word database
(Version 1.3, 2002), available online. The semantic cues were taken from the
Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus, available online.
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Appendix D
Experimental stimuli used in experiments 3 and 4.
Table Dl
Trait implying sentences and their corresponding neutral sentences and semantic
associate cues. The numbers in the bracket are the frequency/syllable count/word
length.
Trait implying Neutral Semantic Distracter
He smiled and said hello to He met all his friends at cup bus
everyone at the tea party. the tea party. (216/1/3) (219/1/3)
He told the teacher that he He was asked by the curtain shirt
broke the window. teachers to close the (32/2/7) (32/1/5)
window.
He takes the bus to the park He goes to play in the park SWIng kitten
that is just two streets away. at the end of his street. (108/1/5) (105/2/6)
He checked that everyone's He removed his seatbelt road sound
seatbelts were fastened and got out of the car. (398/1/4) (419/1/5)
before starting the car.
He defeated the world He watched the world gloves chicks
boxing champion in the very boxing championship on (49/1/6) (49/1/6)
first round. television. I!
i
He did not offer his seat to He sat next to an old lady ticket cookie
the old lady on the crowded on the bus. (11/2/6) (11/2/6)
bus.
239
He took the sick puppy that He found his puppy sick pills corns j
he found on the road to his when he reached his house. (3/1/5) (5/1/5)
house.
He slipped on the blue rug He rolled up the blue rug colour page
and twisted his ankle. that was in the hall. (70/2/6) (70/1/4)
He picked out the best He had chocolate cake for milk nose
chocolates for himself at the dessert at the party. (289/1/4) (297/1/4)
party.
He gets the first rank in his He sat down to write the questions engines
class exams every year. first exam of the year. (32/2/9) (32/2/7)
He dusted and vacuumed his He dusted and vacuumed garden king
house every morning. his house for the party. (663/2/6) (698/1/4)
He sat alone in a comer at He placed the tree in a teacher country
the school Christmas party. comer for the school (249/2/7 (249/2/7)
Christmas party.
Table D2
Trait implying sentences with trait and action cues. The numbers in the bracket
are the frequency/syllable count/word length.
Trait implying Trait Distracter Action Distracter
13 He called the newcomers to friendly powerful invited boiled
his house for dinner. (38/2/8) (38/3/8) (27/3/7) (27/1/6)
2..+0
14 He did not wipe off the messy bossy spill I bend
sauce he dropped on his (11/2/5) (8/2/5) (14/1/4) . (22 1 4)
shirt.
15 He just sat in front of the lazy cruel watched pushed
television the whole day (16/2/4) (19/1/5) (22/1/7) (219/116)
long.
16 He always drove a little careful brilliant slowly working
below the speed limit. (68/2/7) (92/2/9) (203/2/6) (208/2/7)
17 He carried the office chair strong clean climbed flew
with just one hand up three (224/1/6) (276/1/5) (373/1/7) (368/1/4)
floors.
18 He left the dinner party rude fussy went like
without thanking the (16/1/4) (22/2/5) (3678/1/4) (3578/1/4)
hostess.
19 He took some hot dinner to kind brave visited leaped
his ill neighbour. (192/1/4) (211/1/5) (11/3/7) (11/1/6)
20 He bumped into the clumsy cheeky hurt threw
cupboard door and hit his (41/2/6) (22/2/6) (160/1/4) (160/1/5)
nose.
21 He ate all the scones greedy nasty finished decided
without leaving any for his (976/2/6) (116/2/5) (157/2/8) (1573 7)
I
younger brother.
-_.-
2-+1
22 He usually got all the clever funny solved burnt
answers correct in the math (292/2/6) (379/2/5) (19/1/5) (19/1./5)
class.
i
23 He wore a spotless and well tidy proud dressed lifted
ironed shirt each day. (62/2/4) (65/1/5) (62/117) (62/3/6)
24 He looked at the floor when shy crazy greeted crawl
he said hello to his new (16/1/3) (16/2/5) (5/217) (16/1/5)
classmate
Note: Both forms of the experiment contained 24 sentences, six each from the
following four sentence-cue pairs; trait implying sentence-semantic associate cue
pair, neutral sentence-semantic cue pair, trait implying sentence-trait cue pair and
trait implying sentence-action cue pair. All the semantic associate cues, presented
in table Cl were presented in both forms but in one form only the sentences in red
was used and in the other only the sentences in blue. All eleven sentences in table
C2 were presented in both forms. But in one form the cues in red were presented
and in the other the cues in blue. Each cue was matched for frequency, syllable
and word length with its distracter. The frequency was based on Children's
printed word database (Version 1.3, 2002), available online. The semantic cues
were taken from the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus, available online.
Appendix E
Experimental stimuli used in experiment 5
Table El
Trait implying sentences and their corresponding neutral sentences and action
cues
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Trait implying Neutral Action Distracter
He called the new neighbours He was called for dinner invited poured
to his house for dinner. at his friend's new house.
He dusted and vacuumed his He dusted and vacuumed cleaned folded
house every morning. the house for the party.
He took the old lady's bag of He took his bag of carried increased
groceries to her car. groceries to the car.
He left the dinner party He left for the dinner leave tell
without thanking the hostess. party with his friend.
He sat in front of the He sat in front of the watched spread
television the whole day long. television for the football
match.
He started off in his car He started off in his car drive hear
without wearing his seatbelt. for his work place.
He took some hot dinner to He went over to his visited choose
his ill neighbour. neighbour's house in the
evening.
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He told the teacher that he He told the teacher about reported appeared
broke the window. the window that was stuck
He usually gets the correct He looked whether the solve packed
answers in the math class. answers he got in the math
class were right.
He finished the scones He was so hungry he ate bend
without leaving any for his finished off all the scones.
younger brother.
He was often seen looking He looked for a good car search faced
around for his car keys. deal on the net.
He looked at the floor when He went over to say hello greeted assist
he said hello to his new to his mate at the party.
classmate.
Table E2
Trait implying sentences and their corresponding neutral sentences and semantic
associate cues
Trait implying Neutral Semantic Distracter
He smiled and said hello to He met all his class cup dog
everyone at the tea party. mates at the tea party.
He wore a spotless and well He spotted a nice shirt at night car
ironed shirt each day. the shop the other day.
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He spent many hours showing He had to spend an hour clock pound
his cousin how to use his new waiting for his new
computer. computer to be delivered.
He did not offer his seat to the He sat next to an old lady ticket forests
old lady on the crowded bus. on the crowded bus.
He drove to the park that was He goes to P.illY in the swmg guitar
just at the end of his street. park that is at the end of
his street.
He forgot to check whether He went to shut the curtain apples
the widows were shut before window because the
leaving the house. room was getting cold.
He took the sick puppy he He found his puppy sick pills beans
found on the road to his when he reached his
house. house.
He returned the lost wallet He returned the damaged pocket birds
with all the money in it. wallet back to the store.
He gets the first rank in his He sat down to write his questions months
class exams every year. first exam for the year.
He picked out the best biscuits He picked up some tea mail
for himself before the guests biscuits to have in the
arrived. evening.
He left his mobile phone on He topped up his mobile food college
the shelf in the supennarket. phone at the
I
2.+5
supermarket.
He sat alone in a comer at the He placed the tree in the teacher coffee
school Christmas party. comer for the school
Christmas party.
Note: Both forms of the experiment contained 24 sentences, six each from the
following four sentence-cue pairs; trait implying sentence-semantic associate cue
pair, neutral sentence-semantic associate cue pair, trait implying sentence-action
cue pair and neutral sentence-action cue pair. In one form the sentences in red
were presented and in the other the sentences in blue. Each cue was matched for
frequency, syllable and word length with its distracter. The frequency was based
on MRC Psycholinguistic Database (1987). The semantic cues were taken from
the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus. Both are available free on the internet.
Appendix F
Experimental stimuli used in experiments 6 and 7
Table Fl: Facts, fact implying sentences and face stimuli
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Fact implying
sentence
Fact Actor Fact implying
sentence
Fact Actor
This is Charles who
carried the lunch
ordered by the
customer to their table.
This is George who
checked the soup
packet to make sure
that it does not contain
any meat.
waiter
vegetarian
This is Thomas who student
doe s a full time
course at the local
college.
This is Edward who actor
plays the role of
Romeo in 'Romeo
and Juliet'.
This is Ben who does
not ever smoke a
cigarette or a pipe.
This is Robert who
cannot hear much even
with his hearing aid.
This is Andrew who
went to bed with a sore
throat and a bad cold.
non-
smoker
deaf
sick
This is Fred who
has to bend down to
enter most door s.
This is David who
did not have an
umbrella and had to
walk home in the
ram.
Th is is Mathew
who can afford to
buy only from sale s
at charity shops.
tall
wet
poor
This is Harry who
came over from
Au stralia to work here .
fore igner This is Jack who
has a two year old
son.
father
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Table F2: Traits, trait impl yin g sentences and face stimuli used
Trait Trait
This is Ross who clever This is Mike who friendl y
usually gets the correct smiled and said
answers in the math hello to everyone at
class. the party.
This is Neil who is daring Thi s is Paul who confident
going to learn was cool standing
skydiving over the in front of the huge
summer holidays. crowd and giving
his speech.
This is Victor who determined This is Gordon who careful
ignored his injurie s always drove a
and completed the little slower than
race . the speed limit.
Thi s is Carl who impulsive This is John who ignorant
suddenly decided to go doe s not know who
away for the wee kend. the current
Ame rican pre ident
IS .
2.+
This is Duncan who shy This is Walter who forgetful
sat alone in a comer at left his bag of
the party. groceries on the
bus .
This is Bill who sat in lazy This is Pat who careless
front of the television made many errors
the whole day long. do ing math
problems he kne w
how to do.
Table E3 : Trait and fact implying sentences presented with names
This is Alex whose Alex This is James who James
jokes make everyone took the sick puppy
laugh so hard the y he found on the
hold their sides. roa d to his hou se.
This is Steve who Ste ve Thi s is Dick who Dick
watches his re fused to eat the
-
~ ..
neighbour's hou se to peas that had gotten
see who comes and into his gravy .
goes.
Thi s is Mart in who Martin This is Henry who Henry
picked out the best did not offer his
b iscu its for himself eat to the old lady
be fore the guests on the crowded
arrived . bus..
This is Peter who Peter This is Nick who Nick
bought the plane in for works at the local
a smooth landing. salon cutt ing hair.
This is Ian who owns Ian This is Sam who Sam
two mansions and weighs about ten
many cars. stone.
This is Larry who was Larry Thi s is Will who is w.u
born and bought up in about four and a
Edinbugh. half feet tall.
2.+9
